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INTRODUCTION

Questions about procedural justice are remarkably persistent. From the
Court of Star Chamber in the fourteenth century1 to Guantanamo Bay in the
twenty-first,2 the common law tradition is no stranger to the notion that
procedural rights may be sacrificed on the altar of substantive advantage.
Legal sophisticates will hardly be surprised to learn that academics in the
utilitarian tradition have argued that procedural fairness can be reduced to
1. See CORA LOUISE SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (Burt Franklin ed.,
1969) (1900) (finding references to Star Chamber as early as 1356); William Hudson, A Treatise of the
Court of Star Chamber, in COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 1 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1980) (1792) (stating that
Star Chamber dates from the twelfth century reign of Henry II). For more information on the Court of
Star Chamber, see Frank Riebli, Note, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English
Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807
(2002).
2. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004); K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive
Policy Toward Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
662 (2003); Michael Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive
Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (2003).
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the calculation of costs and benefits,3 including, perhaps, a taste for
participation.4 Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have
suggested that the most basic procedural rights, notice and an opportunity
to be heard, may be denied if the balance of interests does not favor them.5
But the ascendancy of consequentialist reasoning in the courts and the
academy has not laid the question of procedural justice to rest. Whenever
life, liberty, or property is taken without affording the affected individual a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, the
cry of procedural unfairness is heard. The thesis of this Article is that such
cries are grounded in reason as well as passion. While procedural justice is
concerned with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of adjudication, it is
not solely concerned with those costs and benefits. Rather, procedural
justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that
guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for
the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms. Meaningful
participation requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and it requires a
reasonable balance between cost and accuracy.
My case for these simple and intuitively plausible claims is elaborated
in the form of a theory of procedural justice for a system of civil dispute
resolution. It is a commonplace of procedure scholarship to observe that
theories of procedural justice are “thinly developed.”6 My aim is to begin
the process of remedying this defect by providing a fully articulated and
defended theory of procedural justice for a system of civil adjudication.
A. WHERE TO BEGIN? EX ANTE AND EX POST PERSPECTIVES
Where can we begin? We need a point of entry into the question,
“What makes a procedure just?” One obvious way to approach this
3. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow, The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307 (1994)
[hereinafter Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication].
4. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in MassExposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996).
5. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976) (using a balancing approach to
resolve the question of whether the denial of an opportunity to be heard violates due process); Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950) (using a balancing approach to
resolve the question of whether due process requires notice of a proceeding).
6. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2003). See also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at
228 n.6 (noting the lack of developed theories of procedural justice); Jon O. Newman, Rethinking
Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646–47 (1985) (noting that
fairness arguments about procedure are limited and narrow).
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question is to take up the ex post perspective.7 Imagine that a legal
proceeding is complete and a final judgment has been entered. From the ex
post perspective, we care about the outcomes of civil proceedings. Some
outcomes are substantively just; others are unjust on the merits. Some
judgments are legally correct; others are in error. Some findings of fact are
true; others are false. We want outcomes that are substantively just,
judgments that are legally correct, and findings that are factually true.
What then about procedures? Do they matter and, if so, why? Without
further reflection, one might be attracted to the view that, while outcomes
matter in a deep way, procedures do not. What real difference does a
supposedly fair procedure make, we might ask, if it results in an unjust
outcome? What solace can procedural justice be to someone who has
suffered a substantive wrong?8 Posing the questions in this manner
suggests an answer: only substantive outcomes really count and only
substantive rules or their application can truly be said to be just or unjust.
This answer deflates the claims of procedural fairness and cautions against
“the ugly spectre of procedural rights.”9 The implication of this conclusion
is that the very notion of procedural justice as an independent criterion of
fairness is empty.
Even if we were to accept this deflationary view of procedural justice
as our starting point, it would not follow that procedures are unimportant. If
we begin with criteria for a just outcome, then it follows that our system of
dispute resolution should be designed to decide controversies in accord
with these criteria. From the bare premise that outcomes count from the ex
post perspective, we can derive a minimal notion of procedural justice. A
perfectly just procedure would guarantee correct outcomes; a procedure
would be more or less fair or just insofar as it approximates this ideal. If we
take the rules of substantive law (torts, contracts, property, and so forth) as
applied to the facts (the state of the world) as the criteria for just outcomes,
7. See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997)
(distinguishing between the ex post and ex ante perspectives on procedural justice).
8. Alice Kaswan provides a very clear example of this sort of argument:
If the issue is framed as one of “procedural justice,” then decision-makers might argue that
they have solved the “fair treatment” problem through the creation of procedures that ensure
participation of all groups in decision-making processes. It is not clear, however, that
procedural requirements enhancing public participation will necessarily lead to substantive
decisions that are more responsive to public opinion. While enhancing participation
procedures to equalize opportunities is an important step in creating the preconditions for
political justice, it provides no guarantee that the substantive decision will embody political
justice.
Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1046–47 (2003).
9. Randy E. Barnett, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market”: Comment, 3 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 427, 427 (1979).
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then the ideal procedure would discern the truth about the facts and apply
the law to those facts with 100% accuracy. From the modest premise that
outcomes matter, we can derive the view that procedural justice is a
function of accuracy.
There are, however, obvious problems with this simple theory. Even
from the ex post perspective, formal legal outcomes, such as judgments for
plaintiffs and defendants, are not the only effects of adjudication. Dispute
resolution systems impose costs on the parties to the dispute and on society
at large. If we enlarge our view of outcomes to encompass all of the costs
and benefits imposed by the litigation system, then our view of procedural
justice will be enlarged as well. An outcome that includes a damage award
that reflects an accurate application of the substantive law to the facts
might nonetheless be unjust if the plaintiff who was entitled to prevail had
to pay more in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment. A dispute
resolution system that achieved 100% accuracy would be viewed as
monstrously unfair if it required each disputant to devote her entire life to a
painstaking process of fact-finding and consumed the great bulk of the
social product to finance the enterprise.10 The addition of these
uncontroversial premises to our modest assumption that outcomes matter
yields the conclusion that even from the ex post perspective a fair
procedure must, at a minimum, strike a fair or reasonable balance between
the benefits of accurate outcomes and the costs imposed by the system of
procedures.11
Procedural perfection is unattainable. No conceivable system of
procedure can guarantee perfect accuracy. Approaching procedural
perfection is unaffordable because a system that achieved the highest
10. Henry Friendly makes the point well:
It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources,
that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and that the expense of protecting those
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving.
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1975).
11. The claim made in the text requires qualification. It might be argued that the costs of
accuracy (and, for reasons that are established below, the value of participation, see infra Part V) are
external to the concept of procedural justice. On this view, procedural fairness is one thing and the costs
of procedure quite another. For an analagous argument in the context of distributive justice, see G.A.
Cohen, Rescuing Justice from Constructivism, at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1534/JDG/cohen2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004). The assumption underlying this argument is that procedural justice should answer
to the morally relevant properties that are internal to procedure. Morally relevant properties external to
procedure may well be relevant to the question of what should be done, all things considered, but are
outside the domain of procedural justice. Even on this view, however, it could be argued that procedural
systems impose direct costs that are properly considered as internal to procedure. Such direct costs
include, for example, the monetary and nonmonetary cost of participation in the procedural system—
time spent, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and so forth.
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possible degree of accuracy would be intolerably costly. Even the
application of an elaborate system of error-correction mechanisms (for
example, a system with motions for a new trial, appeals, and, for some
types of errors, collateral attacks) would result in many cases with
substantively unjust outcomes—lawsuits in which fact-finding went awry
or the applicable rule of law was not correctly identified. Litigants
themselves make procedural mistakes that thwart their own substantive
rights. And litigants are bound by erroneous judgments that are truly final,
beyond all further correction of mistake. This is a fact about procedure in
the actual world, which we might call the fact of irreducible procedural
error.
So far, our view of procedural fairness has been entirely ex post. This
view, however, is incomplete for many reasons, not the least of which is
the fact that final judgments are not the end of the story. From the ex ante
perspective, the role of law is to provide a mechanism for the coordination
of human conduct. Substantive rules of law define rights and
responsibilities that provide reasons for action. Property law tells us who
has what dominion over which resources. Tort and criminal law define our
obligations toward others. Contract law enables us to create and enforce
new obligations. Law is action guiding. From the ex post point of view,
however, it appears that the action-guiding work of law is done by
substance and not by procedure. Is that conclusion correct?
To test the adequacy of the ex post view of procedural fairness, we
need to ask the following question: can the substantive law perform its
action-guiding function without the aid of procedure? Given certain
idealizing (counterfactual) assumptions, the answer to this question would
be yes. Were we to assume (a) that citizens have perfect information about
the state of the world and the content of the law, (b) that the content of the
law is fully specified, and (c) that each and every citizen viewed the law
and the facts impartially, then the rules of substantive law could perform
their action-guiding function without the aid of a system of procedure. In
the actual world, however, none of these three idealizing assumptions holds
true. Instead, the actual world is characterized by three problems of
compliance with substantive legal norms: (1) the problem of imperfect
knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of
legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality.12 Notice that these three
12. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998) (discussing analagous
problems of knowledge, interest, and power).
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problems would exist even if citizens saw themselves as obligated by the
content of the substantive legal norms.
Each of these three problems requires a few words of explanation.
How does the actual world differ from the idealized world of perfect
information, fully specified laws, and impartiality? First, the actual world is
characterized by the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact. No
one citizen has perfect information about the content of the law or the state
of the world. Indeed, each of us knows only a small fraction of the
information that would be required for perfect compliance with our legal
obligations. Moreover, given human capacities, knowledge is local;
different parties to a dispute may each possess different information about
the facts. Without some process that can supply the parties to a dispute with
a common understanding of the law and the facts, even citizens who
attempt to use the law to coordinate their behavior may be unable to do so.
Second, the actual world is characterized by the problem of
incomplete specification of legal norms. Legal rules are constructed using
the tools provided by natural human languages. For rules to guide conduct,
they must be comprehensible, and, hence, they must be framed in relatively
general and abstract language. As a consequence, the substantive law is
inherently incomplete and ambiguous. Without a procedure whereby its
content can be specified and disambiguated, different citizens will
inevitably have different views about the content of the law.
Third, the actual world is characterized by the problem of partiality.
Citizens are inevitably partial to their own interests, to the interests of their
friends and families, and to the interests of causes and ideologies to which
they are committed. The problem of partiality interacts with the problem of
incomplete information about law and fact and the problem of incomplete
specification of the law. So, citizens will be likely to form views about the
content of the laws and the state of the world that favor the interests to
which they are partial. Without a procedure whereby conflicting partial
perspectives can be reconciled, different citizens will inevitably disagree
about which actions the law requires.
Given the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification,
and partiality, legal disputes will arise. Conversely, with perfect
knowledge, complete specification, and impartiality, almost every dispute
could settle.13 From the ex post perspective, the role of procedure is to
13. The sentiment that every dispute could settle is an exaggeration. Settlement might be
thwarted if the legal system provided incentives for delay, for example, if the defendant was not
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resolve these disputes, but from the ex ante point of view, procedure has
another role—to guide action after the formal legal proceedings have ended
and the judgment has become final. 14 This is the real work of procedure—
to guide primary conduct after the judgment is rendered. The real work of
procedure does not begin until the trial is over, the appeals exhausted, and
the judgment has become final. Legal proceedings communicate
information about law and fact to parties and others. They also specify the
content of general and abstract legal rules. Legal proceedings provide
authoritative resolutions of the differences in perspective generated by
partial interests. Procedure provides the information, specificity, and
impartiality that is required for citizens to conform their behavior to the
requirements of the law.
This point can easily be missed. The action-guiding role of procedure
is not always transparent. Indeed, in the context of criminal procedure, the
action-guiding role of procedure is almost totally opaque. One might easily
imagine that the role of a system of criminal procedure is to impose just
punishments and that direct application of the coercive power of the state is
the necessary and sufficient means to this end. Criminal defendants are
coerced by force, not guided by legal norms specified by a procedure. We
should not, however, overgeneralize from the criminal context. On the civil
side, there are contexts in which the action-guiding role of procedure is
crystal clear. One such context is the declaratory civil judgment.15 In an
action for declaratory relief, a coercive order does not issue. Rather, the
judgment simply declares the parties’ legal rights and obligations.
Declaratory judgments can guide action without coercion, precisely
because they provide information about law and fact that can overcome the
required to pay the plaintiff prejudgment interest. More generally, a procedural system can (but need
not) provide perverse incentives to litigate a frivolous case or defense.
14. This point is inspired by George Smith, Justice Entrepreneurship In a Free Market, 3 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 405 (1979).
15. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 12–13 (2d ed. 1941) (“The more highly
organized a society becomes, the less occasion there is to display force in order to secure obedience to
its decrees and adjudications. . . . The mere authoritative declaration of the reciprocal rights and
obligations of the parties suffices to ensure obedience.”). See generally Edwin Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, Part I, 28 YALE L.J. 1 (1918) (tracing the
historical development of declaratory judgments); Edwin Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A
Needed Procedural Reform, Part II, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) (analyzing declaratory actions and
judgments from the time to “determine the scope of and limitations upon” them); Edwin M. Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 243, 245 (Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.
ed., 1928); Edson R. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisors of the People, 54 AM. L.
REV. 161 (1920); Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights—The Declaratory
Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1917); Developments in the Law, Declaratory Judgments—1941–
1949, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949).
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The action-guiding role of procedure is important because it
undermines an assumption that is implicit in the ex post view of procedural
fairness. The ex post view assumes that there is a sharp division between
the action-guiding role of substantive law (the rules of torts, contracts, and
property) and the dispute-resolving role of procedural law (the rules of
jurisdiction, pleading, discovery, trial, appeal, and preclusion). Once this
assumption is exposed by the move to the ex ante view, we can begin to
appreciate that the real work of procedure may be every bit as action
guiding as is the work of substance. As we shall see, the action-guiding
work of substantive law is inextricably entangled in the action-guiding
work of procedural law.
For adjudicative procedure to perform its action-guiding function well,
procedures and their outcomes must be regarded as legitimate sources of
authority for officials, third parties, and litigants. If adjudication works, the
losing party may regard the judgment as authoritative and binding—that is,
as providing good and sufficient reason to pay the judgment or obey the
injunction. If adjudication fails and the losing party resists enforcement,
further proceedings are required. Remedial proceedings will require either
officials (a sheriff or marshal) or third parties (a bank or employer) to
regard the outcome of an adjudication as a source of legitimate authority—
for example, as good enough reason to confiscate property, turn over bank
accounts, or garnish wages. If a system of procedure is widely regarded as
a source of legitimate authority, then it will succeed in guiding action. If
the system is seen as illegitimate or without authority, then the system may
fail.
What is our basis for regarding procedures as the source of outcomes
that are legitimately authoritative? We might begin with the assumption
that the substantive rules of law are themselves legitimate. An accurate
outcome would then derive its legitimate authority from the legitimacy of
the underlying substantive rule. If a legitimate substantive rule of property
law plus the true state of the world would result in awarding title to
Blackacre to Smith, then a judgment that awards Blackacre to Smith might
be said to be legitimate. This account of the legitimate authority of
procedure is called the derivative theory of procedural legitimacy.
16. Of course, coercion is in the background. I am not claiming that coercion is never required
for civil adjudication to do its work of guiding action.
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But the derivative theory of procedural legitimacy immediately runs
into an obstacle in the form of the fact of irreducible procedural error. As
an official or a third party, I cannot know whether any particular verdict is
accurate or not. I may have reason to believe that it is highly likely the
verdict is accurate. But then again, I may not, for example, if I have some
independent knowledge of the case. Litigants usually have independent
knowledge of the merits of the proceedings to which they are parties. As a
losing litigant, I may, even after discounting for my own self-interest, have
a well-founded belief that the judgment against me is in error. Moreover,
losing litigants will not always be able to discount for their self-interest,
and hence will frequently have an ill-founded belief that unfavorable
judgments are in error.
So, a system of procedure cannot always confer legitimacy on
outcomes by providing either objectively or subjectively adequate
assurance that the outcomes the system produces are correct or even likely
to be correct. The fact of irreducible procedural error raises what we might
call the hard question of procedural justice: How can we regard ourselves
as obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we
believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits?
The deflationary view of procedural justice, which claims that procedural
justice can be reduced to justice in outcomes, cannot easily provide an
answer to this question. When we know the outcome to be unjust, the
justice of the outcome cannot be the source of its legitimate authority. This
conceptual point has a crucial corollary: only just procedures can confer
legitimate authority on incorrect outcomes.
Untangling the complex strands of argument that contain an answer to
the hard question of procedural justice is the enterprise undertaken in this
Article. But even at this early stage, we can glimpse the broad outlines of
an answer. We can regard ourselves as legitimately bound by an erroneous
judgment if it results from a procedure that affords us a meaningful
opportunity to participate in a process that strikes a reasonable balance
between the goal of accurate outcomes and the inevitable costs imposed by
any system of dispute resolution. Procedural justice is the route to
reconciliation with substantive error. Adjudicative procedures create legal
norms and, like other norm-creating procedures, require rights of
participation to establish legitimacy. This idea—which we shall call “the
participatory legitimacy thesis”—will be explicated in due course.17
17.

The participatory legitimacy thesis is developed and defended in Part V.
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B. A ROADMAP TO THE ARGUMENT
This Article responds to the challenge posed by the hard question of
procedural justice. That theory is developed in several stages, beginning
with some preliminary questions and problems. The first question—what is
procedure?—is the most difficult and requires an extensive answer. Part II,
“Substance and Procedure,” defines the subject of the inquiry by offering a
new theory of the distinction between substance and procedure. This theory
acknowledges the entanglement of the action-guiding roles of substantive
and procedural rules while preserving the distinction between two ideal
types of rules. Part III, “The Foundations of Procedural Justice,” lays out
the premises of general jurisprudence that ground the theory and answers a
series of objections to the notion that the search for a theory of procedural
justice is a worthwhile enterprise. These two sections set the stage for the
more difficult work of constructing a theory of procedural legitimacy.
The work of constructing a theory of procedural legitimacy begins in
Part IV, “Views of Procedural Justice,” which investigates the theories of
procedural fairness found explicitly or implicitly in case law and
commentary. After a preliminary inquiry that distinguishes procedural
justice from other forms of justice, Part IV focuses on three models or
theories. The first theory, the accuracy model, assumes that the aim of civil
dispute resolution is a correct application of the law to the facts. The
second theory, the balancing model, assumes that the aim of civil procedure
is to strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication.
The third theory, the participation model, assumes that the very idea of a
correct outcome must be understood as a function of a process that
guarantees fair and equal participation. In Part V, “The Value of
Participation,” the lessons learned from analysis and critique of the three
models are then applied to the question of whether a right of participation
can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either participation’s
effect on accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication. The most
important result of Part V is the participatory legitimacy thesis, the idea
that it is (usually) a condition for the fairness of a procedure that those who
are to be finally bound shall have a reasonable opportunity to participate in
the proceedings.
The central normative thrust of the procedural justice theory is
developed in Part VI, “Principles of Procedural Justice.” The first principle,
the Participation Principle, stipulates a minimum (and minimal) right of
participation, in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard, that
must be satisfied (if feasible) in order for a procedure to be considered fair.
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The second principle, the Accuracy Principle, specifies the achievement of
legally correct outcomes as the criterion for measuring procedural fairness,
subject to four provisos, each of which sets out circumstances under which
a departure from the goal of accuracy is justified by procedural fairness
itself. In Part VII, “The Problem of Aggregation,” the Participation
Principle and the Accuracy Principle are applied to the central problem of
contemporary civil procedure—the aggregation of claims in mass litigation.
Part VIII offers some concluding observations about the point and
significance of procedural justice.
II. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
The first question that any theory of procedural justice must face is the
obvious one: what is procedure? The second question follows directly from
the first: how can procedure be distinguished from substance? Without
some account of the substance-procedure distinction, the subject matter of
any theory of procedural justice is not well defined. But as we all know, the
substance and procedure problem is a tough nut to crack. The purpose of
this section is to put the theory of procedural justice on a solid foundation
by providing a fully adequate account of the nature of procedure and the
ways in which it is distinguishable from substance.
A. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE THROUGH THE LENS OF ERIE RAILROAD
V. TOMPKINS
The distinction between substance and procedure can be approached
from many directions. We might attempt to begin a priori with a conceptual
analysis, starting with general and abstract concepts of substance and
procedure. Or we might begin a posteriori by compiling a list of legal rules
that ordinary legal usage counts as procedural in nature, then moving
inductively to general definitions. Yet another possible starting point is the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,18 the case
that gave rise to the familiar idea that when federal courts hear state law
claims, they are obligated to apply state substantive law but should apply
the federal rules that are procedural in nature. Erie and its progeny created
a task for courts and commentators, establishing criteria that sort substance
18. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie literature is vast. See, e.g., John Hart
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–25 (1974); Richard D. Freer, Erie’s
Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989) [hereinafter Freer, Mid-Life Crisis]; Richard D. Freer,
Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998) [hereinafter Freer,
Some Thoughts]; Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search
of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 364–65 (1977).
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from procedure. Every lawyer educated in American procedure knows that
this task created an enduring problem for judges and lawyers. Justice
Reed’s concurring opinion in Erie stated that problem succinctly: “The line
between procedure and substance is hazy . . . .”19 Hazy, indeed, as
generations of American law students have learned to their chagrin. More
than sixty years of Erie jurisprudence has yet to result in any clear
consensus on the distinction between substance and procedure.
1. Why Start with Erie?
The Erie doctrine is notoriously complex and obscure; moreover, Erie
is linked to considerations of federalism that are tangential to procedural
justice. Nonetheless, Erie and its progeny have produced a substantial body
of judicial opinions and scholarship that address what procedure is in a
wide variety of concrete contexts. Additionally, because Erie has been the
context in which the substance and procedure problem has arisen for
procedure scholars in the United States, it provides a common conceptual
vocabulary that is well suited to the task at hand.20 Any discussion of
substance and procedure that does not start with Erie will nonetheless be
interpreted by American judges, lawyers, and legal academics with Erie’s
legacy in mind. In a sense, the question “What is procedure?” begins with
Erie—whether we like it or not.
Although proceduralists associate inquiry into the line between
substance and procedure with Erie, that case itself did little more than
introduce the problem. Erie addressed whether federal courts could
substitute their own judgments about the content of the common law for the
judgments of state courts. Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court
answered this question in the negative: “There is no federal general
common law.”21 The majority opinion in Erie uses the word “substantive”
only once,22 and does not discuss procedure at all. The relationship
between substance and procedure, however, was the subject of a famous
19. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
20. Of course, there are other important contexts. Closely related to the vertical choice of law
context in Erie is the horizontal choice of law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
122 (1971) (“A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be
conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”).
See also Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the
Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999) (examining how principles and methodologies of
conflict of law analysis can “prove useful in the Erie setting”). The locus classicus is Walter Wheeler
Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
21. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
22. Id.
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sentence in Justice Reed’s concurring opinion: “The line between
procedural and substantive law is hazy,” goes the passage quoted in part
above, “but no one doubts federal power over procedure.”23 So, what is the
line between substance and procedure? Or, if these two sets are
overlapping, what makes a legal rule substantive, procedural, both, or
neither? More radically, must we accept Linda Mullenix’s conclusion that
the line between substance and procedure “is inherently unresolvable”?24
2. The Inadequacy of Intuitionist Formalism
One approach to the substance-procedure distinction is the claim that
substance and procedure have intuitively accessible meanings.25 We know
that torts, contracts, and property are substance—these examples might
serve as a premise for our reasoning. We could then add another premise:
we know that jurisdiction, pleading, joinder, and discovery are
procedures—again, we have paradigm cases. This general approach is
illustrated by Richard Freer in the following passage: “[W]hatever
‘substantive’ means, it clearly encompasses the standard of tort liability to
an invitee, which was at issue in Erie.”26 Additionally, when courts are
required to distinguish substance and procedure, they often fail to provide
any criteria for their classifications.27 From these premises, we might
conclude that the line between substance and procedure can be drawn in a
fashion analogous to Justice Potter Stewart’s method for sorting
pornography into the categories of works that are obscene and those that
are not: we may know it when we see it.28 We might call this approach to
the substance and procedure problem “intuitionist formalism.”29
23. Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
24. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997).
25. The distinction between substance and procedure might be understood as purely nominal. A
nominalist theory of procedure would hold that a given legal rule is procedural if and only if we call it
“procedural.” If it is the case that the two sets of legal rules (substance and procedure) are nothing more
than names given to arbitrary collections, then it should follow that there can be no adequate theory of
procedural justice.
26. Freer, Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 18, at 1102.
27. Id. at 1108–10.
28. Justice Stewart explained his method thus:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. Michael Moore calls this approach “the paradigm case theory,” which he sees as one of the
two “conventionalist theories of meaning.” Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 295 (1985).
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Whatever the virtues of intuitionist formalism as a decision procedure
for practical purposes, it will not do for the purpose of defining the scope of
a theory of procedural justice. That purpose requires more than a set of
paradigm cases of procedural and substantive rules, and it requires more
than an ability to do ad hoc sorting of particular procedures because a
theory of procedural justice must be formulated in abstract and general
terms,30 the content of a theory of procedural justice necessarily requires a
domain of application.
Furthermore, there are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of
intuitionist formalism as a practical decision procedure. If Erie has any
lesson, it is Justice Reed’s observation about the line between substance
and procedure being hazy, which has been vindicated by experience. No
one familiar with the cases is likely to believe that we can sort substance
from procedure because we know it when we see it. Quite the contrary, the
lesson of Erie is that we often fail to see it even when we know it. Many of
the settled issues in Erie jurisprudence remain hazy even after they are
resolved.31
Nonetheless, our intuitions (or better, our considered judgments) about
particular cases are certainly relevant to the inquiry at hand. An adequate
theory of substance and procedure must account for ordinary language and
for the settled judgments of competent legal practitioners (like scholars,
judges, and lawyers). A theory of substance and procedure must either
count pleading and joinder as procedural and classify the duty of care in
negligence as substantive, or offer a compelling explanation as to why our
considered conviction about these paradigm cases is in error.
3. Outcome Determination: Ex Ante and Ex Post
Does the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence have anything to teach
us about substance and procedure? The first place to look is the case in
30. This is not to say that we could not offer microtheories that address the fairness of particular
procedures. For example, we could articulate a microtheory of procedural fairness that took pleading
rules as its domain. Such a theory would require criteria for what counts as a pleading rule, but it would
not necessarily require an answer to whether and why pleading rules are procedural in nature. One
might produce a microtheory for each and every legal rule that our intuitions count as procedural. The
set consisting of these microtheories might then be said to comprise a “theory of procedural justice,” but
it would be more natural to say that if microtheories are the best we can do, then there is no
macrotheory of procedural justice.
31. Examples are numerous. Statutes of limitations are considered substantive for Erie purposes,
see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–12 (1945), but intuitive formalism suggests the
opposite result—that limitations periods are procedural rather than substantive in nature.
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which the Court itself first attempted to develop a deep answer to the
question, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.32
a. Outcome Determination: Ex Post from Termination
Simplifying greatly, the issue in York was whether a state statute of
limitations or the federal equitable doctrine of laches applied to the
plaintiff’s claim. This would determine whether an action for breach of
fiduciary duty would be time-barred; the former doomed the claim, while
the latter allowed it to go forward.33 Given Justice Reed’s statement in
Erie, one might think that this would turn on whether statutes of limitations
should be classified as substantive or procedural. Justice Frankfurter’s
opinion for the Court in York suggests that this question is not well framed:
Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about
in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the
same keywords to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor
‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different
variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.
And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the
terms are in common use in connection with situations turning on such
different considerations as those that are relevant to questions pertaining
to ex post facto legislation, the impairment of the obligations of contract,
the enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and the
multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws.34

Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion is that the terms “substance” and
“procedure” take on different meanings in different contexts. What is
substantive in one context may be procedural in another. If that were all
that Frankfurter said, then York might suggest that the search for a general
theory of procedural fairness is doomed to failure, but that is not all he said:
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a
matter of ‘procedure’ in some sense. The question is whether such a
statute concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such
statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is
relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of
a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
32. Id. at 99.
33. Id. at 100–01. See also id. at 107 (“[T]his case reduces itself to the narrow question whether,
when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the statute of limitations,
a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity of citizenship between
the parties.”).
34. Id. at 108 (citation omitted).
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controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a
State court?35

The italicized clause might provide us with a test for the line between
substance and procedure. That is, we might say that if a legal rule was
outcome determinative ex post from the point of view of the termination of
the litigation, then the rule is substantive; but, if a legal rule did not
determine who won or lost from the ex post perspective, then it is
procedural. In York, the choice between the federal equitable doctrine of
laches and the state statute of limitations was outcome determinative; under
the former rule, the action should have been allowed to go forward, but
under the latter rule, the action would have been barred.
Is this an adequate criterion for the sorting of legal rules into the
categories of substance and procedure? The answer is no for reasons that
were presented by Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer.36 In Hanna,
the plaintiff brought a state law claim in federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. The defendant was served pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4, which allowed process to be left at the defendant’s
home with a responsible person.37 Under Massachusetts law, in-hand
service was required.38 Is the choice between these rules outcome
determinative? Chief Justice Warren answered thus:
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is
applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point
“outcome-determinative” in the sense that if we hold the state rule to
apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs,
the litigation will continue. But in this sense every procedural variation
is “outcome-determinative.” For example, having brought suit in a
federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to file subsequent
pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable in the state courts,
even though enforcement of the federal timetable will, if he continues to
insist that he must meet only the state time limit, result in determination
of the controversy against him.39

Why does every procedural variation seem outcome determinative, post
hoc, from the perspective of the termination of litigation? The assumption
on which the reasoning of Hanna rests is that procedural rules are enforced
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 468–69 (emphasis added).
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through outcome-affecting rulings.40 That is, if you fail to serve process in
compliance with the service of process rule, the sanction is that your action
is dismissed. If you fail to plead in accordance with the pleading rules, then
you are subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (or a
demurrer). If you fail to properly join a defendant, your claim against that
defendant will not be heard. This criticism of the York outcomedetermination test is generally considered to be decisive. For our purposes,
the point is that outcome determination from an ex post perspective of the
termination of the litigation will not serve as the criterion for what counts
as procedure. In that context, the proper formulation of the test would be
whether a given procedural rule could affect the outcome of the litigation.
Application of the test will yield the conclusion that the set of procedural
legal rules is empty.41
b. Outcome Determination: Ex Ante from Initiation
If Hanna provides the rationale for rejection of the ex post outcome
determination test, it also articulates a substitute test. Rather than asking
whether a given legal rule is outcome determinative ex post, we can instead
ask whether it is outcome determinative ex ante from the point of view of
the initiation of the action. As Chief Justice Warren put it,
Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two
rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.
Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation
where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather,
adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way
in which process was served.42

The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test seems a more
promising candidate for a general test of the line between substance and
procedure. Our considered judgment is that the rules of tort, contract, and
property law are substantive, and these rules are outcome determinative
40. There is an ambiguity in this formulation. Some rulings affect the outcome of a particular
civil action, but do not preclude the claim. For example, a dismissal based on jurisdiction (personal or
subject matter) may terminate the immediate civil action, but the claim may be refiled in another court.
The general rule is that the claim preclusive (res judicata) effect is given only to judgments that are on
the merits. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.30 (3d ed. 1997).
41. More precisely, the proposed test makes the classification of a legal rule as substantive or
procedural depend entirely on the method by which the rule is enforced. Thus, pleading rules become
substantive if enforced by dismissal and procedural if enforced by fines. Measured against our
considered judgments, the ex post outcome-determination test is still inadequate. Pleading rules and
joinder rules are paradigm cases of procedural rules, whether they are enforced by dismissal or by
monetary sanctions.
42. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469 (footnotes omitted).
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from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum ex ante at the time
litigation is initiated.
Consider the following example: Suppose there is a case where the
choice is between two standards for the duty of care in negligence law. One
jurisdiction employs Judge Learned Hand’s test and balances the cost of
precaution against the cost of injury, discounted by the probability of its
occurrence (the B<PL formula). Another jurisdiction asks whether the level
of care falls below that of the ordinary citizen (the median level of care in
the relevant community). For a wide range of cases, these standards of care
will be identical, but, where they differ, the choice between them will be
outcome determinative from the ex ante perspective.
The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test also fits well
with our considered judgments about the paradigm cases of procedure. For
example, service of process, pleading, and joinder rules are considered
procedural, but it would seem that none of these is outcome determinative
from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum. Take the Hanna case
as an example. So long as the service of process rule is announced in
advance, the plaintiff can comply with whatever rule is in effect.
4. A Critique of Ex Ante Outcome Determination
Despite the first blush attractiveness of Hanna’s ex ante version of the
outcome determination test, it is, in the end, wholly unsatisfactory for our
purposes. Ex ante outcome determination fails as the criterion for sorting
rules into substance and procedure for at least four reasons: (1) it fails to
account for the existence of procedural rules with substantive purposes,
functions, and effects; (2) it cannot account for the ex ante outcomedeterminative nature of rule variations that systematically affect accuracy;
(3) it is unable to account for the ex ante outcome-determinative nature of
rule variations that systematically affect procedural costs; and (4) it
classifies forum-selection rules (for example, venue and jurisdictional
rules) as substantive. Each of these points deserves comment.
a. Procedural Rules with Substantive Purposes, Functions, and
Effects
The first failure of ex ante outcome determination is that it fails to
account for the fact that substantive rules can easily be cast in procedural
guise. One way to illustrate this is to examine the text of the Rules
Enabling Act,43 the federal statute that authorizes the Supreme Court to
43.

Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
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create rules of procedure and evidence for the federal trial courts.44 The Act
provides that
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges
thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.45

Subsection (a) empowers the Supreme Court to create “general rules of
practice and procedure” while subsection (b) prohibits the Court from
making rules that “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights.”46 If
substance and procedure were two mutually exclusive categories, then §
2072(b) would be mere surplusage. But as Paul Carrington succinctly
expressed the point, “the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are not
mutually exclusive.”47 That is, it is possible for a procedural norm to alter a
substantive right.
How can procedure modify substance? Consider a simple
hypothetical: suppose that a pleading rule requires that plaintiffs provide
the sort of detailed and particularized information in their complaint that is
usually under the control of the defendant. Drawing on the model of Rule
9(b), which requires that fraud must be pled with particularity,48 we could
imagine a rule that requires a level of particularity that is, in practice,
unattainable. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
199549 (“PSLRA”) provides pleading rules for securities fraud actions50
44. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1168–69
(1982). See also Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1282–86 (2002) (discussing the substance-procedure dichotomy and the federal rules
scheme).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).
46. Id.
47. Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 281, 287. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
49. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
50. See, e.g., William D. Browning, Comment on “The New Securities Fraud Pleading
Requirement,” 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1996); William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading
Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity,
Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893
(1996); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the
PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998);
Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error,
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that are far more difficult for plaintiffs to meet than the transsubstantive
rules of pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.51 If the
pleading burden is raised enough, the effect may be to change the substance
of the law. A claim that cannot be successfully pled is, in one sense, no
claim at all. Borrowing terminology from Meir Dan-Cohen,52 the point is
that rules of procedure provide “decision rules” (directed at officials such
as judges) that can change the meaning of the “conduct rules” (directed at
ordinary citizens) with which they are associated. This change in meaning
may take time because substance-affecting rules of procedure are less
transparent to the public than are rules of substantive law. But as time
passes and legal advice translates the substance-affecting procedural
decision rules for those whose conduct is at issue, rules of procedure may
become de facto rules of conduct.
Before proceeding further, I should note that this criticism of the ex
ante outcome-determination test is not aimed at the usefulness of the test
for Erie purposes. Rather, my point is that this test cannot, by itself,
provide the criterion by which we define substance and procedure. Why
not? Because the ex ante outcome-determination test does not distinguish
between the category of procedural rules with substantive effects and the
category of purely substantive rules. This point is illustrated by Figure 1
below.
Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996); Elliott J.
Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 That the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998); Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading
Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud
Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675 (1996); Michael B. Dunn,
Note, Pleading Scienter after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 193 (1998).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8–9.
52. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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FIGURE 1. Substance and procedure
Purely
procedural
rules

Purely
substantive
rules

Procedural rules with
substantive effects

b. Accuracy Effects
There is a second reason for rejecting the ex ante outcome
determination test: it misclassifies rule variations that systematically affect
the accuracy of a system of procedure. Consider the following hypothetical:
a litigant is given the choice of two systems of procedure. The first system
has hypertechnical pleading rules and allows for almost no pretrial
discovery. The second system has simplified pleading rules and provides
for extensive pretrial discovery. Assume for the purposes of the
hypothetical that the first system places a very high premium on lawyering
skills and that it therefore systematically produces inaccurate results in
cases where the litigant with the worse case on the merits has the better
lawyer. This system might well be viewed as outcome determinative from
the point of view of a plaintiff choosing a forum. For example, a plaintiff
with a weak case on the merits but a superb lawyer might prefer system
one, whereas a plaintiff with a strong case on the merits but a weak lawyer
might prefer system two.
The point of the hypothetical is that procedural systems may vary in
systematic and predictable ways with respect to accuracy. Because
accuracy effects can be outcome determinative from the ex ante point of
view, they would be classified as substantive by the Hanna ex ante
outcome-determination test. But this result is inconsistent with many of our
considered pretheoretical judgments about the line between substance and
procedure. Discovery and pleading rules do not automatically become
substantive because they can systematically affect accuracy. This
conclusion needs to be qualified. If the rules of discovery or pleading are
substance specific, so that they disfavor (or favor) particular plaintiffs with
particular kinds of claims, then they can become quasi-substantive in
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nature. The difference between the less accurate procedure and the more
accurate procedure is not a difference of substantive law, however, simply
because procedural improvements can make the system more accurate in a
predictable way.
c. Procedural Costs
The third failure of ex ante outcome determination is closely related to
the second. Some procedural systems are more costly than others, and this
fact may be viewed as outcome determinative from the point of view of a
litigant choosing a forum. In this situation, as a plaintiff I must choose
between two procedural systems, an expensive system that will require me
to expend more than the value of the claim to get relief and a cheap system
that will permit me to pursue my claim to judgment without such an
expenditure; from my point of view, then, when I am choosing a forum,
this choice is outcome determinative. Procedural systems impose a variety
of costs, including directly-charged fees, the costs of representation, and
the costs imposed by discovery.
Even though litigation costs may be outcome determinative from the
point of view of a litigant choosing a forum, it does not follow that costs
transform procedure into substance. Once again, the outcome determination
test seems to produce a false positive for substance, sweeping in variations
that are procedural in nature.
d. Forum Selection Rules
The fourth failure of ex ante outcome determination is very specific
but nonetheless quite telling. Rules of jurisdiction and venue are
paradigmatic cases of procedural rules, but they are, of course, outcome
determinative from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum. If the
court lacks venue or jurisdiction over a claim, it will be dismissed. Once
again, the ex ante outcome-determination test fails to sort properly.
e. Summary
In sum, Hanna’s ex ante version of the outcome determination test
simply is not appropriate for the job of sorting substance from procedure.
As Justice Harlan wrote in his Hanna concurrence,
In turning from the “outcome” test of York back to the unadorned forumshopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like
oversimplification, for a simple forum-shopping rule also proves too
much; litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they
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consider the advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try
their cases before a supposedly more favorable judge.53

Both procedural rules and substantive rules may seem outcome
determinative from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum.
5. Primary Conduct and Litigation Conduct
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna suggests yet another approach
to the substance-procedure dichotomy. Justice Harlan wrote,
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply
a state or a federal rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay
close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would
substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct
which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.54

The key phrase is “primary decisions respecting human conduct.”55 This
test, although never endorsed explicitly by the Supreme Court, has been
influential in the Erie context.56
The meaning of Justice Harlan’s phrase can be explicated by a
metaphor. Procedure, we might say, regulates conduct inside the
courtroom. Substance, on the other hand, regulates conduct outside the
courtroom.57 By “inside the courtroom” we refer not only to literal
courtrooms, but also to clerks’ offices, conference rooms where depositions
are taken, lawyers’ offices where pleadings are drafted, and so forth. By
“outside the courtroom” we refer to the full range of human conduct from
driving automobiles to selling real estate and entering into contracts. Of
course, this primary conduct may take place inside a courtroom where torts
may be committed, property sold, or contracts made. The topographic
metaphor—inside and outside the courtroom—stands for a larger
distinction.
53. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For example, Judge Posner equates “substantive” with “designed to shape conduct outside
the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process.” S.A. Healy
Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995). Posner does not cite Justice
Harlan, but the connection is obvious, as has been noted by Freer. See Freer, Some Thoughts, supra note
18, at 1661. For a discussion of the influence of Justice Harlan’s formulation, see Jed I. Bergman, Note,
Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
969, 975 n.33 (1996). See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985) (using Justice Harlan’s definition of substantive rules).
57. See S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 310.
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So, what distinction stands behind this metaphor? Serving process,
drafting complaints, and taking depositions are just as much human
conduct as speeding, buying a home, or entering into a personal services
contract. Using Justice Harlan’s distinction, what marks out the latter as
primary decisions respecting human conduct?58 The danger of circularity is
apparent. We cannot use procedure or process, or substance or substantive,
to mark the distinction because those are the terms for which we are
seeking meaning.
But a second look at the metaphor is, nonetheless, revealing. Courts
(as well as other adjudicative institutions, such as administrative tribunals
or arbitration firms) are themselves identifiable. We know which
institutions are courts and which are not. We know what lawsuits are, and
we know under what conditions parties become parties to disputes. We also
know when parties are not engaged in litigation. So when we speak of
litigation-related conduct, we are not begging the substance-procedure
question. Rather, we are appealing to relatively certain usages that do not
depend directly on the answer to the substance-procedure question. Once
we are able to identify the contexts in which litigation occurs, we then are
able to apply Justice Harlan’s primary conduct test. A rule is procedural if
its function is to regulate adjudication-related conduct. A rule is substantive
if its function is to regulate conduct that occurs outside the context of
adjudication. A rule of law is both substantive and procedural if its function
is to regulate both types of conduct. Rules that have both procedural and
substantive functions may, nonetheless, have a function that dominates.59
There is yet another technique for explicating the meaning of Justice
Harlan’s phrase “primary decisions respecting human conduct.” When
looking at the outcome-determination test, I employed two perspectives—
ex post (looking back from the end of litigation) and ex ante (looking
forward from the point immediately prior to litigation). I can, however,
move the ex ante perspective back in my stylized chronology of a dispute
to the point in time that precedes the conduct that gave rise to the dispute.
In other words, we can view a dispute ex ante from the point in time before
58. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J. concurring).
59. In this Article, I use the word “function” in a crucial role, and I have chosen that word rather
than effect or purpose. We might define the line between substance and procedure by referring to the
effects of legal rules. For example, tort law affects primary conduct and pleading rules affect litigationrelated conduct. Or we might draw the same line by inquiring into the purpose of legal rules, for
example, contract law is intended to regulate agreements outside of the litigation context, whereas
joinder rules are intended to affect the way lawsuits are put together and taken apart. “Function” in this
context implies that rules themselves have a purpose or telos, and the ends of the rules are revealed in
part by the effects that the rules have.

SOLU12.DOC

206

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:181

the accident occurred, before the contract negotiations began, and so forth.
From that perspective, we can ask whether the legal rule in question would
have altered the ways the parties to the dispute would have behaved before
litigation commenced. From this perspective, we might define substantive
rules as those that would alter predispute (primary) conduct.60
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws applies the ex ante
perspective of a person deciding how to act before a dispute arises. In
applying this perspective, it argues that a forum should apply its own
procedural rules to a dispute in which the substantive law may be that of a
different jurisdiction:
Parties do not usually give thought to matters of judicial administration
before they enter into legal transactions. They do not usually place
reliance on the applicability of the rules of a particular state to issues that
would arise only if litigation should become necessary. Accordingly, the
parties have no expectations as to such eventualities, and there is no
danger of unfairly disappointing their hopes by applying the forum’s
rules in such matters.61

The Restatement paints with too broad a brush. In practice, rules of judicial
administration directly affect the way litigants behave before disputes arise.
Strict pleading rules may assure potential defendants that they can engage
in certain conduct with the confidence that claims against them based on
such conduct will be dismissed at an early (and relatively low-cost) stage of
litigation.
B. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: ACOUSTIC SEPARATION OF SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE
So far, our approach to the substance versus procedure question has
been theoretically cautious and mostly doctrinal—closely tied to the
60. The focus on predispute conduct emphasizes an important fact about the relationship between
procedure and conduct that occurs postdispute but before the complaint is filed. During this period, the
parties may interact in a variety of ways: a demand letter may be dispatched, a settlement offer may be
made and rejected, or informal mediation may occur. These activities take place “in the shadow of the
law,” both substantive and procedural. When parties settle, they calculate their expected liability or
expected recovery minus litigation costs. In a very real sense, this bargaining takes place in the shadow
of procedure. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 993–95 (1979) (discussing the interplay between substantive and
procedural law in divorce litigation); Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N.
Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in
Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992) (discussing the interplay between substantive and
procedural law in civil rights litigation).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (1971).
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development of the Erie doctrine in the context of concrete cases with
particular facts. But before proceeding further, we must grasp the abstract
distinction between substance and procedure. Such a grasp is elusive
precisely because of the entanglement of substance and procedure. By
avoiding the complex particularity of the actual legal world, a thought
experiment will allow us to see substance and procedure in a simplified
legal environment. If the actual world of substance and procedure is a
jungle, overgrown by intertwined strands of substance and procedure, we
need a “desert landscape” so substance and procedure can stand in splendid
isolation.62
This thought experiment posits a world in which citizens know only
the content of the substantive law, and only legal officials know the content
of the procedural law. We will explore the thought experiment in two
stages—informal and formal. The informal version aims to make the
posited world vivid and simple enough for an immediate intuitive grasp.
The formal version aims to make this possible world precise and
transparent.
1. The Informal Thought Experiment: The Cone of Silence
Imagine a world in which legal institutions (judicial, legislative, and
executive officials) are “acoustically separated” from ordinary citizens.63
As an aid to your imagination, you might picture a giant cone of silence
covering the government complex, preventing any transfer of information
from legal institutions to ordinary citizens with only a few exceptions.
What are the exceptions? First, a code of conduct regulating matters
such as contract, criminal activity, property, and torts is promulgated by the
legislature and allowed to pass through the cone to the outside world,
where each citizen commits the code to memory. Second, information
relevant to particular legal disputes, such as documents, deposition
transcripts, exhibits, and witnesses, is allowed to pass through the cone into
the legal system, where it is processed by legal representatives and judges
using a code of procedure. Finally, judgments (orders to pay money
damages, injunctions, and orders for incarceration) pass through the cone
into the outside world.
62. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, On What There Is, in 2 REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS (1948),
reprinted in WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 1, 4 (2d revised ed. 1961) (using the “desert landscape” metaphor to contrast its pleasing
aesthetic with an unattractive overpopulated universe).
63. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 52, at 630.
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To those outside the cone of silence, the system of adjudication is a
black box: information flows in and statutes and judgments flow out. The
rules governing the operation of the courts inside the cone are the rules of
procedure. The rules governing the conduct of citizens outside the cone are
the rules of substance. Because of the acoustic separation between the
institutions of adjudication and the outside world, the categories of
substance and procedure are well defined and mutually exclusive.
2. The Formal Thought Experiment: The Possible World of Acoustic
Separation
This informal version of the thought experiment can be made precise
by carefully defining the conceptual tools used and by precisely specifying
its conditions. To build the formal version, we need to avail ourselves of
three conceptual tools: (1) H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between primary and
secondary rules, (2) acoustic separation between conduct and decision
rules, and (3) possible worlds’ semantics. Each of these three ideas requires
brief explication:
a. Primary Rules and Secondary Rules
The first conceptual tool is the distinction between primary and secondary
rules, made famous by H.L.A. Hart in his magisterial book, The Concept of
Law.64 Hart’s distinction “discriminate[s] between two different though
related types” of rules65:
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or
primary type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain
actions, whether they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a
sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first; for they provide that
human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules
of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways
determine their incidence or control their operations.66

Secondary rules, in Hart’s sense, encompass the rules of contracts and
trusts, which permit private individuals to create, modify, and extinguish
primary obligations. The secondary rules encompass the rules that define
the powers of legislatures and administrative agencies—powers to make
general laws and rules that create, modify, or extinguish both primary
obligations and secondary rules. Finally and crucially, secondary rules
64.
65.
66.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80–99 (2d ed. 1994).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
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allow adjudicators to determine the incidence and control the operation of
other primary and secondary rules in particular cases.
b. Acoustic Separation Between Conduct Rules and Decision Rules
The second distinction that we need to formalize our thought
experiment is the idea of acoustic separation between conduct and decision
rules—that is, the cone of silence. Formulated in a more rigorous way the
idea of acoustic separation specifies domains, between which information
of a certain type does not flow. Dan-Cohen has explored the idea of
acoustic separation:
The general public engages in various kinds of conduct, while officials
make decisions with respect to members of the general public. Imagine
further that each of the two groups occupies a different, acoustically
sealed chamber. This condition I shall call “acoustic separation.” Now
think of the law as a set of normative messages directed to both groups.
In such a universe, the law necessarily contains two sets of messages.
One set is directed at the general public and provides guidelines for
conduct. These guidelines are what I have called “conduct rules.” The
other set of messages is directed at the officials and provides guidelines
for their decisions. These are “decision rules.” 67

Dan-Cohen’s formulation is evocative but not formally complete. Acoustic
separation is insufficient, for the purposes of our experiment, because
information could flow between the realms of conduct and decision
through visual, electronic, or other means. The formal requirement is that
no information regarding decision rules should pass from the one zone to
the other.
c. Possible Worlds
In the actual world, only limited acoustic separation exists between the
officials who implement rules of decision and procedure, on the one hand,
and the citizens whose actions are governed by rules of conduct, on the
other. Our thought experiment requires that we posit a hypothetical
situation or possible world68—to use the notion made famous by Gottfried
Leibniz69 and developed by the contemporary philosophers Saul Kripke70
67. Dan-Cohen, supra note 52, at 630.
68. See generally JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002) (providing a comprehensive
introduction to the issues raised by the philosophical idea of possible worlds).
69. See GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, The Theodicy, in LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS
509, 509–11 (Philip P. Weiner ed., 1951) (introducing the idea of possible worlds). Leibniz used the
idea of a possible world to answer the argument against the existence of an omnipotent and beneficent
God from the problem of evil. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the
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and David Lewis.71 The point of the thought experiment is neither that the
actual world could become this possible world nor that this possible world
is consistent with the laws of natural science and human psychology and
sociology. The world of the thought experiment is simply one that
resembles the actual world, except that acoustic separation obtains as
specified. So long as we can imagine this possible world as required by the
thought experiment, further questions, such as the precise mechanism by
which acoustic separation would operate, need not be answered.
The formal thought experiment can be stated in a stripped-down
version, which contains key features, but abstracts from the complex details
of actual legal systems. We can posit a possible world with the following
characteristics:
1. There is a single political entity, the State.
2. All general rules of law are promulgated by a single unicameral
legislature and integrated into a Code.
3. All dispute resolution is accomplished through a unified
judiciary that consists of a single trial court with a single judge
and no jury. All legal proceedings terminate in a judgment, which
is an order that requires specific actions by the parties to a dispute.
All litigation costs including attorneys’ fees are borne by the
State.
4. The Code is divided into four parts:
i. The Constitutional Code, which consists of secondary rules
that confer power on the legislature to enact, modify, or
terminate provisions of the Code.
ii. The Code of Conduct, which consists entirely of conduct
rules that are addressed to citizens, including primary rules,
such as criminal prohibitions, and secondary rules, such as
contract law.
iii. The Code of Decision, which consists of decision rules
addressed to legal officials, that attaches legal consequences
to violations of the primary and secondary rules either
contained in or authorized by the Code of Conduct.
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. Id. “World” here refers to the whole universe through
time and not just the planet Earth.
70. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (rev. ed. 1980) (summarizing Kripke’s
philosophy of language and his mind-body problem theory).
71. See DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism, which
posits the existence of numerous alternate world universes).
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vi. The Code of Adjudication, which consists of rules for
conducting dispute resolution by the unified judiciary
specified above. These rules include (a) conduct rules for the
legal representatives of parties in civil and criminal actions
and (b) decision rules for judges, which define the actions
that judges must take in response to each possible action by
the legal representatives for the parties. These rules are
designed so that the relevant facts and provisions of the Code
of Decision are accurately presented to the judge.
5. The Constitutional Code requires the four-part division of the
Code specified above. It further specifies that all legal rules
aiming at the regulation of conduct shall be included in the Code
of Conduct and that the content of the Code of Decision shall
conform to the Code of Conduct. The Constitutional Code also
requires the Code of Adjudication to maximize accuracy, that is,
to maximize the extent to which findings of fact are in conformity
with the state of the world and the extent to which the law is
correctly applied to the facts. Legislators do, in fact, conform to
the provisions of the Constitutional Code.
6. The Code is fully specified. For every possible action by
citizens that the Code permits, forbids, or requires, the Code
specifies that the action can be permitted, forbidden, or required
by a contract. For every possible action by the legal
representatives of parties in the course of representation, the Code
specifies a legal consequence. Every possible action by legislative,
judicial, and executive officials is either required, prohibited, or
permitted by the Code.
7. Each natural person is either a citizen or an official. The class
of officials includes members of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches, as well as lawyers and their staffs. Officials act
only in their official capacity and act in full compliance with the
provisions of the Code.
8. There is acoustic separation between substance and procedure,
specified as follows: (a) each citizen knows the content of Part ii
of the Code, but no citizen is aware of the content of Parts i, iii, or
iv of the Code; (b) legislative and executive officials are aware of
the whole content of the Code; (c) judicial officials and lawyers
are only aware of the content of Parts i, iii, and iv of the Code; (d)
citizens have no knowledge of the content of legal proceedings
except that parties to a dispute do know the content of the
judgments of their legal proceeding; and (e) citizens make no
attempt to infer the content of the Constitutional Code, the Code
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of Decision, or the Code of Adjudication from the information
they possess about the outcome of individual adjudications.
The thought experiment can be made more concrete by imagining a
particular case:
Ben drives negligently and hits Alice’s automobile. The Code of
Conduct contains a provision that specifies that negligent drivers
will pay compensation to their victims. Alice contacts her legal
representative by passing a message through the barrier
establishing acoustic separation. Behind the barrier, Alice’s legal
representative then initiates a proceeding against Ben in court as
specified by Code of Adjudication. Also pursuant to the Code of
Adjudication, Ben and Alice’s lawyers prepare pleadings, conduct
discovery, participate in a trial, and so forth—resulting in findings
of fact and conclusions of law that accurately represent the state of
the world and the content of the Code of Decision. Information
regarding Ben and Alice’s conduct flows into court, but the
proceedings take place in secret, without information concerning
their content flowing to Alice, Ben, or other citizens. At the end of
the proceedings, the judge applies the law to the facts and issues a
judgment requiring Ben to pay Alice $500 in damages. The
judgment passes through the barrier and is then communicated to
Ben and Alice. Ben pays Alice the $500.
In the world of acoustic separation between substance and procedure, we
have no difficulty drawing a precise bright line between substance and
procedure. The substantive law is divided into two parts, the Code of
Conduct and the Code of Decision.72 The procedural law is contained in the
Code of Adjudication. Provisions are sorted into the Parts of the Code by
reference to (1) the audience to whom they are addressed, and (2) the
purposes for which they are enacted. Because of the provisions of the
Constitutional Code and the fact of acoustic separation, no provision of the
Code of Adjudication has any substantive effects or purposes. Because no
officials are citizens, the substantive law only affects adjudication through
the Code of Decision.
72. The Code of Conduct is clearly substantive because it is aimed at the regulation of primary
conduct. The Code of Decision, however, is aimed at regulating the decisionmaking processes of
judges. Our thought experiment assumes, however, that the content of the two codes is matched. Thus,
if there is a provision in the Code of Conduct that says, “Murder is prohibited,” then there will be a
matching provision in the Code of Decision that states, “If some person P, commits murder, then P shall
serve a twenty year sentence in a prison.” Because provisions of the Code of Decision regulate
litigaton-related conduct, there is an important sense in which they are also procedural. This point is
explored below. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing procedural functions of rules of decision).
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Thus, the pleading rules that govern Ben and Alice’s dispute are
purely procedural. The standard of care, on the other hand, is divided into
two parts—a rule in the Code of Conduct that is available to Ben and Alice
and a rule in the Code of Decision that is not available to Ben or Alice, but
is available to attorneys and judges.
3. Implications of the Thought Experiment
Of course, the actual world is not the world of acoustic separation of
substance and procedure. In the actual world, there is no guarantee of
acoustic separation. Citizens can become aware of the content of the
procedural rules and decision rules. In the actual world, legislatures can
attempt to influence the primary conduct of citizens by varying the rules of
procedure. Moreover, procedural rules may have the unintended
consequence of affecting conduct to the extent that they may produce
inaccurate results that can be systematically predicted. In the actual world,
substance and procedure are entangled.
Nonetheless, the thought experiment allows theorists to analyze the
entanglement of the procedural and substantive dimensions of actual rules.
For any particular entangled rule, we can imagine how that rule might be
disentangled in the world of acoustic separation. By disentangling mixed
rules into discrete rules of conduct, decision, and adjudication, we can
identify their substantive and procedural aspects. The thought experiment
allows us to see clearly the entangled strands of substance and procedure.
In other words, the thought experiment provides a rigorous way of
“inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct.”73 The rigor of the method does not
imply that it provides a determinate answer for every case. When we look
at the history of actual rules, their functions may be difficult to discern.
This is an epistemological problem stemming from our incomplete
knowledge of legislative purpose and causal relationships in the actual
world. This kind of epistemological problem may be of substantial practical
significance, but it does not undermine the ontological status of the
distinction between substance and procedure that is revealed by the thought
experiment.
Some further explanation is required. The view advanced here is that
the line between substance and procedure is an idealization. Useful
application of the idealization to the actual legal rules requires knowledge
73.

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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about the world. When that knowledge is unavailable, characterizing a rule
as procedural or substantive may be impossible. Furthermore, one may not
be able to untangle the strands of substance and procedure. Nonetheless,
even in these cases, the thought experiment provides a means of identifying
the knowledge that would be decisive if it became available.
The thought experiment performs another important function by
providing a mechanism for distinguishing form from function in the
context of the distinction between substance and procedure. In the world of
the thought experiment, procedural form maps perfectly onto procedural
function, and substantive form likewise maps perfectly onto substantive
function. In the actual world, where acoustic separation and purity of
procedural intention are counterfactual, perfect mapping does not hold.
Nonetheless, the thought experiment provides a fairly precise and
analytically rigorous mechanism for identifying the formal and functional
dimensions of a given legal rule. In the actual world, we might then classify
legal rules using a two-by-two matrix, as in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Form and function

Form

Substantive
Function

Procedural

Substantive
Pure substantive rule
Substantive form
with procedural
function

Procedural
Procedural form with
substantive function
Pure procedural rule

This distinction between form and function is reflected in actual practice.
For example, legal rules are divided into codes of procedure (for example,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and codes of conduct (for example,
the California Penal Code).
Finally, the purpose of the thought experiment is not to provide a
device that will allow actual rules to be sorted into rules of substance and
rules of procedure—although in some cases a rough and ready
approximation of such sorting may serve practical purposes. Quite the
contrary, the point of the thought experiment is to demonstrate how
substance and procedure are thoroughly entangled in the actual rules of
existing legal systems.
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C. THE ENTANGLEMENT OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
The idea that substance and procedure are not mutually exclusive is a
familiar one. As Justice Frankfurter articulated in the York case, “[n]either
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies
different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is
used.”74 The New Jersey Supreme Court has opined that “it is simplistic to
assume that all law is divided neatly between ‘substance’ and
‘procedure.’”75 Scott Matheson argued that “[l]aw is the product of
interaction between substance and procedure, but the relationship between
the two is more subtle and complex than simply their joinder in
litigation.”76 And finally, Judge Easterbrook once wrote that “[s]ubstance
and process are intimately related. The procedures used determine how
much substance is achieved, and by whom. Procedural rules usually are just
a measure of how much the substantive entitlements are worth, of what we
are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal attained.”77
If the idea that substance and procedure are entwined is well accepted,
the task that remains is to explicate that entanglement with the aim of
clarifying rather than muddying the distinction between substance and
procedure. What are the modes of entanglement? How do substance and
procedure overlap and interact? My answer to these questions proceeds in
steps. The initial step involves sorting the obvious cases of overlapping
substance and procedure into two heuristic categories: (a) substantive
procedure and (b) procedural substance. The initial category includes rules
of law that are primarily procedural in form, but have a substantive
function: these are rules of substantive procedure. The other category
includes rules of law that are primarily substantive in form, but have a
procedural function: these are rules of procedural substance. The next step
is an exposition of the core idea of the entanglement thesis: procedure is an
essential component of the action-guiding function of substantive law.
1. Substantive Procedure
The idealization of a pure rule of procedure assumes that procedural
rules regulate the sphere of adjudicative institutions. Similarly, the
idealization of a pure rule of substance posits that the function of the
74. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
75. Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (N.J. 1973).
76. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the
First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 223 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
77. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112–13.

SOLU12.DOC

216

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:181

substantive law is to regulate primary conduct—the whole of human
activity outside adjudicative contexts. These idealizations allow us to
identify the formal and functional characteristics of substance and
procedure. For example, pleading rules are procedural in form because they
address the litigation process and not primary conduct. However, rules that
are formally procedural may have a substantive function. There are two
types of rules that we might call “substantive procedure.” The first involves
deliberate use of procedural forms to modify substantive decision rules.
The second involves the action-guiding role of procedures that particularize
general legal norms. Let us begin with type one, the simplest case of
substantive procedure.
a. Substantive Procedure: Type One—Procedural Rules with
Intentionally Substantive Functions.
In the world of acoustic separation, procedural rules are ill suited to
the function of regulating primary conduct—citizens cannot modify their
behavior to accord with procedural variations because they are acoustically
isolated from the adjudicative institutions. In the actual world, however,
policymakers can take acoustic leakage into account and manipulate
procedural forms in order to achieve substantive goals.78
A familiar example of a substantive rule cast in procedural form is the
parol evidence rule, which excludes oral evidence of the content of a
written contract. The parol evidence rule has the form of a rule of evidence,
but it functions as a substantive rule of law. To confirm this conclusion, we
can perform the thought experiment of disentangling the substantive and
procedural elements of the rule. Suppose that we thought the parol
evidence rule truly was a rule of evidentiary procedure. In that case, the
parol evidence rule would appear solely in the Code of Adjudication in the
possible world of acoustic separation. Contracting parties would be
unaware of the rule, and hence might try to modify or supplement their
written agreements by oral statements. On this interpretation, the parol
evidence rule would fail to perform its substantive function. The actual
parol evidence rule is addressed to contracting parties; the rule informs the
parties that in the case of an integrated writing, oral modifications or
78. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. Leonetti & Austin W. Bartlett, The Substantive
Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1999) (examining the interplay
between procedural and substantive legal reform in the heightened federal pleading regime); Pamela J.
Stephens, Manipulation of Procedural Rules in Pursuit of Substantive Goals: A Reconsideration of the
Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1131 (1993) (discussing whether
court use of procedural law to address judicially perceived limitations in the substantive law
undermines public confidence in the legal process).
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supplements do not have legal force. That is, the parol evidence rule is a
secondary rule of substantive law (in Hart’s sense of “secondary”). The
parol evidence rule tells citizens what they must do to modify the primary
rules of conduct provided by a contract. Thus, in the world of acoustic
separation, the parol evidence rule would have two components: (1) a
provision in the Code of Conduct addressed to contracting parties; (2) a
provision in the Code of Adjudication addressed to judges. No special rule
of evidence would be required, because parol evidence of oral supplements
or modifications would be excluded by the general evidentiary rule of
relevance.
Another important example of a rule with substantive function and
procedural form is provided by the pleading provisions of the PSLRA79 and
its sibling, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.80 The PSLRA
modifies the transsubstantive rules of pleading provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 9(b). 81 Rule 8(a)(2) embodies the
principle of “notice pleading” and requires only “a short and plain
statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”82 Rule 9(b)
provides that allegations of fraud must be made with particularity.83 The
general pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a minimal level of
factual detail.84 Even Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud be pled with
particularity has been interpreted to allow plaintiffs to allege fraud by
specifying only the statement or conduct that was the basis of the
79. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). See generally Patricia J. Meyer, Note, What Congress
Said About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading
Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (1998) (analyzing various interpretations of procedural pleading
standards for securities fraud and their substantive function); Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-by-Case
Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2265 (1999) (same).
80. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See also David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54
BUS. LAW. 1 (1998) (discussing developments that led to the Act and analyzing its substantive effect on
securities fraud law); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing how the Act preempts
state substantive law).
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 9(b). See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,
81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (discussing the survival of the heightened pleading requirements despite the
trend toward liberal pleading standards); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading
Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
84. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (providing only sketchy information in the model complaint
for negligence).
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allegation.85 Not all false statements are fraudulent, however, and in the
context of a securities fraud action, predictions of future business success
may give rise to allegations of “fraud by hindsight” when a business
experiences unanticipated turbulence. Defending securities fraud actions is
expensive and the fact that the action is pending may create uncertainties
that interfere with the defendant firm’s ability to raise capital. Because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit extensive and time-consuming
discovery and pretrial motion practice, claims that would eventually be
defeated on the merits may, nonetheless, alter primary conduct—for
example, the kinds of statements made on behalf of firms to potential
investors. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish tough
standards for summary judgment86 and directed verdicts.87
The PSLRA adopts pleading standards that are much tougher than
those provided by Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b). For example, if the
complaint alleges a state of mind, it must “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.”88 Commentators on the PSLRA have observed that this
language seems designed for a substantive purpose. For example, Leslie M.
Kelleher observes that
[p]artisan rule reformers recognized the importance of a particularity
requirement to the outcome of a case and bypassed the Advisory
Committee completely, taking their proposals for procedural
amendments directly to Congress. The strict pleading requirement of the
PSLRA . . . is designed to favor defendants over plaintiffs in securities
lawsuits, not to implement some carefully planned vision of the
procedural system.89

Kelleher concludes that
[t]he PSLRA is a clear illustration of the latest stage in the politicization
of procedure. With the PSLRA, Congress has gone further than ever in
providing procedural benefits to a particular group in order to vindicate
the substantive goals of the Act. As Congress and partisan lobbyists have
discovered the usefulness of procedural provisions in effectuating
substantive purposes, the hazy line between substance and procedure has
85. See Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 578, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (reasoning that the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) is satisfied if a plaintiff identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that
a defendant can adequately answer the plaintiff’s allegations).
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
89. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 60 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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been blurred further, and we should expect to see even more instances of
statutory procedural provisions.90

The PSLRA is just one of many examples of type one (functionally
substantive rules cast in procedural form).91 The essential structure of this
type of entanglement of substance and procedure can be analyzed using the
model of acoustic separation. The PSLRA uses procedural rules (that is,
rules that would be found in the Code of Adjudication) to indirectly modify
substantive decision rules (that is, rules found in the Code of Decision).
Because of acoustic leakage, these modifications can have the same effects
as changes in the substantive conduct rules (the Code of Conduct).
b. Substantive Procedure: Type Two—Particularized Conduct Rules
The second type of substantive procedure is more fundamental and
pervasive than the first. Every civil action involves procedures that are
substantive in the sense that they function to communicate particular rules
of primary conduct—in other words, they are procedures that are action
guiding. The standard picture of substance and procedure is that substantive
rules of law function to guide primary conduct, conduct that occurs outside
the litigation process, whereas procedural rules function to guide litigationrelated conduct. But the standard picture omits an important action-guiding
function of procedure—the particularization of general legal norms. Our
exploration of type two of substantive procedure can begin with examples
and then proceed to a more abstract analysis.
A very clear example of the particularization function is the
declaratory judgment.92 Declaratory judgments have two critical features:
(1) they take a general legal rule and apply it to a particular factual context,
and (2) they can resolve a dispute by guiding primary conduct. A
declaration that A’s work does not infringe B’s copyright enables A to
enter into an agreement with C to distribute the work; the opposite outcome
would communicate a message to C that distribution of the work would be
contrary to law. A declaratory judgment acts as a kind of particularized
statute or ex post facto law; whereas statutes declare obligations in general
and abstract form, declaratory judgments legislate for particular individuals
(or entities) on particular occasions.
90. Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
91. See Parness et al., supra note 78, at 414–24 (listing federal securities claims, New Jersey and
Georgia professional malpractice claims, medical malpractice claims, requests for punitive damages,
childhood sexual abuse claims, and federal civil rights claims as examples of substantive rules cast in
procedural form).
92. For a collection of sources on declaratory judgments, see supra note 15.
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Declaratory judgments provide a perspicuous example of actionguiding particularization of general legal norms, but they are not the only
example. Injunctions perform the same function, supplementing the
declaration of rights with a coercive order backed by the force of
punishment. The action-guiding function of damage awards is not always
as clear because, on the surface, damage awards appear to operate
backward (ex ante). Sometimes a damage award only guides action to the
extent that it requires an act of payment in satisfaction of the judgment, but
this is not always the case. Sometimes a damage award guides behavior by
informing the parties (and others) about their particular legal obligations
toward one another. Similarly, the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion guide action by making judgments, findings, and rulings
explicitly binding parties in contexts outside the four corners of a particular
civil action.93
These examples of the action-guiding particularization of general legal
norms are not accidental or exceptional. In the Introduction, we established
that the actual world is characterized by three problems of compliance with
substantive legal norms: (1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law
and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal norms, and
(3) the problem of partiality.94 The possible world of acoustic separation of
substance and procedure allows us to appreciate the significance of
procedure’s particularization function. When we laid out the conditions of
acoustic separation, we stipulated that action-guiding outcomes
(declaratory judgments, injunctions, and damage awards) could pass
through the acoustic barrier. This specification was necessary for law to
function effectively. If citizens were not allowed to learn of judgments,
then the substantive law would effectively be crippled by the problems of
imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality. This fact
leads to an important conclusion about the relationship between substance
and procedure: even an idealized model of substance and procedure
requires procedures to play the substantive role of action-guiding
particularization of legal norms. This conclusion is important because it
demonstrates the essential entanglement of substance and procedure.
93. The doctrine of issue preclusion, for example, has the effect of transforming factual and legal
determinations in every case into the functional equivalent of declaratory judgments. What is
“declared” in a summary judgment, verdict, finding of fact, or conclusion of law in a prior adjudication
becomes binding on the parties to that adjudication.
94. See supra Part I.A.

SOLU12.DOC

2004]

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

221

2. Procedural Substance
The entanglement of substance and procedure takes another form.
Rules that are substantive in form may serve procedural functions. In the
world of acoustic separation, courtrooms are insulated from the general
rules of primary conduct. In the real world, rules aimed at primary conduct
also regulate the litigation process. There are two types of procedural
substance. Type one involves particular court rules that directly impact the
litigation process. Type two involves the more general relationship between
conduct rules and decision rules.
a. Procedural Substance: Type One—Formal Conduct Rules with
Intentionally Procedural Functions
In the world of acoustic separation, the Code of Conduct does not
impinge on the system of adjudication. In the actual world, no acoustic
barrier prevents application of general rules of primary conduct to
litigation-related behavior. Given this fact, procedural functions can be
performed by rules cast in substantive guise. Among the many examples of
such rules are criminal statutes prohibiting obstruction of justice, witness
tampering, and destruction of evidence, and the tort of spoliation of
evidence.95 These rules are substantive in form—criminal law and tort law
are classified as substantive—but these substantive rules have procedural
functions—deterring the destruction of evidence and correcting the
injustices caused by procedural irregularities.
b. Procedural Substance: Type Two—Particularized Decision Rules
In the world of acoustic separation, what we ordinarily call the
substantive law was divided into two parts, the Code of
Conduct addressed to citizens and the Code of Decision addressed to
judges. But the actual world of litigation does not involve this sort of
acoustic separation. In the actual world, the articulation of the substantive
law by appellate courts (as opposed to legislatures) always takes place in a
particular procedural context.
One such context is the motion for judgment as a matter of law96 (the
demurrer in some state systems or the 12(b)(6) motion in federal court97).
95.

See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION
(2001); Stephen Marzen & Lawrence Solum, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L. J. 1085 (1987) (analyzing the destruction of evidence with
proposals for a coherent judicial approach).
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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Whether a demurrer is granted depends on the substantive law (the rules of
conduct and decision), but the articulation of standards for granting or
denying a demurrer will be phrased in terms of pleading. The pleading of
some facts may be required for a particular cause of action; the pleading of
other facts will defeat a claim.
The summary judgment motion presents another context.98 Whether a
summary judgment motion is granted depends on the substantive law, but
the articulation of the standards for granting such motions will require
appellate courts to decide when “a genuine issue of material fact” exists
and when it does not. Operationally, summary judgment standards will
require that affidavits, documents, or discovery responses containing
certain types of facts be put before the court.99 Once again, the substantive
law is translated into standards for resolution of a procedural question.
A final example of the translation of substance into procedure is the
jury instruction. Rules governing jury instructions are clearly procedural in
the sense that they regulate conduct inside the courtroom. The rules
governing jury instructions translate rules of conduct and decision into
rules of procedure. When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s jury
instruction, it performs a dual function. On the one hand, it reviews the
substance of the instruction de novo. On the other hand, it reviews the form
of the instruction for an abuse of discretion. This dual standard of review
reflects the entanglement of substance and procedure that is inherent in the
process of instructing a jury. Jury instructions are procedures, but they are
procedures that transform the abstract and general principles of substantive
law into concrete and particular guidelines for deliberation.
D. THE ENTANGLEMENT THESIS
We are now in a position to appreciate the various modalities of
entanglement between substance and procedure. Rules and mechanisms
that are formally procedural nonetheless perform substantive functions, for
example, the PSLRA or declaratory judgments. Rules that are formally
substantive perform procedural functions, for example, the spoliation tort
or the substantive standards for demurrers and summary judgments. Table
2 summarizes the modalities of entanglement.

98.
99.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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TABLE 2. Modalities of entanglement

Type I
(Intentional)

Type II
(Particularized)

Substantive Form
Procedural Function
Formal Conduct Rules
with Intentionally
Procedural Functions
(Example: spoliation
tort)
Particularized
Decision Rules
(Example:
particularized
standard for summary
judgment)

Procedural Form,
Substantive Function
Procedural Rules with
Intentionally
Substantive Functions
(Example: PSLRA)
Particularized
Conduct Rules
(Example: declaratory
judgment)

In both the case of substantive procedure and of procedural substance,
entanglement comes in two types. The first kind of entanglement (“Type
I”) is most easily recognized. When a legislature intentionally uses a
procedural form to achieve a substantive end, the entanglement between
substance and procedure becomes unmistakable. The PSLRA and the
spoliation tort both involve a deliberate crossing of the line between
substance and procedure. Type I entanglement is important because it
draws our attention to the fact that substantive forms can be used to achieve
procedural ends and vice versa.
But the second type of entanglement (“Type II”) is more fundamental
and pervasive. Type II entanglement implicates every rule of procedure and
every substantive law. Every legal proceeding is the source of
particularized conduct rules. Every rule of substantive law is transformed
into rules of pleading, summary adjudication, and jury instructions. Type II
entanglement involves two kinds of particularization. First, general and
abstract conduct rules are transformed into particular resolutions of claims
and issues resulting in judgments that announce or imply standards of
conduct, which are concrete and contextualized to individual cases.
Second, general and abstract rules of procedure are transformed into
particular standards for the resolution of motions for judgments on the
pleadings, summary judgment, and jury instructions.
The pervasiveness of the particularization involved in Type II
entanglement is a necessary feature of any system of adjudication. In the
Introduction we explored why particularization is necessary. Abstract and
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general rules must be applied to concrete and particular facts and
procedural histories. And this process of application must respond to the
three problems that we have identified: (1) the incomplete problem of
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of specification of
legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Type II entanglement is the
inevitable byproduct of the particularization required to overcome the
problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality.
Without it, general and abstract rules would not be applied. Although I
have expressed this idea in a novel framework, my core thesis has been
expressed by others in a variety of ways. Geoffrey Hazard puts it this way:
“Substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.”100
The entanglement thesis is simply the idea that the entanglement of
substance and procedure required by the application of abstract rules to
concrete cases is a pervasive feature of adjudication. This thesis can be
confirmed by consulting our thought experiment of acoustic separation
between substance and procedure. In the world of acoustic separation, Type
I entanglement disappears. The PSLRA could not achieve its goals in a
world where those who issue securities are completely unaware of the
operations of the adjudication process; an attempt to enact such a provision
would violate the constitutional requirement that all conduct rules be
promulgated in the Code of Conduct. But even in the world of acoustic
separation, Type II entanglement would be pervasive. This is because the
acoustic separation between substance and procedure cannot be complete in
any possible world without “magical” connections between primary actors
and the courts. For the system to work, facts must flow from the world of
conduct into the world of adjudication and judgments must travel in the
reverse direction.
E. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE RESTATED
Justice Reed’s Erie concurrence was premised on a picture of the
relationship between substance and procedure.101 Substance was one thing,
and procedure another—although the line between the two might be
hazy.102 The development of the Erie doctrine involves a series of attempts
to operationalize this distinction—to render clear that which is hazy. The
outcome-determination test (in both its original form and as reinterpreted in
100. Geoffrey Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, in CLASS
ACTIONS: EXPERTS FROM A SYMPOSIUM BEFORE THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973).
101. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 92.
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Hanna) may have merit as a test for the resolution of Erie problems, but it
is an utter failure for the purpose of distinguishing substance from
procedure.103 A more promising approach for this task was suggested by
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna; his concurrence was premised on
the notion that substantive law regulates primary conduct and procedural
law regulates the adjudicative process.104 But Justice Harlan’s suggestion
runs into the problem of entanglement, which is exemplified by the
PSLRA’s intentional use of procedural forms to achieve substantive
goals.105 The thought experiment acoustically separating substance from
procedure allows us to precisely characterize this entanglement by
comparing actual legal rules to the form that they would take in the world
of the thought experiment. The thought experiment allows us to distinguish
the various modalities of entanglement between substance and procedure,
resulting in a typology of substantive procedure and procedural substance.
A closer examination of the types of entanglement yields the conclusion
that one source of entanglement—the need to particularize general rules of
substance and procedure—is ineliminable, even in the thought experiment
of acoustic separation.
The upshot of our investigation is not a deconstruction of the
distinction between substance and procedure. Instead, the thought
experiment yields a precise analytic tool for appreciating procedural forms
and functions and allows us to appreciate the ineliminable and inherent
entanglement of substance and procedure. For the purposes of a theory of
procedural justice, the important conclusion is that procedures particularize
abstract and general substantive rules. That is, the real work of procedure is
to provide particular action-guiding legal norms.
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
We have begun to lay the foundation for a theory of procedural justice
by giving an account of the nature of procedure. This part of the Article
completes the foundation by laying out the jurisprudential assumptions of
the theory of procedural justice. The trick is to say enough about
jurisprudential foundations to make the substance of the theory clear while
avoiding unnecessary forays into the thorny and intractable problems of
legal philosophy. This foundational work begins in Section A, “The
Jurisprudential Framework for the Theory,” which briefly sketches a
103. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
468–69 (1965).
104. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J.,- concurring).
105. See, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2000).
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plausible relationship between this Article and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of
law as integrity. In Section B, “The Role of Public Reason,” I introduce an
important qualification of Dworkin’s view: political morality requires legal
justifications to rely on public reasons, implying that the theory of
procedural justice introduced here must be grounded in arguments that are
accessible to the public at large. Finally, in Section C, “Some Objections to
a Theory of Procedural Justice,” I consider some of the most prominent
objections that have been made to theoretical approaches to law in general
and to a theory of civil procedure in particular.
Some readers may be willing to go along with my project, and forgo
the discussion of foundational questions that is found in this Part of the
essay. If you prefer to do so, turn to Part IV, “Views of Procedural Justice.”
A. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEORY
My aim is to develop a theory of procedural justice and not a theory of
general jurisprudence. Theories of general jurisprudence are enormously
controversial, and there is reason to doubt that such controversies will ever
be resolved. My aim, therefore, is to avoid the following question: what
general normative theory should guide the law? Instead, I simply sketch
one general theoretical framework, using that framework for convenience
of exposition. The general approach that I will adopt is interpretive. The
theory of procedural justice I offer here is intended to fit and justify the
existing procedural landscape. This approach is, of course, familiar from
the work of Dworkin.106
Dworkin’s own elaboration of his theory utilizes a heuristic device, an
imaginary judge named Hercules. In an early essay, “Hard Cases,”
Dworkin posited that Hercules was confronted with a difficult case, in
which the settled law did not provide a clear answer.107 In our context, we
imagine that Hercules is faced with a case of first impression concerning an
issue of procedural due process, the right to fair procedure contained in the
106. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). Although I use Dworkin’s
framework, the argument that I offer here is independent of “law as integrity,” the name Dworkin gives
to his theory. My own views of general jurisprudence differ in important respects from Dworkin’s
views. Whereas Dworkin may require only a loose degree of fit before proceeding to justification, my
view is that the criterion of fit should do most of the work if the task at hand is that of a judge deciding
a case. On the other hand, if the task is legislation, then justification properly steps to the front as the
primary criterion. Although important, this disagreement is not crucial for the current project, which
does not offer an interpretation of the Due Process Clause, but instead develops a theory of procedural
justice.
107. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106, at 105–30.
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Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution.108 To decide this hard case, Hercules must construct a theory
of procedural due process. We might imagine that his decisionmaking
proceeds in two steps. First, he identifies the theories that fit the
constitutional text as well as the already decided cases: Hercules asks,
“Which theories of procedural justice are consistent with the language of
the Due Process Clause, its history, and the general contours of the
Supreme Court’s procedural due process cases?” Second, from among
these theories, he selects the theory that provides the best supporting reason
for a due process doctrine as a matter of political morality. Hercules asks,
“Of the theories of procedural justice that fit existing doctrine, which
provides the best justification for that doctrine?”109
One caveat should be noted at once: I have presented Hercules’
method as a linear two-step process, but this oversimplifies the theory for
purposes of simplicity and clarity.110 Let us pause for a moment and
examine the relationship between the two criteria, fit and justification, for
evaluating a theory of procedural justice. Fit measures the adequacy of a
theory by its ability to explain the shape of existing law. Thus, to meet the
criterion of fit, a theory of procedural justice must cohere with the
constitutional text, the judicial decisions, and the general shape of the civil
dispute resolution system in the United States. An adequate theory of
procedural fairness should account for basic features of civil procedure,
such as the following: procedural due process doctrine, personal
jurisdiction, the rules of pleading and joinder, the system of discovery, the
rules of evidence, standards of appellate review, and the prior adjudication
doctrines.
We should observe, however, that there may be features of the system
of civil procedure for which we should not seek an explanation. For
example, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and some
aspects of personal jurisdiction doctrine can only be explained by the fact
that we have a system allocating power between the federal government
and the states. There may be aspects of civil procedure that are mostly a
108. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
109. By adopting the interpretive method as an expository device, I do not mean to endorse
Dworkin’s approach to constitutional interpretation as against its rivals, such as textualism or
originalism.
110. For Dworkin, the line between fit and justification is not hard and fast; rather, the line
between fit and justification “is a useful analytical device that helps us give structure to any
interpreter’s” working theory. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 106, at 231.
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matter of convention.111 Take the example of pleading. Not just any system
of pleading would be fair, but there may be a broad range of pleading
issues that can be settled by convention, for example, whether there are to
be pleadings beyond the answer or reply,112 whether some issues are to be
raised in the answer or by motions, and a variety of similar questions. The
important thing is that the system of pleading should not unduly interfere
with decisions on the merits as opposed to procedural technicalities.113
In sum, the criterion of fit demands that our theory of procedural
fairness be a theory that takes the current system of civil dispute resolution
as its subject. The theory must fit existing doctrine where fairness is at
stake, but need not fit features that are explained by other concerns, such as
federalism or conventions, or arbitrary within certain limits.
The second criterion is justification: what theory of procedural
fairness offers the best justification—that is, the best argument of political
morality—in support of our system of civil dispute resolution? This Article
approaches the criterion of justification in two ways. First, we will assess
proposed models of procedural justice using the familiar tools of moral and
political argument. This first method sticks close to common sense,
utilizing argumentative strategies that might be employed in a judicial
opinion or brief. The second approach to the criterion of justification is
more theory-laden or philosophical. An inquiry into procedural justice can
step back from existing legal practice and ask the following question of
political philosophy: what conception of procedural justice should be
adopted in a just society?114
The second dimension of the inquiry into justification is related to the
first. Certainly our current practices and ideas about the reform of these
practices will have much to tell us about the ideal case of a well-ordered
society that is regulated by the best available conception of justice. But the
two inquiries are not identical. It might be the case that core features of the
111. Here, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction between conventional and natural justice. See
ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, 1094a1,
1130b31–1131a9 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press photo. reprint 1949) (1915).
112. This is not to say that procedural justice does not imply some limits on pleading rules. A
system that required many, many levels of pleading, with technical requirements that operated as a trap
for the unsophisticated, might run contrary to concerns for accuracy and efficiency.
113. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 308–20 (1938)
(discussing the shift from code to notice pleading and its merits).
114. For the purposes of the second approach, I shall work within a roughly Rawlsian paradigm.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993). For a summary of John Rawls’s theoretical framework as I understand it, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549 (1994).
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current procedural system would not be included in the ideal case; for
example, it might be argued that the best conception of procedural justice
would not include the adversary system.
I would like to make one concluding point about the jurisprudential
framework within which this Article operates. Although this framework is
broadly Dworkinian, it relies on only a subset of Dworkin’s ideas. Thus, I
shall not rely on the right-answer thesis, Dworkin’s claim that every case
has a unique, legally correct answer. Nor shall I rely on Dworkin’s claim
that judges may only rely on considerations of fairness or principle, and
thus, that reasons of policy or social utility have no proper role in judicial
interpretation. For the purposes of this Article, I want neither to agree nor
to disagree with Dworkin on these issues. Rather, my intention is simply to
set these controversial features of Dworkin’s theory aside for the time
being, on the ground that their resolution is not necessary for the task at
hand. Moreover, although my argument is couched within the framework
of Dworkin’s interpretivism—I shall claim that a certain conception of
procedural justice is superior to its rivals on the criteria of fit and
justification—this is not a necessary feature of my argument. The
normative and descriptive arguments that I make here can be made clearly
distinct, yielding an argument of political morality on the one hand and an
argument of descriptive legal theory on the other. A final caveat concerning
the relationship between this Article and Dworkin’s theory of law as
integrity follows immediately in the next section.
B. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC REASON
A further question arises with respect to the dimension of justification:
what sorts of reasons count as good justifications for the law? One answer
to this question is that the laws should be justified by the best available
moral theory, whether that theory is a deontological theory like Emmanuel
Kant’s, a consequentialist theory like Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, or a
virtue-centered theory like Aristotle’s. In turn, when Hercules constructs a
theory of procedural fairness, he ultimately may be required to resolve the
great questions of moral theory and decide whether utilitarianism,
Kantianism, virtue-ethics, or some other view offers the best general
account of morality.
The thesis that the deep premises of particular comprehensive moral
doctrines are good legal reasons is problematic for two reasons. First, the
question as to which moral theory is best is deeply controversial and, as a
practical matter, no project in legal theory will get off the ground if the
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deep questions of normative ethics must be resolved as a preliminary step.
Essentially, if a legal theory rests on the deepest truths of moral theory,
then it may be properly critiqued by cogent attacks on its underlying moral
view. Because the history of moral philosophy suggests that the deep
disagreements between those with theological and secular views or
between utilitarians and Kantians are unlikely to be resolved, the reliance
on deep moral reasons would render practical progress in legal theory an
unreachable objective.
Second, given that deep moral consensus is not a practical possibility,
we must give public reasons if our justifications for the law are to inform or
persuade our fellow citizens in general and the legal community in
particular. This point involves more than simply a matter of instrumental
efficacy. Respect for our fellow citizens requires that we make good and
sufficient reasons available to them; the legitimacy of a democratic society
requires this.115 In other words, it would be a denial of respect to give our
fellow citizens only reasons that conflict with their most deeply held moral
and religious beliefs, and a regime that provides such reasons cannot claim
democratic legitimacy. Public reasons include common sense, the true and
uncontroversial results of the sciences (broadly understood), and values
embedded in our public legal and political culture that are available to our
fellow citizens.116 Thus, when we assess a theory of procedural justice by
the criterion of justification, we ought to ask whether the justifications are
of the right sort; that is, we ought to ask if they are public reasons.117
The ideal of public reason to which we shall appeal is similar to that
offered by John Rawls. In summary, its features are as follows:
(1) Content of Public Reason: Public reason is reason that relies
on premises and modes of reason that are available to the public at
large, including (a) the general features of all reason, such as rules
of inference and evidence and (b) generally shared beliefs,
common sense reasoning, and the noncontroversial methods of
science.118
115. See JEREMY WALDRON, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 61, 61
(1993); Christopher Bertram, Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity, and Democratic
Community, 107 ETHICS 563, 565 (1997).
116. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 224–25.
117. See id.; Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
729 (1993); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1089–92 (1990)
(discussing the requirement that judges rule on the basis of public reason); Lawrence B. Solum,
Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Public Reason,
APA NEWSLETTERS, Spring 1996, at 54 (1996); Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1459 (1996); Solum, supra note 114 (discussing Rawls’s theory of public reason).
118. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 224–25.
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(2) Scope of Application: At a minimum, the ideal of public
reason applies to deliberation and discussion concerning the basic
structure of society and the “constitutional essentials.”119
(3) Persons Obligated: The duty of civility specified by the ideal
creates obligations for (a) both citizens and public officials when
they engage in public political debate, (b) citizens when they vote,
and (c) public officials when they engage in official action—so
long as the debate, vote, or action concerns the subjects specified
in (2).120
(4) Structure of the Obligation: The ideal requires citizens and
public officials to include public reasons in public political debate,
but nonpublic reasons may be included, provided that public
reasons are offered in due course.121 In special contexts, such as
the decision of a legal dispute or the passage of a bill, public
officials should exclude nonpublic reasons from official
pronouncements such as judicial opinions or statements of
legislative purpose.122
(5) Nature of the Obligation: The duty of civility implied by the
ideal is an obligation of political morality, and the ideal does not
justify legal restrictions on public political discourse.123
If Hercules complies with this ideal of public reason as a judge, he
will be bound by the strict requirement that the ideal imposes on judges
acting in their official capacity. That is, Hercules may offer only public
reasons for his decisions. Thus, Hercules’ theory of procedural fairness
may not rely on the deep and controversial premises of particular
comprehensive views. He may not rely on the truth of a religious doctrine,
Kantianism, utilitarianism, or any other particular comprehensive view.
Hercules’s theory of procedural justice may, however, incorporate values
and principles drawn from the public political culture. Importantly, the fact
that a publicly available value or principle is part of or is supported by a
variety of comprehensive doctrines does not render that value or principle
nonpublic. Quite the contrary, public reasons will commonly find support
in a variety of comprehensive doctrines, although the deep foundations for
the public reason may vary from doctrine to doctrine.
My theoretical framework differs from Dworkin’s theory to the extent
that his view does not incorporate an ideal of public reason with content
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 224, 227.
See id. at 217–18.
See id. at 217–18, 224–26.
See id. at 236, 252.
Id. at 217.
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similar to that outlined above. Even if Hercules may voyage into the deep
waters of ultimate value or ascend to the airy heights of abstract moral
theory, this Article will remain on foot, relying for the most part on the
familiar tools of legal theory and practical political argument. We shall
endeavor to limit the conceptual ascent to those climbs that are necessary to
counter rival views or to lay bare the bones of our shared intuitions about
procedural fairness.
C. SOME OBJECTIONS TO A THEORY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
This section considers three foundational objections to my project.
The first foundational objection is rooted in legal pragmatism. It argues that
highly abstract, large-scale theories, like a theory of procedural justice,
ought to be eschewed in favor of mid-level or low-level principles. The
second foundational objection is grounded in a radical critique of liberal
legal theory. It states that no theory of procedural justice can succeed
because existing doctrine is fundamentally incoherent and can only be
explained as a function of political struggle. The third foundational
objection is based on concerns raised in critical race theory and feminist
jurisprudence. It states that a supposedly neutral theory of procedural
justice must be incomplete unless it explicitly incorporates the perspectives
of excluded groups.
My aim is not to lay these objections to rest; each of them raises large
questions that are outside the scope of this Article. Rather, my aim is to
suggest that such foundational objections do not give us a priori reasons to
turn aside from the project of developing a theory of procedural justice.
Foundational questions can be raised properly if they are cogent after we
are successful in developing a theory of procedural justice. At this point, let
us consider each objection in turn.
1. A Pragmatist Objection
A legal pragmatist might make the following argument against the
usefulness of developing a theory of procedural justice. We are not likely,
the pragmatist begins, to reach agreement at the most general and abstract
level about what procedural justice requires.124 Some will adhere to a
utilitarian theory of procedural justice, others to a theory based on
deontological (or rights-based) concerns. Because ultimate agreement on a
general theory is not a realistic goal, we ought, for pragmatic reasons, to
124.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 161–63 (1996).
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seek instead agreement on more particular and concrete principles. Rather
than a theory of procedural justice, we ought to be developing mid-level
principles.125 Utilitarians and deontologists may agree that our pleading
system ought to provide adequate notice and avoid deciding disputes on the
basis of technicalities, even though they disagree on the reasons for these
principles. We ought to be seeking “incompletely theorized agreements,” to
use Cass Sunstein’s felicitous phrase.126
This objection must be taken seriously. In the case of procedural
justice, the objection has an especially strong appeal because most
discussions about procedure (and certainly most thinking by judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars) have avoided the most general and abstract
issues of procedural justice. Rather, the focus has been on relatively
concrete and particular problems. For example, a great deal of attention has
been devoted to working out the precise implications of the rules of
procedure in relatively narrow contexts. At the next level of conceptual
ascent, there has been a great deal of focus on the middle level of
abstraction and developing an adequate account of personal jurisdiction or
of the Erie doctrine. The practice of proceduralists provides a good reason
to believe doctrinal detail and mid-level principles provide a better target
for theorists than general and abstract principles of procedural justice.
The practice of legal scholars is reflected in judicial opinion. The
Supreme Court has stated, “We must bear in mind that no single model of
procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by
the Due Process Clause. ‘The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation.’”127 It is well to bear this statement in mind. The search for
principles of procedural justice should not be confused with a much less
promising enterprise, the quest for a universal set of procedures applicable
in every factual and legal context. The likelihood that this latter exercise
would be futile does not mean that the former task—the identification of
general principles of procedural justice—is without promise.
125. A mid-level principle might, for example, address questions such as the following: Should
finders of fact be lay persons or judges? Should there be a right of representation by counsel? And
should there be an extensive right to pretrial discovery? Mid-level principles address questions that are
relatively more particular and concrete than the questions addressed by the relatively general and
abstract principles developed here. See infra Part VI.
126. SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 35 (defining this phrase as a situation in which people “accept
the principle [but] need not agree on what it entails in particular cases”).
127. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982) (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)).
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At this point, my claim is simply that there is no way to settle, a priori,
whether a theory of procedural justice will be fruitful or not. Such theories
must stand on their merits—the reasons advanced in their favor, the
answers to the objections raised, and their utility as tools for analysis. In
other words, we ought to have a pragmatic attitude about the usefulness of
abstraction and generality in legal thinking. Though pragmatic
considerations sometimes counsel against highly abstract, large-scale
theories, they do not always so counsel. The only way for a pragmatist to
judge the value of a theory of procedural justice is to put it to work and see
if it pays. William James famously asked whether a theory has “cash
value.”128 If a theory of procedural justice can cut legal ice, then we have
good reason to use it.
A bit more can be said about the pragmatist objection, however,
especially in light of the role of public reason, as sketched in Part III.B.
There are strategies and resources available to a theory of procedural
justice for coping with the problem of disagreement. It is unrealistic to
hope that utilitarians and deontologists will agree across the board about
anything, procedural justice included. But a theory of procedural justice
need not be expressed in a way that takes sides in the great debates of
moral theory or religious belief. Rather, we may express the theory in terms
of a set of principles, which might be affirmed for a variety of reasons
including legal reasons (such as fit with existing doctrine) and reasons of
moral theory (such as those provided by utilitarianism, virtue ethics, or
some version of deontology). In Rawlsian terms, we might seek an
“overlapping consensus” between those who affirm the principles for a
variety of reasons.129 As Sunstein puts it, we can seek an “incompletely
theorized agreement.”130 When we put the case for the theory, we shall
avoid reliance on particular comprehensive doctrines (for example, on
utilitarianism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, or particular religious views) and
instead rely on public reasons, or those reasons that are widely available to
the public at large.131
128. As James puts it, “Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea or belief to be true,’
it says, ‘what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false?
What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?’” WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism, in
WRITINGS 1902–1910, at 479, 573 (Bruce Kukclick ed., 1987).
129. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 15.
130. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 35.
131. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 223–24.
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2. A Radical Objection
Consider a more radical objection to the project of developing a theory
of procedural justice. The very idea of a theory that “fits” existing law
assumes that there is some minimum degree of coherence in current
procedure doctrine, but that assumption is open to question. It might be
argued that existing doctrine is strongly incoherent. The most extreme form
of this claim would be the strong indeterminacy thesis. As applied to civil
disputes, the thesis states that there is no outcome of any procedural
question that we can reasonably see as legally incorrect. More concretely, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion can be properly granted or denied with respect to any
conceivable complaint. Any court can properly assert or reject personal
jurisdiction over any conceivable defendant. Indeed, any procedural motion
can be properly granted or denied in any conceivable case. This form of the
objection seems too strong to be plausible. In procedure, as elsewhere,
there are easy cases. Some complaints clearly state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.132 Others clearly do not.133 If there are easy cases in
procedure, then the strong indeterminacy thesis is false in the procedural
domain.134
But the strong indeterminacy thesis is not required for a radical
critique of my project to succeed. For a theory of procedural justice to fit
existing doctrine, it will not suffice for the doctrine merely to avoid total
incoherence; rather, existing doctrine must meet a minimum threshold level
of coherence if the project is to succeed. This is not to say that the project
requires perfect coherence. Any plausible version of interpretivist legal
theory must admit that there are mistakes in doctrine. Some cases or rules
will not fit the best available theory of procedural justice. With respect to
them, the theory will maintain that the decision should be overruled or the
rule amended.135 But if it turns out that the underlying principles of fairness
that best explain the law of personal jurisdiction are fundamentally
inconsistent with those that explain the opportunity to be heard, and that yet
a third set of inconsistent principles best explain pleading and joinder, then
132. The forms that accompany the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide paradigm cases of
complaints that should not be dismissed on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
133. A complaint with no allegations at all would seem to be an easy case for granting a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.
134. See Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy and Equity, in RADICAL CRITIQUES OF THE LAW 44,
47–48 (Stephen M. Griffin & Robert C.L. Moffat eds., 1997) [hereinafter Solum, Indeterminacy and
Equity] (giving an example and explanation of an “easy case” in which only one outcome is possible);
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462,
471–72 (1987) [hereinafter Solum, Indeterminacy Crisis].
135. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106, at 118–23.
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the interpretivist project will face severe obstacles. Interpretivism assumes
that the law is a seamless web, but what if it is not?
A theory of procedural justice will lack validation on the criterion of
fit if there is moderately strong incoherence in existing doctrine. But once
again, this objection does not provide an a priori reason to reject the project
of developing a theory of procedural justice. If a theory can be developed
and shown to fit existing doctrine, then the charge of incoherence will have
been false. Unless one believes that there are good a priori reasons for
believing that the law can never be coherent, then once again the issue
should be postponed until after we have a particular theory of procedural
justice in view.
3. A Perspectivalist Objection
Consider yet another foundational objection to the project of
developing a theory of procedural justice. Perspectivalists will argue that
such a theory is fundamentally misguided because it fails to acknowledge
the perspectives of those who have been excluded from the making and
shaping of modern procedure doctrine, especially women and people of
color.136 Surely there is some truth to this objection. The method for theory
construction that I have proposed is biased or tilted because it takes
existing doctrine as fixed and as the data for which the theory must
account. Thus, the interpretive approach incorporates the possibility that
existing procedure institutionalizes systematic unfairness.137
But the perspectivalist objection does not justify abstention from the
project of theory building. First, articulating the notion of procedural
136. See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal
Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (1994). Cf. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72
B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (“Unfortunately, the myth of due process repeatedly has been corrupted to
enhance the position of the powerful. Consequently, due process is a myth not only because it is a set of
stories that transmit values, but also because it is a fantasy for many who claim its protection.”). See
generally Lawrence B. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111 (1990) (discussing the
exclusion of the voices of persons of color, women, the poor, and homosexuals from political
discourse).
137. The theory of procedural justice articulated in this Article can be seen as a response to the
perspectivalist critique in an important respect. By emphasizing rights of participation, procedural
justice can at least ensure that the voices of excluded groups are heard when the rights of individual
members of such groups are at stake. Cf. Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic
Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 453–55 (1994) (suggesting that improved community participation
procedures would make administrative agencies more responsive to poor and minority communities);
Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 350–54, 420–21 (1990) (exploring efficiency reforms of current court
procedures that tend to reduce minority access to the courts and decrease advocacy of minority rights).
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fairness implicit in existing practice has substantial value even if the
perspectivalist objection is correct: reconstructing the implicit ideal
provides definition to a debate that would otherwise be murky. Second, the
truth of the perspectivalist critique cannot be assumed in advance. After a
theory of procedural justice has been articulated, perspectivalist critics can
put forth their arguments, which can then be judged on the merits.
We have completed our sketch of a justification for the enterprise of
developing a theory of procedural justice. I recognize that this sketch will
be unsatisfying to many and that the issues that are raised by the objections
to my project cannot be resolved in the brief scope of this
Article. My goal is more modest. I hope that I have laid my cards on the
table, so that the reader can evaluate the project with a sense of its
foundational assumptions and with some notion of the objections that
might be raised. At this point, we turn to the idea of procedural justice
itself.
IV. VIEWS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
This part surveys and critiques the notions of procedural justice that
are implicit in judicial opinion and legal scholarship. Section A sets out a
general framework for thinking about procedural fairness and delineating
the subject matter that the theory will cover. Current thinking about
procedural fairness has been informed by three ideas laid out and critiqued
in Section B. First, the “accuracy model” assumes that the aim of civil
dispute resolution is correct application of the law to the facts. Second, the
“balancing model” assumes that the aim of civil procedure is to strike a fair
balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication. Last, the
“participation model” assumes that the very idea of a correct outcome must
be understood as a function of a process that guarantees fair and equal
participation. Section C suggests the ways in which the three models can be
integrated into a unified theory of procedural justice.
A. THE IDEA OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In this section, I set out some very basic preliminary points about the
idea of procedural justice. In Section 1, I define the topic, relating
procedural justice to the notions of corrective and distributive justice, and
then lay out three possible views of procedural justice—perfect, imperfect,
and pure. In Section 2, I distinguish the subject matter of the theory, setting
out those issues that I bracket or reserve for another occasion.

SOLU12.DOC

238

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:181

1. The Conceptual Framework
The notion of justice can be analyzed in many ways, but one good
place to start is with Aristotle. Aristotle divides the topic of justice into two
main parts, which we shall call “distributive justice” and “corrective
justice.” Distributive justice concerns the division of shares in social
benefits and burdens; thus, many questions of tax policy are questions of
distributive justice. Corrective justice involves the rectification of injustice,
and thus includes a variety of topics from criminal law, torts, and contracts,
among many others.138 Supplementing Aristotle’s account, let us say that
“procedural justice” is concerned with the means by which social groups
(including governments, private institutions, and families) apply the
requirements of corrective and distributive justice to particular cases. In the
context of a modern nation-state, procedural justice is concerned with the
adjudicative methods by which legal norms are applied to particular cases
and the legislative processes by which social benefits and burdens are
divided. In this Article, we am concerned with the procedures of corrective
justice, and in particular, with the procedures of corrective civil justice—
that is, civil procedure. A conception of procedural justice specifies the
conditions under which the application of the norms of corrective justice to
particular cases is fair.
The idea of procedural justice may be made easier by using a simple
example. Consider the familiar procedure for dividing a cake: the person
who slices the cake picks last.139 What makes this a fair procedure? One
answer is that the criterion for what constitutes a fair outcome, equal slices
for all, requires that the slicer pick last. The slicer-picks-last rule is fair
because it guarantees accuracy in cutting equal slices. Or does it? A more
reliable way to ensure perfectly equal slices would be to use a compass and
principles of plane geometry. But this strikes us as an undue amount of fuss
to go through when slicing a cake. Perhaps the reason we believe that the
slicer-picks-last rule is fair is that it strikes a balance between the
importance of the outcome and the cost of getting there; it gets us close to
equal shares most of the time at a reasonable price. Thus, the slicer-pickslast rule might be considered fair because it does a good job of balancing.
Or is there something even more to the idea that the slicer-picks-last rule is
fair? Maybe we believe that the slicer gets a fair share because the slicer
was the one who did the cutting; the slicer’s participation in the cutting
validates the outcome, even if the slicer ends up with a smaller slice (or
138.
139.

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 111, at 1131b25–1132b20.
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 85.
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among the calorie conscious, a bigger slice).140 The slicer-picks-last rule
could be fair because of process independent of outcome.
These questions about the fairness of procedures for slicing a cake can
be generalized by setting out a framework for analyzing the idea of
procedural justice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls distinguishes between
three general kinds of procedural justice: (1) “perfect” procedural justice,
(2) “imperfect” procedural justice, and (3) “pure” procedural justice.
Consider perfect procedural justice first. There are, he writes,
[t]wo characteristic features of perfect procedural justice. First, there is
an independent criterion of what is a fair division, a criterion defined
separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And
second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to give that
desired outcome.141

Rawls argues that the rule for slicing cakes is an example of perfect
procedural justice. The person who slices picks last, thereby ensuring the
equal division of shares. “Equal shares for each” is the independent
criterion of a fair division; the slicer-picks-last rule is the procedure that
reliably produces that outcome.
In the case of imperfect procedural justice, the first characteristic, an
independent criterion for fairness of outcome, is present, but the second, a
procedure that guarantees that outcome, is not. Rawls contends that
[i]mperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial. The
desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and
only if he has committed the offense with which he is charged. The trial
procedure is framed to search for and to establish the truth in this regard.
But it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead
to the correct result. The theory of trials examines which procedures and
140. See id. Strictly speaking, this argument only works for a two-person cake slicing game. The
strategy can be generalized to a n person game. For example, if there are n potential cake consumers
(call them C1, C2, C3, and so forth to Cn) the procedure would be as follows: C1 cuts a slice that C1
considers to be 1/n of the cake. If C2 believes the slice is 1/n or less, she passes. If C2 believes the slice
is more than 1/n, she trims the slice to equal what she believes is 1/n. This procedure is repeated until Cn
either trims or passes. The last person to touch the slice gets it. This procedure is then iterated, so that in
the second and subsequent rounds, each consumer cuts a slice that he or she believes is 1/n of the
original, until all of the slices have been distributed. Using this procedure, the consumers receive slices
that they believe are all 1/n of the original cake, with one possible exception. Cn may not believe that the
last slice is 1/n of the original cake because Cn might rationally believe that she was in error when she
failed to trim some or all of the prior slices. We might still believe, however, that Cn has received a fair
share of the cake because Cn had an opportunity to trim each of these slices and chose not to do so. See
JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 8 n.* (1995) (describing the
procedure in a four-person cake-slicing game). I owe thanks to David Leonard for calling my attention
to the n- person version of the familiar rule.
141. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 85.
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rules of evidence, and the like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose
consistent with the other ends of the law. Different arrangements for
hearing cases may reasonably be expected in different circumstances to
yield the right results, not always but at least most of the time.142

Thus, imperfect procedural justice incorporates the notion of an
independent criterion for accuracy but adds the notion of “other ends of the
law,” or considerations of cost that may be balanced against accuracy.
Rawls’s final kind of justice is “pure procedural justice”:
[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion
for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that
the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the
procedure has been properly followed. This situation is illustrated by
gambling. If a number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the
distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair,
whatever this distribution is.143

Pure procedural justice rejects an underlying assumption of both perfect
and imperfect procedural justice—the assumption that there is an
independent criterion for what constitutes the correct outcome. Though
there are not criteria for the correct outcome, there is an ideal (or actual) set
of procedures.
We shall take Rawls’s analysis as the beginning point for our inquiry
into procedural justice. That is, as we begin to unpack our notions of
procedural justice, we shall ask whether we are implicitly using the idea of
perfect, imperfect, or pure procedural justice, or some other notion.
2. The Limits of the Enterprise
This Article develops a theory of procedural justice, and before we
proceed any further, I should say a few words about the limits of this
enterprise. First, we shall limit our consideration to civil justice, explicitly
excluding consideration of criminal procedure. This limitation may be
arbitrary, but it is, I think, necessary if the enterprise is to get off the
ground at all. Civil procedure is a large enough topic, indeed, perhaps too
large a topic. Moreover, the criminal system is different in a number of
respects, including the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt, the
special protections for criminal defendants provided (or formerly provided)
142. Id. at 85–86.
143. Id. at 86. Rawls notes that his gambling example requires further assumptions, including that
the bets are fair in the sense that the expected payoff of each bet is zero, that the bets are made
voluntarily, that no one cheats, that the players entered the game under fair conditions, and so forth. Id.
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by the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the
protections provided by the search and seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment.144 A complete theory of procedural justice would address
these differences between the civil and criminal systems, but this essay
does not attempt to develop such a complete theory.145
There is a second limit on the enterprise of building a theory of
procedural justice. Procedural fairness may be the most central principle of
civil procedure, but it is not the only principle. Federal civil procedure in
the United States, which we shall most frequently use as an example, is
shaped by concerns for federalism that are not matters of procedural
justice. For this reason, the theory that I offer does not fully account for a
variety of doctrines in which federalism (or some other principle or policy)
plays a shaping role. These topics include federal subject matter
jurisdiction, the federalism component of the due process limits on personal
jurisdiction, and much of the Erie doctrine.
In addition, there is a third limit on the theory that is developed here.
The theory focuses on adjudication as the application of general rules to
particular cases. Our investigation will focus on the civil action at the trial
level. This focus elides an important aspect of the system of civil
adjudication—the role of appellate courts in developing and modifying
general and abstract rules themselves. This role is thematized by the way
that the U.S. Supreme Court uses particular cases as a vehicle for
announcing general rules of constitutional law. In cases like Miranda v.
Arizona146 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,147 the Supreme Court acts
in a legislative capacity, creating a constitutional code that supplements the
actual text of the Constitution. A similar role is played by state courts in
144. The civil-criminal distinction is the topic of a large literature. See Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (discussing some
distinctions between civil and criminal law in a broader analysis of the increasing use of civil remedies
to punish criminal conduct); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and
Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878, 1887–90 (1992)
(discussing the increasing overlap of civil and criminal law and the potential policy problems associated
with this development); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1993) (critiquing the
distinction between criminal and civil law in the context of indirect contempts); Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795
(1992) (discussing punitive civil sanctions and the procedures used to impose those sanctions).
145. At various points in the Article, I will offer remarks that point toward an account of the
distinctiveness of criminal procedure. See infra Part IV.B.2(b).
146. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
147. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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cases governed by the common law. In cases like Li v. Yellow Cab Co.148
or MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,149 state courts of last resort create and
modify general rules of contracts, property, and torts—once again playing a
role that is analogous to that played by legislatures.
Because my focus will be on the application of general rules to
particular cases, for the most part we will simply set aside the special
problems and issues raised by judicial lawmaking in civil litigation. The
theory offered here is not a theory of the common lawmaking process or of
constitutional adjudication. Moreover, my focus on rule application puts to
the side important questions regarding public law litigation that others may
believe should be at the center of a theory of procedural justice.150 This
does not mean that the theory of procedural justice cannot and should not
be extended to these contexts; rather, these issues are simply put aside in
order to allow us to focus on the core case of civil adjudication—the case
in which the general rules are fixed and application is the focus of the
adjudicative process.151
B. THREE MODELS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In this section, we examine three simple conceptions or models152 of
procedural justice that are, at least partially, implicit in current legal
practice.153 Each model will be measured against the criteria of fit and
148. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
149. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1150 (N.Y. 1916).
150. In this regard consider, Owen Fiss’s concession that his theory may not apply to the
adjudication of “purely private disputes.” Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979).
151. In addition to the limits discussed, the scope of this Article is limited in a variety of other
ways. For example, the discussion focuses on procedural justice in the public sphere and does not
consider the issue of procedural fairness in private associations. See generally Pinsker v. Pac. Coast
Soc’y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 260 (1974) (en banc) (holding that public policy requires certain
private associations “to refrain from arbitrary action” with respect to the admission, disciplining, or
expulsion of members and that “the association’s action must be both substantively rational and
procedurally fair”).
152. I use “concept” and “conception” to refer to the general idea of procedural justice as opposed
to particular theories of procedural justice. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106,
at 103–04; W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTLELIAN
SOCIETY 167, 167 (1956).
153. I use three models, labeled “accuracy,” “balancing,” and “process” to discuss the major
families of ideas about procedural fairness. Similar distinctions have sometimes been mapped with
different terminology. For example, Laurence Tribe distinguishes between the “instrumental” and
“intrinsic” values of due process. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (distinguishing between the “instrumental” and “intrinsic” values of due
process). See also Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
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justification. For each model we will question whether it accounts for the
shape of current doctrine and whether it provides a normatively attractive
grounding for that doctrine.
We can begin with the utopian hypothesis that the current doctrine is
structured by an implicit conception of perfect procedural justice—or the
accuracy model. This hypothesis is shown to be inadequate on grounds of
fit. Although a concern for truth-seeking and accuracy does characterize
some procedure doctrines, there are a variety of doctrines that cannot be
explained on the model of perfect procedural justice. Examples include res
judicata and other rules that protect the finality of judicial decisions.
Moreover, the accuracy model suffers from a crucial ambiguity: does it
pursue accuracy in particular cases or accuracy in the system as a whole?
The shortcomings of the accuracy model lead to a second hypothesis:
current doctrine is best explained as structured by a conception of imperfect
procedural justice—the balancing model. Two variations of this hypothesis
are explored. The first variation is utilitarian or consequentialist. Procedure
doctrine might be seen as structured by the balancing of accuracy and cost.
The second variation is rights based: it assumes that procedural justice
requires attention to the fair distribution of the costs imposed by the system
of procedure. These two variations can be combined in a variety of ways to
produce other, more complex versions of the balancing model.
We then consider a third hypothesis that a conception of pure
procedural justice best fits and justifies existing doctrine. We shall call this
the participation model. The key notion is that it is the process itself and
not outcome that defines procedural justice. If process is the key, what kind
of process is intrinsically fair? This question can be answered in at least
two different ways. The first answer uses actual acceptability to the parties
as the criterion for fair process. The second variation uses the notion of
acceptability under ideal conditions. Both variations of the participation
model suffer from serious flaws, namely, the exclusion of all
considerations of accuracy and cost as the criteria for procedural fairness.
That is, it purchases conceptual purity at the price of plausibility.
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 598 (1993) (distinguishing between outcome-oriented and
process-oriented participation theories).
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1. The Accuracy Model
The first model focuses exclusively on accuracy, or the correct
application of the law to the facts.154 My exposition of this model begins
with its utopian form—the ideal of perfect procedural justice.
a. The Utopian Ideal of Perfect Procedural Justice
Consider the possibility that current doctrine is informed by the
utopian ideal of perfect procedural justice.155 Substantive law provides an
independent criterion for the correct outcome. Robert Bone has called this
the “rights-based” view.156 The procedural system is designed to ensure
that in each case the substantively correct outcome actually issues. Let us
call the conception that procedural justice is measured solely by the
correctness of outcomes the accuracy model.
On the surface, it seems obvious that the system strives for correct
outcomes. Consider the basic structure of the civil litigation system. Courts
frequently articulate the telos of the civil litigation system as a “search for
truth.”157 One federal court opined that “the ultimate aim of the judicial
system is to ascertain the real truth.”158 Thus, liberal pleading rules are
designed to guard against erroneous resolutions on technical grounds.159
Extensive discovery aims to provide the parties with all the relevant
154. See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 882 n.1 (1994) (“I will use the term ‘procedural justice’ broadly to suggest an
assessment of the quality or success of procedural law in providing dispute-resolution participants what
we think they are due.”).
155. See D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION
57–61 (1986). See also Susan Kneebone, Natural Justice and Non-Citizens: A Matter of Integrity?, 26
MELB. U. L. REV. 355, 374 (2002) (characterizing D.J. Galligan as maintaining that “the main purpose
of the doctrine of procedural fairness is to make the best (that is, the most accurate) decisions in terms
of substantive outcomes”).
156. Bone defines rights-based views thus:
A rights-based theory assumes that the purpose of adjudication is to determine each party’s
legal rights accurately. Because rights trump social utility, a deprivation of a right cannot be
justified by direct appeal to the aggregate social benefits the offending activity makes
possible. Thus, if an erroneous result counts as a deprivation of substantive right, procedures
that increased error cannot be justified simply by citing the aggregate benefits to all resulting
from reduced litigation and delay costs.
Bone, supra note 153, at 598.
157. See, e.g., Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating
that “[t]he search for truth . . . is at the heart of the litigation process”); Millen v. Mayo Found., 170
F.R.D. 462, 464 (D. Minn. 1996) (“Justice is the search for truth in an effort to resolve conflict.”
(internal quotation omitted)).
158. See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991).
159. See, e.g., Mahler v. Drake, 43 F.R.D. 1, 3 & n.8 (D.S.C. 1967) (stating the Federal Rules may
be construed liberally “in the search for truth as the ultimate justice”).
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evidence for their case.160 Accuracy in fact-finding and in the application of
law to fact is provided by elaborate trial procedures,161 including cross
examination,162 neutral judges163 and juries,164 rules of evidence,165 and
representation by counsel.166 A multilevel appellate system provides for the
correction of errors made at the trial level.167 Even statutes of limitations
have been explained as a mechanism for enhanced accuracy.168 At least one
commentator has suggested that the current system of procedural rulemaking is utopian in aspiration and fails to take costs into account.169 That
the system is not actually perfect does not mean that perfect procedural
justice is not its aspiration; perfect procedural justice can be the animating
160. See, e.g., Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t., 115 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating
that “the overriding policy is one of disclosure of relevant information in the interest of promoting the
search for truth in a federal question case”); Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 220 A.2d 693, 697 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1966) (“The discovery rules are to be construed liberally, for the search for truth in aid of
justice is paramount. Concealment and surprise are not to be tolerated in a modern judicial system.”).
161. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “fundamental
fairness requires that plaintiffs have the opportunity to present their cases so that the trier of fact can
make a meaningful search for the truth.”); D’Auria ex rel. Mendoza v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 147,
147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (stating that “trials . . . function as forums for the search of
truth.”).
162. See, e.g., In re Grant, 936 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Kan. 1997) (Six, J., dissenting) (“As lawyers and
judges, we acknowledge cross-examination as an aid in the search for truth.”).
163. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 591 A.2d 1095, 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating that
judges must undertake a “search for truth”).
164. See, e.g., Ray v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the
purpose of jury instructions is to aid the jury in its “search for truth”).
165. See, e.g., Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, 699 n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“The general
purpose of the Rules of Evidence is to facilitate the search for truth.”).
166. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 599 (Conn. 1995) (Borden, J., concurring) (stating
that the right to counsel aids in the “search for truth”); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 52 (1967) (“Limiting the right to counsel
‘gravely endangers the judicial search for truth.’”). But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258
(1967) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth”).
167. See, e.g., Shiflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50, 60 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “at least one appeal is a necessary and desirable step in the search for truth”);
United States v. Brown, 50 F.R.D. 110, 112 (D.D.C.) (stating that “appeals, like trials, are a search for
truth”), rev’d on other grounds, 428 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
168. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating that statutes of limitations
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be
seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise”). For a thorough analysis of the various
justifications for statutes of limitations, see generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997).
169. See Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 575–76, 582 (1994).
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principle of procedure doctrine, even though a residue of inaccuracy exists,
despite the system’s best efforts.
But this hypothesis will not withstand serious scrutiny because the
procedural system is replete with rules that explicitly aim at the insulation
of error from corrective action. One obvious example is appellate review.
The clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards insulate trial judge
decisions that are in error from appellate review. Another example is the
law of prior adjudication. The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
prevent relitigation of particular legal theories and whole causes of action,
even when the prior litigation resulted in an inaccurate decision. This idea
has been expressed by the courts on numerous occasions. For example,
[i]t has been said that res judicata makes black white and crooked
straight. In some cases its application produces a demonstrably incorrect
result. The principle that litigation must come to an end, however, is a
very important one, and the fact that some decisions will be incorrect in a
way that can later be demonstrated is a necessary price.170

The point is that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion cannot be
explained on the ground that they aim at accuracy of results. Although the
current law of prior adjudication may sometimes protect a correct
determination from subsequent reconsideration that can result in error, a
prior adjudication doctrine that truly aimed at accuracy would have a much
different shape than existing doctrine: it might allow relitigation after a
showing of clear and convincing evidence that the prior decision was
incorrect, for example.
Thus, the conception of perfect procedural justice fails to meet the
criterion of fit.171 It cannot account for basic features of procedure doctrine.
170. Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 165 (N.J. 1991) (Stein, J., dissenting). The most
prominent expression of the idea is from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jeter v. Hewitt:
Under the system of that State, the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the
quiet of families, require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals
shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in her
jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that which
is black, and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other
evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can
detract from its legal efficacy.
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. 352, 363–66 (1859). See Taxing Dist. of Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U.S. 493,
505 (1889).
171. In the text, I do not consider the possibility that the features of existing doctrine that do not
fit the accuracy model should be viewed as “mistakes,” which are subject to eventual correction through
common law adjudication. See DWORKIN, supra note 106. The best way to approach this possibility is
to compare the accuracy model with other available models, including the balancing model and the
principles of procedural justice that I introduce in Part VI.A. When the alternatives are on the table the
question will be, which theory best fits and justifies procedure doctrine as a whole. At this point, I offer
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This utopian conception fails on the criterion of justification as well. Given
that civil procedure imposes real costs on litigants and society at large, it is
difficult to argue that the smallest marginal gain in accuracy is worth the
largest investment of resources. Justice has a price, and there is a point at
which that price is not worth paying.172 Moreover, we have every reason to
believe that accuracy is subject to the law of diminishing returns. If we
were to make perfect accuracy our highest commitment, we would find that
as we got closer and closer to our goal, the cost of reducing the marginal
rate of error would become higher and higher. We would reach a point
where society would be required to invest enormous resources for an
infinitesimal gain in accuracy.
In sum, the accuracy model suffers from defects in both fit and
justification. Doctrines like prior adjudication suggest that the existing
system of procedure does not aim at accuracy alone, and the law of
diminishing returns suggests that a system aiming at accuracy alone cannot
be justified as striking a reasonable balance between competing claims on
social resources.
b. Systemic Accuracy Versus Case Accuracy
There is another difficulty with the accuracy model: the notion of
accuracy is itself ambiguous or underdeterminate.173 To begin the
investigation of this point, note that the accuracy of a procedure can be
viewed from two perspectives. From the ex post perspective, we can ask
whether the result in a particular case was correct; call this “case accuracy.”
From the ex ante perspective, we can ask whether a given procedure will
produce more or less accurate results for all future cases; call this “systemic
accuracy.” Do these two kinds of accuracy track each other, that is, do
the more modest claim that a theory of procedure that calls for wholesale revision of prior adjudication
doctrine is, at least, subject to a prima facie objection that it suffers from a substantial problem of fit.
172. Bone articulates the problem thus:
Our current system tolerates procedural error even when expensive procedures might reduce
it, and we do not believe that a moral wrong or a rights violation has occurred every time
some procedure marginally increases the error risk. Furthermore, if a substantive right
implied a right to a perfectly accurate outcome, parties would be entitled to demand that the
community invest resources in procedure at a level that maximized accuracy regardless of
cost. Any system that recognized such a right could easily find itself morally committed to a
disastrous level of financing for adjudication.
See Bone, supra note 153, at 599.
173. On the notion of underdeterminacy, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy Crisis,
supra note 134; Solum, Indeterminacy and Equity, supra note 134.
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procedures that maximize case accuracy also maximize systemic
accuracy?174
This is a difficult question, and the answer, as one might expect, is it
depends. There are some contexts in which the procedure that would result
in case accuracy ex post in the particular case would result in systemic, ex
ante inaccuracy. A clear example of the potential conflict between systemic
and case accuracy is provided by the effects that statutes of limitations have
on the accuracy of civil proceedings. On the one hand, statutes of
limitations are defended on the ground that they are accuracy enhancing.
For example, in United States v. Kubrick,175 the U.S. Supreme Court
argued that statutes of limitations “protect defendants and the courts from
having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”176
The use of the modal operator “may” is revealing. Statutes of limitations
create incentives to bring claims within the limitations period, and the
likely effect of this incentive is that early filing preserves the evidentiary
record and thus increases the likelihood of accurate adjudication. But in
any particular case in which the statute runs before the claim is filed, the
result is that the claim is lost, even if it is meritorious and even if the
evidentiary record is sufficiently preserved to ensure a high likelihood of
accurate adjudication. In other words, statutes of limitations purchase
systemic accuracy at the price of case accuracy.177
174. It might be argued that the procedure that maximizes case accuracy will always maximize
system accuracy. Begin with the procedural rule that maximizes systemic accuracy, and then consider
the application of that rule to a particular case in which it is believed that a different rule would
maximize case accuracy. There must be some feature of the particular case that accounts for the
difference. But the rule that maximizes systemic accuracy can always be modified to create an
exception for that kind of case. Because systemic accuracy is simply the sum of case accuracy for all
future cases, a rule that incorporates the exception will produce greater systemic accuracy than would a
rule without the exception. Therefore, systemic accuracy requires the exception, and the supposed
divergence between systemic accuracy and case accuracy disappears. This argument is a version of a
familiar argument, first made by David Lyons, for the extensional equivalence of act and rule
utilitarianism. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). Whatever the merits
of Lyons’s argument are as applied to utilitarian moral theory, it does not establish the extensional
equivalence of case accuracy and systemic accuracy because it does not take into account the incentive
effects that legal rules (as opposed to the ideal rules of rule utilitarianism) have on future behavior.
175. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
176. Id. at 117.
177. The substance of this point is recognized by Tyler Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich. See Ochoa &
Wistrich, supra note 168, at 477–79. See also Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitations—
Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 134 (1955).
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Another example is provided by the legal rules that deal with a party’s
destruction of evidence. In Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills
Distributors, Inc.,178 then-Judge Breyer explained the two different
purposes that underlie the spoliation inference, a judge-made rule of
evidence that permits a finder of fact to draw an inference against a
spoliator, or a person who destroys evidence:
The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary
and one not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common
sense observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant
to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to
have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same
position who does not destroy the document. The fact of destruction
satisfies the minimum requirement of relevance: it has some tendency,
however small, to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable
than it would otherwise be. Precisely how the document might have
aided the party’s adversary, and what evidentiary shortfalls its
destruction may be taken to redeem, will depend on the particular facts
of each case, but the general evidentiary rationale for the inference is
clear.
The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic
and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference
presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it
can be introduced at trial. The inference also serves as a penalty, placing
the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully created
the risk.179

What Breyer calls the “evidentiary rationale” expresses an aim at accuracy
in the individual case. Although the destruction of evidence may create
uncertainty, the system can respond to that uncertainty by drawing those
inferences that seem most likely under the circumstances. The “punitive”
rationale is focused on systemic accuracy: by deterring future acts of
178. Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982).
179. Id. at 218 (internal citations omitted). The First Circuit also describes the spoliation inference
this way:
When a document relevant to an issue in a case is destroyed, the trier of fact sometimes may
infer that the party who obliterated it did so out of a realization that the contents were
unfavorable. Before such an inference may be drawn, there must be a sufficient foundational
showing that the party who destroyed the document had notice both of the potential claim and
of the document’s potential relevance. Even then, the adverse inference is permissive, not
mandatory. If, for example, the factfinder believes that the documents were destroyed
accidentally or for an innocent reason, then the fact-finder is free to reject the inference.
Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l., Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Allen Pen Co. v.
Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that without some evidence
that documents have been destroyed “in bad faith” or “from the consciousness of a weak case,” it is
“ordinarily” improper to draw an adverse inference about the contents of the documents).
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destruction of evidence, the system aims to improve the long-run accuracy
of the system as a whole. But the goals of case accuracy and systemic
accuracy may conflict in any particular case. When evidence is negligently
destroyed, for example, the careless failure to preserve it may not support
an inference that the destroyed material was unfavorable to the party who
destroyed it. Hence, accuracy in the individual case would be undermined
by imposing a penalty for this destruction. From the systemic point of
view, however, imposing a penalty on the negligent destruction of evidence
might create incentives to be more careful in handling such evidence,
improving the long-run accuracy of the system as a whole.
For which sort of accuracy should procedural justice aim? This type of
question arises frequently in both the law and moral theory. In the law, we
frequently draw a distinction between case-by-case balancing, in which
factors are balanced to decide a particular case, and systemic balancing, in
which the factors are balanced to create a general rule, which is then
applied to decide particular cases.180 In moral theory, we distinguish
between two forms of utilitarianism: act utilitarianism, which holds that an
action is right if and only if that action will maximize utility as compared to
the possible alternative actions, and rule utilitarianism, which holds that an
action is right if and only if that action is in accord with a general rule that
would maximize utility if the rule were generally obeyed.181 The general
distinction between rules or systems, on the one hand, and acts or
individual cases, on the other, is operating in the distinction that we have
drawn between case accuracy and systemic accuracy.
In formulating a conception of procedural justice in general and
articulating the accuracy model of procedural fairness in particular, the
tension between case accuracy and systemic accuracy poses a problem that
must be resolved. If we aim at case accuracy, we achieve procedural justice
in the case before us, but we may sacrifice accuracy in future proceedings.
If we aim at systemic accuracy, we achieve a system that produces more
accurate outcomes in the aggregate, but particular cases require a ruling
against the party that is otherwise entitled to prevail. Wholesale procedural
justice is purchased at the price of retail procedural injustice.
How can this dilemma be resolved? One way out would be to appeal
to a general moral theory for guidance. For example, we might appeal to a
180. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (using the terms “definitional” and “ad hoc” balancing to refer to the distinction
between systemic rule balancing and case-by-case balancing).
181. See Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 824,
824 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
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deontological view, like Kant’s, for the proposition that one should never
render an unjust decision at the expense of an innocent litigant in order to
achieve systemic benefits. Instead, we might choose to pursue case
accuracy because it respects an important political right—the right to an
accurate determination of one’s legal rights. Or, we might appeal to a
consequentialist view, like utilitarianism, and opt for systemic accuracy on
the ground that rules designed to produce systemic accuracy will produce
the greatest good for the greatest number.182 But, as I have already
argued,183 the appeal to general moral theories to arbitrate between
conceptions of procedural justice is inconsistent with the ideal of public
reason. Our resolution of the tension between systemic and case accuracy
will neither command widespread assent nor offer reasons that can be
accepted as legitimate by the citizenry at large if it depends on the truth of a
particular comprehensive moral doctrine.
The next question is whether we can choose between aiming at case
accuracy or systemic accuracy without relying on a comprehensive moral
theory. Consider the following principle of political morality: each
individual has a presumptive right to adjudication of the individual’s
entitlements based on an assessment of the merits of his or her case. This
principle of background morality expresses a presumptive right and not an
unqualified legal entitlement. This principle of political morality does not
need to rest on any particular moral or religious doctrine: the notion that the
law should treat each of us as an individual finds strong support in the
tradition of individual rights and liberties of our political culture.
This background right of political morality is not unqualified. For
example, the system may establish general procedural roles that aim at
systemic accuracy, so long as these rules satisfy the requirements of the
rule of law, that is, so long as they are public and it is possible to comply
with them through the exercise of reasonable care. So, I may be penalized
for destroying evidence if the rule against it is announced in advance and if
the rule allows me the defense that I have made reasonable good faith
182. The passage in the text elides the important distinction between act and rule utilitarianism.
The way that rule utilitarianism supports systemic accuracy over case accuracy is clear: to the extent
that accuracy is a good consequence, rule utilitarianism counsels in favor of the general rule that will
promote the greatest accuracy in the long run. An act utilitarian analysis is more complicated. One
might argue that case accuracy is to be preferred on act utilitarian grounds, because the act utilitarian
analysis focuses on the consequences of each individual act, in this case the decision of a particular
case. In the context of a system of procedural rules, however, the act may be the promulgation of the
rules, and hence the consequences to be summed would include the benefits of accuracy of all future
cases affected by the rule.
183. See supra Part III.B.
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efforts at compliance. In the case of a statute of limitations, it is fair to cut
off my legal claim if I was given reasonable notice of the limitations period
and the period was sufficient to enable me to bring my claim.
In light of this, consider the following three-part hypothesis
concerning the relationship between case accuracy and systemic accuracy:
(1) where systemic accuracy and case accuracy are congruent, the system
of procedure aims at both; (2) where systemic accuracy would impair case
accuracy, the system usually aims at case accuracy; and (3) systemic
accuracy may be preferred over case accuracy if systemic accuracy can be
obtained through general and public rules, so long as it is possible for those
affected to comply with the rules by reasonable good faith efforts.
Assuming, then, that we can offer a satisfactory account of the
relationship between systemic accuracy and case accuracy, the accuracy
model stands. It is modified, though, so that accuracy is a plausible
candidate as a component of an ideal of procedural justice, but it is not a
candidate for a complete account of procedural justice. The thesis that the
system aims at accuracy alone does not fit important aspects of the existing
system of civil dispute resolution and does not offer a normatively
attractive justification of that system. If taken alone, the accuracy model
fails.
2. The Balancing Model
The next hypothesis is that the current shape of procedure doctrine is
best explained and justified by a conception of imperfect procedural justice.
We assume that the substantive law provides an independent criterion for
what constitutes a just or fair outcome. Acknowledging that perfection is
impossible and that diminishing marginal returns imply that approaching
perfection will become too costly at some point, the system aims at a
balance between accuracy and its cost. Let us call this notion of imperfect
procedural justice the balancing model. It is the nature of the compromise
between accuracy and cost that provides content to an ideal of imperfect
procedural justice. Under what conditions will accuracy be sacrificed? How
should the costs of procedural justice be distributed?
One answer to these questions is utilitarian. We could simply weigh
the costs of procedure against the benefits and adopt the system of
procedure that will maximize utility. Another approach would emphasize
rights-based constraints on both the nature of the costs that may be imposed
and the distribution of these costs. Each of these two approaches is
examined in turn.
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The consequentialist version of imperfect procedural justice finds
substantial support in the decisions of the Supreme Court that interpret the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The most striking example is
provided by the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge:185
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.186

This approach is not confined to due process doctrine. It informs courts’
decisions in a number of doctrinal areas.187 Consider, for example, the
following excerpt from a discussion of standards of appellate review:
“Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very
likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”188 The Court made an explicit
appeal to a balancing of the benefits of accuracy with its costs.
Beginning with this emphasis on balancing, we could construct a
utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice. This effort is
complicated, however, because there are many forms of utilitarianism. For
our purposes, we might consider ideal rule utilitarianism, in which an act is
right if and only if it conforms with the system of rules, which, if
universally followed, would produce the best consequences.189 Let us make
184. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
185. For scholarly commentary on Mathews v. Eldridge, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
186. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
187. See, e.g., Yorktown Med. Lab. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the
Mathews balancing test to a due process challenge to a state’s use of sampling in an audit of a
laboratory’s Medicaid payment claims); Bell v. Farmer’s Ins. Exch., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 575 (Ct. App.
2004) (applying the Mathews balancing test to determine whether the use of statistical sampling
techniques to assess class damages comports with due process); In re Travarius O., 799 N.E.2d 510,
515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (analyzing “the possible deprivation of a parent’s due process rights in
termination and adoption proceedings by balancing the factors enunciated . . . in Mathews”).
188. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985).
189. See generally LYONS, supra note 174 (discussing various forms of utilitarianism); J.J.C.
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (same).
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a further simplifying assumption: that all of the relevant costs can be
expressed as prices. The resultant approach would be roughly similar to
some law and economics approaches.
Consider, for example, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of
procedure. He writes, “The objective of a procedural system, viewed
economically, is to minimize the sum of two types of costs. The first is the
cost of erroneous judicial decisions.”190 The second type of cost is “the cost
of operating the procedural system.”191 Operating costs are borne by the
public in the form of subsidies to the judicial system and by the parties in
the form of court fees, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs.
Can a utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice fit and
justify the general contours of existing procedure? Consider first the
dimension of fit. On one hand, the utilitarian conception seems to fit
contemporary procedural due process doctrine remarkably well. Mathews
v. Eldridge and its progeny are all but explicit in their utilitarianism. On the
other hand, a broader survey of the legal landscape reveals a number of
problems.
The first problem of fit concerns the relationship between procedural
and substantive justice. The theoretical framework that we are operating
within postulates that the law is a seamless web.192 Our account of
procedural justice must fit within a larger theory that fits and justifies the
law as a whole. The point is much mooted, but there are grave doubts about
the viability of utilitarian theory to account for the shape of existing legal
doctrine. Indeed, from Bentham on, utilitarians have been critiqued at least
as much as they have been used to explain legal theory. Large domains of
law seem best explained by rights-based accounts, including rights to
privacy as well as freedom of speech and religion.
The second problem of fit concerns the system’s reluctance to take
utility into account in a variety of situations. Mathews embodies a line of
cases in which the plaintiff seeks to extend traditional adversary procedures
to administrative action; in that context, a utilitarian approach
predominates. The same approach does not seem to be followed when we
turn our attention to the traditional pleading, discovery, and trial system. It
is true that some rules can be explained on utilitarian grounds—prior
190. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (4th ed. 1992). See generally Louis
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3 (analyzing the economic costs associated
with legal reforms to increase accuracy in adjudication).
191. POSNER, supra note 190, at 549.
192. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 106, at 239–40, 264, 354, 379–91.
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adjudication doctrine and standards of appellate review may be examples.
But what is the utilitarian case for the elaborate machinery of discovery,
trial by jury, the rules of evidence, and so forth? And why do these
procedures come, for the most part, as an indivisible package? Why not
Mathews in reverse, a doctrine that would eliminate procedures when it
could be shown that their costs exceeded their benefits? These rhetorical
questions are merely suggestive, and much utilitarian work has been done
on the rules of evidence, the jury trial, and so forth. In this regard, it is
important to remember that the expensive machinery of the traditional trial
is used in only a tiny percentage of actual disputes, with negotiated
settlement as the mode for resolving the vast majority. But even conceding
these points, the problems of fit seem overwhelming.
Despite the very broad statement of the holding in Mathews, the
Supreme Court has not applied the balancing test in practice, even in cases
in which the issue is whether a hearing is required. A clear example is the
Court’s decision in Richards v. Jefferson County.193 There the Alabama
Supreme Court gave claim-preclusive effect to a prior judgment that the
parties to be bound did not have an opportunity to participate. Rather than
balancing, the Court relied on a categorical rule:
The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has
litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former
action in a court of competent jurisdiction. The opportunity to be heard is
an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings. And
as a State may not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce
a judgment against a party named in the proceedings without a hearing or
an opportunity to be heard, so it cannot, without disregarding the
requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment
against one who is neither a party nor in privity with a party therein.194

Indeed, the Court in Richards explicitly rejected the weighing of
consequences:
Respondents contend that, even if petitioners did not receive the kind of
opportunity to make their case in court that due process would ordinarily
ensure, the character of their action renders the usual constitutional
protections inapplicable. They contend that invalidation of the
occupation tax would have disastrous consequences on the
county . . . .195
193.
194.
195.

Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
Id. at 797 n.4 (citations and emphasis omitted).
Id. at 802–03.
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The Court did not even accept the invitation to engage in a balancing of
interests:
Of course, we are aware that governmental and private entities have
substantial interests in the prompt and determinative resolution of
challenges to important legislation. We do not agree with the Alabama
Supreme Court, however, that, given the amount of money at stake,
respondents were entitled to rely on the assumption that the [prior] action
“authoritatively establish[ed]” the constitutionality of the tax. A state
court’s freedom to rely on prior precedent in rejecting a litigant’s claims
does not afford it similar freedom to bind a litigant to a prior judgment to
which he was not a party. That general rule clearly applies when a
taxpayer seeks a hearing to prevent the State from subjecting him to a
levy in violation of the Federal Constitution.196

The important point is that the Court in Richards did not engage in
Matthews v. Eldridge balancing; rather, it relied on a general rule that
guarantees an opportunity to be heard, and thus, a right of participation.
Putting aside the dimension of fit, does the utilitarian version of the
balancing model provide the best justification for the structure of existing
procedure doctrine? This is a large question, to put it mildly. Certainly,
utilitarian reasoning has played a role in thinking about the law.197
Moreover, it seems overwhelmingly plausible to believe that consequences
do count in legal justification. Even the most ardent adherents of rightsbased approaches are unlikely to maintain that accuracy or participation
must be purchased at any cost, and the magnitude of the costs imposed is
itself relevant to questions of fairness. Thus, a utilitarian account captures
at least part of the story.
But does the utilitarian version of the balancing model tell the whole
story? Does utilitarianism provide the right kind of justification for the
existing system of procedure? Consider the following argument for a
negative answer to these questions. Recall the observation, made above,
that ours is a pluralist society, in which there are a variety of competing
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Although some features of
utilitarianism, such as the insistence that consequences do count, are the
subject of wide agreement, other features, especially the beliefs that only
consequences count and that all values can be reduced to a single metric,
are highly controversial. For this reason, utilitarian moral theory does not
provide an appropriate justification for our system of procedure. The right
196. Id. at 804–05 (citation omitted).
197. For a very explicit appeal to utilitarian norms, see Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection
to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 497 (1995).
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sort of justification must draw on public reasons, and in particular, on
widely shared values that are implicit in our public political culture. The
utilitarian notion that consequences count does provide a public reason, but
the utilitarian premise that all rights ultimately depend on maximizing
some nonmoral good is not an appropriate justification.
b. Deontological Constraints on Balancing: Consideration of Cost
and Recognition of Procedural Rights
Consider, then, an alternative to the consequentialist model of
imperfect procedural justice. Is it possible to formulate a model of
imperfect procedural justice that uses deontological notions, such as
fairness and rights, to give a systemic account for the ways in which a
system of procedure should aim for less-than-complete accuracy and for
the distribution of costs imposed by such a system? This conception of
procedural justice would need to incorporate accounts of the fair
distribution of procedural burdens and the correction of procedural
injustice.
Begin with the most obvious burden imposed by imperfect procedural
justice: the risk of error. Does fairness have anything to say about the
distribution of this risk? In the civil context, the baseline notion seems to be
that the risks of error should be distributed equally. Neither plaintiffs nor
defendants should enjoy an advantage in any particular category of cases.
The clearest expression of this notion is found in the formulation of the
burden of proof for most issues in civil litigation. The preponderance of the
evidence standard seems designed to spread the risk of error evenly across
potential litigants.198 Why? Consider the alternatives. Suppose that in
ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff were required to prevail beyond a
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. Such burdens would
allocate the risk of error unevenly, resulting in a higher loss rate for
plaintiffs with meritorious claims than for defendants entitled to prevail on
the merits.
198. Consider the possibility that the overall risk of error can be minimized by a procedure that
distributes the risk asymmetrically. For example, imagine that the baseline rate of error in a particular
context is 0.2 (and hence the accuracy rate is 0.8) with the risk distributed equally between potential
plaintiffs and defendants (each bearing a 0.1 risk of an erroneous decision that goes against them and a
0.1 risk of an erroneous decision in their favor). Suppose further that a procedural change would reduce
the overall risk to 0.15 (and hence the accuracy rate is 0.85), but that all of this risk would be borne by
plaintiffs. If accuracy alone were considered, then the procedural change would be preferred
(0.85 > 0.8), but if equal distribution of the risk of error is independently valuable, then the change
might be ruled out on the ground that a 0.15 risk of erroneous decisions that disadvantage plaintiffs
accompanied by a 0.0 risk of erroneous decisions that disadvantage defendants is less fair than the
symmetrical risk that was associated with the baseline error rate.
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The risk of error is influenced by many factors. Suppose that the
criteria of fit and justification are best satisfied by a fairness-based
conception of imperfect procedural justice, requiring an equal distribution
of risks among plaintiffs and defendants from the ex ante perspective. This
hypothesis would be confirmed if it could be shown that existing doctrine
avoids asymmetrical distributions of the risk of error, except in those cases
in which there are countervailing considerations of fairness or cost.199 This
claim needs to be qualified: some asymmetry may be unavoidable. The
criterion of fit does not require that the doctrine fit the goal specified by the
criterion of fairness in the conception of procedural fairness; if the current
practice approximates the maximum degree of satisfaction of the criterion
that is practically possible, then the conceptions can be said to fit current
practice.
There is at least one way in which existing doctrine does not seem to
spread the risk of error equally among the various classes of litigants. In an
adversary system, the quality of representation may affect the risk of
erroneous deprivation of substantive rights. Given that the quality of
representation depends on the ability to pay, current civil procedure
doctrine would seem to provide a systemic distribution of the risk of error
in favor of those who have the greatest share of social resources. Equal
distribution of the risk of error would seem to require the equalization of
legal resources,200 but current doctrine provides very little in the way of
such equalization, especially in cases without a clear market value. This
evidence does not suffice to settle the matter. It might turn out that
inequality of legal resources is required by other considerations of fairness
like fundamental economic liberties. These important issues are outside the
scope of this Article.
A fairness- or rights-based conception of imperfect procedural justice
will have implications for the distribution of other costs that are imposed
by the system of procedure. For example, liberal discovery may operate to
increase accuracy, but it also imposes burdens on both litigants and third
parties. A rights-based approach would attend to the question whether
discovery would violate the preexisting moral or legal rights of the parties,
such as the right to privacy. Rather than balancing the costs of privacy
199. Asymmetrical risks of error might also be justified where they benefit the party that bears the
higher risk of error. Thus, in a variation of the example provided above, supra note 198, a change from
a symmetrical risk of 0.1 for plaintiffs and 0.1 for defendants (total = 0.2) to an asymmetrical risk of
0.05 for plaintiffs and 0.0 for defendants (total = 0.05) is acceptable. This is because the risk of error
disadvantaging plaintiffs is reduced (0.05 < 0.1) even though it becomes unequal (0.0 ≠ 0.05).
200. See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303, 304–06
(1988).
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invasions against the benefits in terms of increased accuracy, a rights-based
conception might look to whether the privacy right has been waived, and if
not, whether that right is more fundamental (or ranked higher in a lexical
ordering) than the interests of the parties in accurate adjudication.
The adequacy of a fairness-based conception of imperfect procedural
justice is more difficult to assess than is the adequacy of a utilitarian
conception. Utilitarian accounts are relatively simple in structure, and
although the assessment of consequences may be difficult in practice, it
may well be possible to devise test cases that will reveal the lack of fit
between the utilitarian account and existing doctrine. This simplicity is
lacking in the case of fairness-based conceptions. A great deal of
argumentative work needs to be done in order to produce even the sketch of
a fairness-based conception of imperfect procedural justice; until that work
is done, it simply is not possible to determine whether existing doctrine fits
the conception. There is another complication here raised by the
relationship between the criteria of fit and justification. If fit alone were the
criterion, a rights-based conception could turn out to be empty and
impossible to falsify. One could always gerrymander a conception of
procedural rights so that it has exactly those rights embodied by existing
doctrine. The criterion of justification demands that the conception of
procedural justice provide a coherent justification for the shape of existing
doctrine. Thus, the criterion of justification rules out arbitrary, post hoc
procedural rights conceptions that are tailored to the shape of existing law.
In Part VI, we will examine an articulated theory of procedural justice—
albeit one that does not fit within the confines of the balancing model.
3. The Participation Model
Let us now consider a third and final family of conceptions of
procedural justice. The participation model holds that procedural fairness
requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in
the process by which the decision is made.201 The idea that procedural
fairness requires participation is a familiar one. In Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc.,202 Justice Marshall wrote that there are “two central concerns of
procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken
201. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1489 (1991) (“Procedural fairness, however, is not subsumed completely by substantive
justice. Procedural fairness means that a legitimate decisionmaking process promotes independent
values of participation, deliberation, and consensus.”); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126 (J. Rolan Pennock et al. eds., 1977).
202. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
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deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decision-making process.”203
The participation model is not well defined because it rests on
uncertain and varying foundations. For this reason, we will investigate four
interpretations of the model. The four interpretations are unified by the idea
of pure procedural justice, that is, the idea that the fairness of a procedure is
a function, not of some independent criteria, but instead of the procedure’s
intrinsic features. This means that the outcome of the procedure is fair,
whatever it is, provided that the requirements of the procedure have been
satisfied. My discussion of the first interpretation, the “gaming
interpretation,” briefly explores the notion that litigation should be
considered a fair game or contest in which the winners are entitled to
prevail if they have played by the rules and are entitled under the rules to
win. My discussion of the second, the “dignity interpretation,” emphasizes
dignity and autonomy as a function of the actual participation of litigants in
procedures that affect them. My discussion of the third, the “satisfaction
interpretation,” argues that participatory process is justified by the greater
level of satisfaction it provides to litigants. My discussion of the fourth, the
“discourse theory interpretation,” suggests an ideal communication
situation as the criterion of a just or correct outcome and then argues that
civil procedure doctrine aims at approximating this ideal.
a. The Gaming Interpretation
At the outset, we should dispose of the least plausible interpretation of
the participation model, the gaming interpretation. This interpretation
expresses two related, but somewhat inconsistent, ideas about procedural
fairness: one is captured by the analogy between litigation and a game of
chance, and the other is expressed by the metaphor of the level playing
field. Each of these ideas is explored in turn.
The first idea is that civil litigation is like a game of chance. Gambling
contests are examples of pure procedural justice, so long as the rules are
announced in advance and enforced, because gamblers and athletes agree to
the procedure. No procedural unfairness can attach to one’s having bet
heavily on three aces if one loses to four twos. On this model, the side that
wins a game of civil litigation deserves its victory, so long as all of the
rules were followed.
This theory has been advanced by many, most notably by Bentham,204
and criticized by others. The theory should properly be viewed as a straw
203.

Id. at 242.
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man or a reductio of the participation model. Jerome Frank provides a
loose statement of the criticism on the gaming theory:
Wigmore (following up a suggestion made by Bentham) suggested that
“the common law, originating in a community of sports and games, was
permeated by the instinct of sportsmanship” which led to a “sporting
theory of justice,” a theory of “legalized gambling.” This theory,
although it had some desirable effects, “has contributed,” said Wigmore,
“to lower the system of administering justice and in particular of
ascertaining truth in litigation, to the level of a mere game of skill or
chance” . . . in which lawyers use evidence “as one plays a trump card,
or draws to three aces, or holds back a good horse till the homestretch . . . .”205

The difficulty with the gaming interpretation of the participation model is
that litigants do not choose to file or defend lawsuits in the same way that
gamblers choose to join a poker game. If one’s legal rights have been
violated and the violator refuses voluntary alternative dispute resolution,
then litigation is the only alternative. Even if it were fair to analogize the
filing of a civil action to entering a sporting event, the requisite voluntary
choice is missing in the case of civil defendants who can be compelled to
play against their will at the risk of a binding default judgment being
entered against them.
If I choose to play a game of poker and lose $10,000, that outcome
can be said to be fair, so long as everyone who played abided by the rules.
Poker players choose to play the game that is constituted by the rules of
poker, and it would be very odd indeed if an experienced player who lost at
poker were to complain that he or she had been cheated on the grounds that
poker itself is unfair. But if I am forced to play a game of civil litigation
and lose $10,000, then there is a further question: were the procedural rules
fair? This question suggests another version of the gaming theory, captured
by the metaphor of a “level playing field,” frequently used in judicial
opinions.206
204. Jeremy Bentham used the analogy to criticize the idea of pure procedural justice as “a maxim
which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench.” 7 JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1843).
205. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTHS AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 91 (3d ed.
1973). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1977) (Fortas, J., concurring) (arguing that a trial
is “not a sporting event”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting
Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1990).
206. United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 897 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing a “level playing field
between the prosecution and the defense”); United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1025–26 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Saunders v. City of Philadelphia, No. 97-3251, 1997 WL 400034, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 1997)
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What is meant by a level playing field? A sporting contest is unfair if
the field is tilted, giving one side an unfair advantage. But the notion of
unfair advantage must be cashed out. In a sporting contest, a level playing
field is required so that the skill of the athletes will determine the outcome.
But we do not believe that the skill of the lawyers should determine the
outcome of civil litigation, although we acknowledge that, in fact, legal
skill may play a role. As a normative matter, an ideal of procedural justice
that is fair to lawyer-contestants is completely unattractive.207
The gaming interpretation of the participation model is a nonstarter as
a theory of procedural justice precisely because it does not recognize the
cogency of the very question it is supposed to address. Although the
gaming interpretation cannot be considered a serious candidate, it does
enable us to see what is at stake in our investigation of the participation
model. We need an interpretation of what makes a process fair that can
address the fact that civil litigation is not a freely chosen activity.
b. The Dignity Interpretation
The second interpretation of the participation model connects the
independent value of process with the dignity of those who are affected by
legal proceedings.208 One way of articulating this central notion is that
everyone is entitled to their day in court. This right to participation is
justified by a background right of political morality, that is, the right of
(stating “the public interest, we find, is best served where all parties have a level playing field, as set
forth in the apposite rules of civil and criminal procedure”); Bilbo ex rel. Basnaw v. Shelter Ins. Co.,
698 So. 2d 691, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“The effect of the amendment [making summary judgment
more freely available] is to level the playing field between the parties in two ways: first, the supporting
evidence submitted by the parties should be scrutinized equally, and second, the overriding presumption
in favor of trial on the merits is removed.”).
207. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”).
208. The dignity argument is associated with its eloquent exposition by Jerry Mashaw. See JERRY
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253 (1985). See also Owen M. Fiss,
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 978 (1993) (stating that “participation has a value in
its own right, manifesting a public commitment to the dignity and worth of the individual”); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981);
Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988);
Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 193 (1978) (“It is this value of individuality—of
respect for personal integrity and identity—that forms the core of inherent dignity. To ignore or deny its
existence, or discard its importance in the procedural due process equation, is to invite a regime hostile
to the role of the individual . . . .”); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1357, 1391–93 (1991) (asserting that participation enhances respect for the dignity of litigants
and reasoned and accurate decisionmaking). For a critique of the dignity theory, see Rutherford, supra
note 136, at 42–47.
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persons (or citizens) to be treated with dignity and respect. A procedure
that ensures parties an opportunity to participate in the process of making
decisions that affect them might be counted as a just procedure for this
reason, independently of the correctness of the outcome that results from
the procedure.
Robert Bone describes a closely related notion as follows: “The ‘day
in court’ ideal in American adjudication is linked to a process-oriented
view of adjudicative participation that values participation for its own sake,
not just for its impact on outcome quality. Participation is important
because it gives individuals a chance to make their own litigation
choices.”209 A variety of values are invoked in connection with the day-incourt ideal, including equality, individuality, and autonomy, but the most
frequently invoked value is dignity. We shall call the interpretation of the
participation model that is grounded in the notion that participation is
essential for dignity the dignity interpretation.
The best account of the dignitary value of participatory process has
been developed by Jerry Mashaw. 210 Mashaw states the intuitive idea as
follows:
At an intuitive level, a dignitary approach is appealing. We all feel that
process matters to us irrespective of result. This intuition may be a
delusion. We may be so accustomed to rationalizing demands for
improvement in our personal prospects, in the purportedly neutral terms
of process fairness, that we can no longer distinguish between outcomeoriented motives and process-oriented arguments . . . .
. . . Yet there seems to be something to the intuition that process itself
matters. We do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly.
And, however fuzzy our articulation of the process characteristics that
yield a sense of unfairness, it is commonplace for us to describe process
affronts as somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not
being taken seriously as persons.211

Mashaw argues that his dignitary theory of procedural due process provides
both a necessary and sufficient account of the Due Process Clauses.212
209. Bone, supra note 153, at 619. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative
Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990)
[hereinafter Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms]; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in
Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Day in
Court].
210. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); MASHAW, supra note 208;
Mashaw, supra note 185.
211. MASHAW, supra note 208, at 162–63.
212. Id. at 169.
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There is something to the notion that a right to participation in
decisionmaking processes is valuable because it respects the dignity and
autonomy of those who are affected by the outcome of those processes.
Certainly, it is not wrong to say that including those who are affected in the
decisionmaking process is respectful of their autonomy and status as equal
citizens (or persons). It is plausible to see dignity as playing at least a
supporting role in an account of procedural fairness.
But at this point the question is whether the dignity interpretation of
the participation model offers an independent model or theory of
procedural justice. It is clear that it does not. First, participation alone is not
sufficient to make for a just or fair procedure. All the participation in the
world will not save a sham trial from a charge of injustice. At the very
least, the role of accuracy in our understanding of procedural justice would
need to be taken into account. Second, it is not clear that the value of
dignity provides reasons that are sufficiently weighty to counter the other
values that bear on procedural justice. By itself, the value of dignity is
closely related to the values that are served by proper etiquette or good
manners. Indignity or disrespect are not the sort of grave injuries that trump
other values tout court, but the dignity interpretation of the participation
model would require dignity to have precisely that kind of force or weight.
It does not suffice to say that dignity is a matter of right because the
concerns implicated by the accuracy model (that is, the underlying
substantive rights vindicated by a system of procedure) are also matters of
right. And if we were to ask whether the substantive rights served by
accuracy trump the right to be treated with dignity, it is difficult to make
the case that dignity ranks so high that it always trumps the other rights
implicated in procedural fairness. As a general theory of procedural justice,
the dignity interpretation is a nonstarter.
c. The Satisfaction Interpretation
The dignity interpretation is rooted in a rights-based or fairnesscentered conception of political morality, but the third interpretation of the
participation model looks to a more utilitarian measure of the value of
process. The satisfaction interpretation of the participation model uses
participant satisfaction as the criteria for the evaluation of process. A
process that provides participants an opportunity to tell their stories and
make litigation decisions may be most satisfactory to participants, even if
the process is less accurate or more costly than alternatives that afford less
opportunity for participation. Social psychologists have attempted to
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measure participant satisfaction levels and other perceptions of various
procedures.213
For the purposes of discussion, let us assume that social psychologists
were able to demonstrate that participation is satisfying to litigants and that
this satisfaction is not substantially dependent on the accuracy and cost of
the process. Would this social fact provide a good and sufficient reason for
the participation model? Stating the issue somewhat differently, would the
213. Social psychology has produced a large literature on procedural justice. See, e.g., E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, OBEY THE LAW]; Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R.
Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
296, 300 (1986); Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and
Distributive Justice, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 390 (Roderick
M. Kramer et al. eds., 1996); James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy,
Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 469 (1989); Pauline Houlden, Stephen
LaTour, Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of
Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (1978); Stephen LaTour,
Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of
Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531 (1978); Stephen LaTour, Pauline Houlden,
Laurens Walker, & John Thibaut, Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L. J.
258 (1976); E. Allan Lind & Robin I. Lissak, Apparent Impropriety and Procedural Fairness
Judgments, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 19 (1985); E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia
A. Ebener, William L.F. Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the
Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 953, 967, 968 tbl. 2 (1990); E. Allan Lind & P. Christopher Earley, Procedural Justice and
Culture, 27 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 227, 227–40 (1992); E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer, & P. Christopher Garley,
Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); Norman G. Poythress, Procedural
Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361
(1994); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to
Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 647 (1993) (reviewing TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra); Blair
H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 956–57 (1985); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1993); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining
Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedure, 33
AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 640–41 (1989) (reporting data from interviews with criminal defendants and
concluding that perceptions of procedural fairness affected attitudes towards judicial authority and
government more so than did outcomes and favorable sentences); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski,
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological
Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433
(1992); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367 (1987);
Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 106 (1988); Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind & John Thibaut,
The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979).
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fact that participatory process produces high levels of satisfaction support a
pure procedural justice theory of civil litigation?
Once again, the answer to these questions is obviously no. To see this
point clearly, let us assume, for the moment, a utilitarian framework for
evaluating these questions. We assume that participatory process has
independent satisfaction value, S. But there are other values to be weighed
in a utilitarian calculus. The benefits of accurate adjudication, A, and other
external costs, C, and benefits, B, of the various alternatives must be
summed. On utilitarian grounds, we should prefer the alternative with the
highest utility score. For each alternative, i, the utility, is calculated as
follows: Ui = Si + Ai + Bi - Ci. But this is the balancing model, not the
participation model. In order for the satisfaction interpretation of the
participation model to succeed on utilitarian grounds, we would need to
show that litigant satisfaction is the only consequence that counts (that is,
that Ui = Si), but there is no basis for making such a showing. Even if it
could be demonstrated that litigants prefer participatory process, even when
they are made aware of the accuracy effects and other social costs and
benefits, the satisfaction interpretation still would not be sufficient because
civil proceedings have effects on persons who are not litigants. For
example, accurate adjudication may produce general deterrence, legal
proceedings may be subsidized by public expenditures, and so forth. Thus,
litigant satisfaction cannot be the sole determinant of the utility of the
procedural system.
This simple utilitarian objection to the satisfaction interpretation is
reinforced when fairness concerns are brought to bear on our evaluation.
Accuracy serves to ensure that litigants prevail when they are entitled to do
so, and inaccurate outcomes deny litigants their rights. Even if some
litigants are more satisfied with a process that results in an erroneous
outcome that disadvantages them (but allows them to participate), this does
not justify denying other litigants outcomes to which they have a right. This
point could be overcome if it could be shown that all (or almost all)
litigants would consent to an erroneous judgment against them in exchange
for more participation, but it seems most unlikely that such a showing
could be made.
It is important to remember that these arguments against the
satisfaction interpretation of the participation model make a very narrow
point—that satisfaction with the process is not the whole story about
procedural fairness. This narrow point does not force the conclusion that
litigant satisfaction is unimportant or that it should not be considered in the
evaluation and comparison of specific procedures. The proper conclusion
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to draw is that the satisfaction interpretation of the participation model fails
as a stand-alone theory of procedural justice.
d. The Discourse Theory Interpretation
Consider then, a fourth interpretation of the participation model. This
interpretation argues for a deep, constitutive connection between
participatory process and correct outcomes. Because this interpretation is
most fully expressed in the discourse theory offered by Jürgen Habermas,
we shall call it the discourse theory interpretation.
Existing procedures do more than simply provide for participation.
Trials, for example, are conducted according to elaborate rules that ensure
that both sides have an equal opportunity to present their cases. Decisions
are made by neutral third parties. These features suggest that the procedural
system might be conceived as the model of the ideal communication
situation articulated by Habermas. He has advanced what might be called a
discourse theory of truth.214 On the discourse theory, we parse a truth claim
as a claim that the proposition asserted as true would be agreed on under
conditions of rational discourse, including the condition that all participants
have an equal opportunity to engage in, advance, or refute arguments,
question claims, and so forth.215 The key notion is that “ultimately there
can be no separation of the criteria for truth from the criteria for the
214. See THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS 291–310 (1978).
See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SOCIETY]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) [hereinafter
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM]. For an important recent secondary account of Habermas’s theory, see A.
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 751 (2003). For a basic exposition of Habermas’s theory, see Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of
Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54
(1989). Another important secondary source is Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice
Be Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas’s Proceduralist Paradigm of Law,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791 (1996).
Thomas McCarthy’s commentary is the best and most accurate introduction and guide to
Habermas’ thought. See MCCARTHY, supra. Lucid summaries of Habermas’s more recent work are
found in ARIE BRAND, THE FORCE OF REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO HABERMAS’ THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1990); DAVID M. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS (1990); STEVEN K.
WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS: REASON, JUSTICE, AND MODERNITY (1988). For a
word on the problem of understanding Habermas’s language, see MICHAEL PUSEY, JÜRGEN HABERMAS
11 (1986). For a study plan for approaching the corpus of his work in a systematic fashion, see id. at
124–25. For a brief introduction, see Richard J. Bernstein, Introduction to HABERMAS AND MODERNITY
1 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985).
215. See MCCARTHY, supra note 214, at 306.
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argumentative settlement of truth claims.”216 As applied to the context of a
civil action, the idea is that there is no criterion for a legally correct
outcome other than the criterion for the settlement of a civil dispute
through fair procedures.217
How does the ideal communication conception of pure procedural
justice fare, when measured against the criteria of fit and justification?
Initially, consider the question of fit. Certainly, there is much that can be
said for the notion that the litigation system aims at the approximation of
ideal discourse conditions. For example, rules about the equality of
communicative opportunity are built into a variety of procedures including
discovery, trial, hearings, and so forth. There does seem to be a basic
notion that in order for a procedure to be fair, each side must have an equal
opportunity to present its case, question, rebut, and so forth.218
Other features of the ideal communication situation are modeled in
existing procedure doctrine. For example, as articulated by Habermas, the
ideal communication situation requires that the validity of norms be subject
to challenge. One might see the appellate system and the practice of
judicial review for constitutionality as providing an institutionalization of
this requirement.
If we assume for now that the discourse theory interpretation of the
participation model satisfies the criterion of fit, the next question is whether
it satisfies the criterion of justification. Does the discourse theory offer the
best justification for the general shape of the existing system of civil
procedure? This question is complicated by the breadth of discourse theory,
which contains within itself a general account of what constitutes an
adequate justification. Consider then, a very brief summary of the central
features of Habermas’s theory.
Habermas’s theory of communicative action borrows from speech act
theory. Persons use language to act—to coordinate behavior through
rational agreement. Promises, assertions, and orders are all examples of
communicative actions. When one engages in a speech act, one implicitly
raises validity claims to comprehensibility, truth, sincerity, and right. When
I ask you to close the window, I am explicitly making a claim (1) to truth,
that there is a window and that it can be closed; (2) to sincerity, that my
request is sincere (not a joke or irony or sarcasm); and (3) to right, that it is
216. Id. at 303.
217. Cf. Solum & Marzen, supra note 95, at 1164–65.
218. The idea of equality of litigation opportunity is very similar to the notion of a level playing
field. See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
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appropriate for me to make such a request of you. Engaging in the request
pragmatically commits me to redeem any of these validity claims should
you challenge the claim. Redemption occurs in rational discourse: we seek
to reach an agreement or consensus on the challenged validity claim. Our
search is rational in the sense that we seek agreement based on the force of
the better argument, and we rule out coercion or deception as the basis for
agreement.
Habermas’s theory can be understood as an attempt to develop a
communicative conception of rationality. Such a communicative
conception contrasts with a subjective (or Cartesian) view. According to
the subjective conception, rationality is understood as a property of an
individual’s isolated deliberation. The communicative conception views
rationality intersubjectively as a property of agreements among persons.
Thus, the operative notion of agreement is the idea of a rational consensus,
distinguished from the brute fact of bare agreement.
Habermas argues that a rational consensus is one that results purely
from the force of the better arguments and not from constraints on
communication. The absence of such constraints can be elucidated in terms
of the formal structure of the communicative situation. A communicative
situation is structured without constraint only if it is open to all with the
ability to communicate, it provides equal opportunity to engage in
communication, and the participants are motivated solely by a cooperative
search for truth or right. These conditions are met in the ideal
communication situation, which Habermas formerly labeled the “ideal
speech situation.”219
The ideal communication situation can be defined more precisely by
identifying three rules that formalize its conditions:
(1) Rule of Participation. Each person who is capable of engaging
in communication and action is allowed to participate.
(2) Rule of Equality of Communicative Opportunity. Each
participant is given equal opportunity to communicate with
respect to the following:
a. Each participant is allowed to call into question any proposal;
b. Each participant is allowed to introduce any proposal into the
discourse; and
219. See REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY, supra note 214, at 25; MCCARTHY,
supra note 214, at 306.
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c. Each participant is allowed to express attitudes, sincere beliefs,
wishes, and needs.
(3) Rule against Compulsion. No participant may be hindered by
compulsion—whether arising from inside the discourse or outside
of it—from making use of the rights secured under (1) and (2).220
As Thomas McCarthy put it, the ideal communication situation “can
serve as a guide for the institutionalization of discourse and as a critical
standard against which every actually achieved consensus can be
measured.”221 To return to the Dworkinian criterion of justification,
discourse theory maintains that an adequate justification is one that would
be the subject of rational agreement under the conditions of the ideal
communication situation. This is the point expressed by the following
passage, which is laden with the theoretical vocabulary of Habermas’s
theory: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.”222
Thus, the formal model of the ideal communication situation might
provide a route to justification of the participation model. The argument
could begin with the rule of participation. The rule of participation
formalizes the notion that an agreement cannot count as rationally
motivated if it can be demonstrated that it was only reached because
someone who would have disagreed was excluded from the process of
deliberation. In the context of litigation, the rule of participation would
justify familiar principles of procedural due process, for example, the right
to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The second step in the argument for the participation model from
discourse theory would focus on the rule of equality of communicative
opportunity. The upshot of this rule is that an agreement does not count as a
rational consensus if it is reached under conditions where one participant or
group of participants is not allowed to engage in the same quantity or
quality of speech acts. Participants must have the same opportunities to
initiate and perpetuate communication. In the context of procedural rules,
220. This formulation is based on one suggested by Robert Alexy and adopted by Habermas. See
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 89 (Christian Lenhardt &
Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990); Robert Alexy, Eine Theorie des Praktischen Diskurses, in
NORMENBEGRÜNDUNG UND NORMENDURCHSETZUNG 22, 40–41 (Willi Oelmüller ed., 1978); Robert
Alexy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 119–24, 193 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans.,
1989). The names given to the three rules are mine.
221. MCCARTHY, supra note 214, at 309.
222. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 214, at 107. See also William Rehg,
Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1150–51 (1996) (discussing Habermas’s formulation).
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the rule of equality of communicative opportunity is reflected in a wide
variety of rules that provide equal opportunity for litigants to engage in
discovery, the presentation of witnesses, cross examination, and so forth.
Where local rules limit the number of interrogatories, the rule is not that the
plaintiff shall have thirty and the defendant ten. If the amount of time
allowed the plaintiff to present his case is limited to one day, the defendant
is likely to be allowed a roughly equal amount of time.223
Habermas himself has made the connection between discourse theory
and rules of procedure:
Rules of court procedure institutionalize judicial decision making in such
a way that the judgment and its justification can be considered the
outcome of an argumentation game governed by a special program. Once
again, legal procedures intertwine with processes of argumentation, and
in such a way that the court procedures instituting legal discourses must
not interfere with the logic or argument internal to such discourses.
Procedural law does not regulate normative-legal discourse as such but
secures, in the temporal, social, and substantive dimensions, the
institutional framework that clears the way for processes of
communication governed by the logic of application discourses.224

Habermas then works through a number of specific examples drawn from
German criminal and civil procedure.225
In sum, a case can be made that an ideal communication conception of
pure procedural justice fits the existing contours of procedure doctrine.
Indeed, some commentary on procedure is at least suggestive of a
Habermasian view. John MacArthur Maguire and Robert Vincent, writing
in 1935, made the following pronouncement: “Courtroom truth is what a
jury or the judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”226
There are, however, a number of problems with the idea that process
fairness is the sole criterion for courtroom truth. One problem arises from
the structure of most of modern evidence doctrine. The rules of evidence
seem to assume that there really is a fact of the matter; thus, the
admissibility and exclusion of evidence should aim at maximizing the
likelihood that trials will result in fact-finding that is accurate according to
223. If inequalities are allowed, it will be because they are justified by a more basic equality. For
example, when each side has been provided adequate time to present its case, more time for one side
would be redundant.
224. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 214, at 234–35.
225. Id. at 235–37.
226. John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or
Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 238 (1935).
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the independent criteria of what really happened. The basic structure of
evidence law, which is built around ideas of relevance and prejudice, is not
structured around the notion that equal opportunity to present evidence
guarantees the emergence of truth.
At a commonsense level, the ideal communication conception of fair
process founders on a very practical objection. Although an agreement that
is reached under nonideal conditions, in which one side was not given an
opportunity to present its side, may be suspect, it does not follow that the
agreement reached under ideal conditions is any guarantee of truth. The
reason is simple: inputs count. Even the fairest trial, conducted under
conditions that closely approximate those of the ideal communication
situation, can yield an unjust outcome if crucial information was not
considered.227 Maguire and Vincent’s formulation built this notion into the
idea of courtroom truth: “Courtroom truth,” they said, “is what a jury or the
judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”228 The notion that
full presentation of evidence is required for courtroom truth reflects the
notion that inputs count. As the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts put the point,
Truth in the real world . . . may well differ from the “truth” announced
by the jury’s verdict. Although the ultimate aim of the judicial system is
to ascertain the real truth, trial is nevertheless, in the scheme of things, an
imperfect method, and the “truth” memorialized by the jury’s verdict
may not necessarily mirror actual truth.229

There is no guarantee of perfect accuracy, but the system aims for
accuracy and not simply an equal opportunity to engage in the presentation
of evidence, the questioning of witnesses, and so forth.
At this point, we can take stock of the participation model. we began
with what is virtually a reductio of the process view, the gaming
interpretation. Because litigation is not a voluntary contest between
litigants or lawyers, adherence to rules announced in advance is not
sufficient for procedural fairness. The second interpretation, which
emphasizes the dignity interest of litigants, at least gets off the ground, but
the dignity-enhancing process is not sufficient for fairness in the face of
skewed outcomes. The third interpretation, the satisfaction interpretation,
227. For Habermas’s view of the relationship between discourse theory and ideas about truth, see
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 135–39 (William Mark
Hohengarten trans., 1992). See generally RICHARD L. KIRKHAM, THEORIES OF TRUTH (1995) (offering
an introductory account of contemporary philosophical thinking about truth).
228. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 226, at 238 (emphasis added).
229. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991).
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suffers from a similar defect; the subjective satisfactions of participation
cannot confer legitimacy on a system with systematically distorted results.
The final attempt to rescue a pure process view attempts to remedy this
defect by positing a constitutive relationship between accuracy and fair
process, but this view is inconsistent with the widely shared and firmly held
convictions of common sense.
C. FROM THE THREE MODELS TO A THEORY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
What can we garner from our consideration of the three simple models
of procedural fairness? Some conclusions are uncontroversial. We have
very good reasons to believe that accuracy counts, even if the accuracy
model does not tell the whole story about procedural justice. We also have
good reasons to believe that any plausible account of procedural justice
must account for the costs of procedure, although we may need to do
further work to determine how the consequentialist and deontological
interpretations of cost should be incorporated. These lessons will be
reflected in the principles of procedural justice,230 requiring that accuracy
be maximized subject to several provisos, including one aimed at striking a
fair balance between accuracy and the costs of adjudication
The question that remains is whether the participation model makes
any contribution to our understanding of procedural justice that is not
already captured in the other two models. Our analysis of the participation
model has, so far, been limited to whether it provides the whole story, and
we have concluded that it does not. The question addressed in this part of
the Article is whether process tells an essential and irreducible part of the
story. Even if fair process is not the sole criterion for procedural fairness, it
does not follow that the value of participation and equality of litigation
opportunity is measured solely by the contribution made to accuracy and
litigant satisfaction. Hence, we must next examine the value of
participation.
V. THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION
What is the value of allowing litigants to participate in civil
adjudications that may bind them? Most obviously, a procedure that
provides for participation is likely to be more accurate than one that does
not. In addition, litigants may feel more satisfied by adjudication that
affords them the opportunity to tell their story in a meaningful way. But the
230.

See infra Part VI.A.
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focus of this part of the Article is not on accuracy or satisfaction. Instead,
our focus will be on the connection between participation and legitimacy.
A good way to begin this inquiry is to recall what we have called the
hard question of procedural justice: How can we regard ourselves as
obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we
believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits?
The answer to this question cannot be accuracy—the hard question arises
only when litigants have a warranted belief that the outcome was not
accurate.231 Nor can the answer to this question be a subjective sense of
satisfaction. Satisfaction that is merely subjective cannot confer normative
legitimacy—although it may provide the legitimacy that is required for the
important social goods of voluntary compliance and social stability. The
full answer to the hard question of procedural justice must include a
normative theory of procedural legitimacy. The participatory legitimacy
thesis—the central claim of this part of the Article—provides such a
normative theory. Procedures that purport to bind without affording
meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate.
The central claim of this part is set forth in Section A, which
investigates the claim that participation has a value that cannot be reduced
to accuracy, because a core right of participation is essential for the
legitimacy of adjudication. Next, Section B examines a framework for
pinpointing the stakes in the debate over the value of process and
participation. Then, Section C surveys three justifications that have been
offered for the proposition that participation has a value that cannot be
231. It might be argued that legitimacy can be conferred on an erroneous outcome by a process
that is accurate in the aggregate. Randy Barnett has advanced such a theory in the context of
constitutional legitimacy. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 9–86 (2004). Although Barnett’s theory suggests the view critiqued in this
footnote, there is a crucial difference. Barnett’s theory answers what makes a constitution legitimate. He
does not answer what we might call the hard question of constitutional legitimacy: how can I regard a
constitutional outcome as just when I am injured by the outcome and it is fundamentally unjust?
Does systemic accuracy confer legitimacy on inaccurate outcomes? Consider a dissatisfied
litigant who answers this question in the negative: the litigant argues that if accuracy is the measure of
legitimacy, then the erroneous outcome that injures the litigant is clearly illegitimate. The natural
counter is to argue that the litigant would have consented in advance to this procedure because it gives
the best chance of systemic accuracy. There are two responses to this argument. First, the litigant might
argue that overall systemic accuracy does not guarantee maximum accuracy in particular case types. If
the litigant’s case is a type for which the general, transsubstantive rules of procedure are less accurate
than alternative rules, the litigant could argue that he or she would not have consented. Second, and
independently, the litigant may argue that if hypothetical consent is the criterion, then he or she would
not consent on the basis of accuracy alone. In particular, he or she might have demanded both
reasonable rights of participation and a reasonable balance between procedural costs and benefits before
giving hypothetical consent.
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reduced to accuracy or cost. Finally, Section D reviews a number of
arguments that have been raised against the idea that process counts quite
apart from considerations of accuracy and cost.
A. THE PARTICIPATION THAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEGITIMACY
This section lays out the case that a right of participation is essential
for the legitimacy of a final and binding civil proceeding. The aim of this
section is to narrow our focus with two claims. First, the value of process
that cannot be reduced to accuracy or cost is connected with participation.
Second, the normative foundation of the irreducible value of participation
must be found in the notion of legitimacy.
1. A Statement of the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis
Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication
processes232—that is the core idea, but the full statement of the
participatory legitimacy thesis is more complex:
Because a right of participation must be afforded to those to be
bound by judicial proceedings in order for those proceedings to
serve as a legitimate source of authority, the value of participation
cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation on
outcomes; nor can the value of participation be reduced to a
subjective preference or feeling of satisfaction.
The full statement suggests several important distinctions. First,
legitimacy does not require actual participation. Only an option or right is
required because participation may be voluntarily forsworn. Second, so far
as legitimacy is concerned, it is the option to participate at a meaningful
stage that is crucial. Temporary decisions that are not binding may be
unjust for other reasons, but they do not violate the fundamental
requirement of legitimacy. Third, the participatory legitimacy thesis makes
a claim about the relationship between participatory legitimacy and
outcomes. The value of participation cannot be reduced to the effect of
participation on outcomes. With these distinctions in place, we can turn to
the obvious question: what does it mean to say that the legitimacy of civil
232. Cf. Bone, supra note 156, at 625 (“A strong participation right can be justified only by a
normative theory of process value that grounds the value of participation in the conditions of
adjudicative legitimacy, such as respect for a party’s dignity or autonomy.”).
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dispute resolution depends on affording those who are to be bound a right
of participation?233
2. The Analogy to Legislation
We can approach the participatory legitimacy thesis by first examining
an analogous case, the case of legitimacy in the exercise of legislative
power. For the exercise of legislative power to be legitimate, the legislation
must be the outcome of a process that satisfies norms of democratic
participation234 (and perhaps other norms as well). These norms include the
requirement that citizens have either the right to vote directly on legislative
proposals or to vote for representatives to whom the citizens have delegated
legislative authority.235 The norms of democratic participation also include
the requirement that citizens have a right to freedom of expression
regarding legislative matters and the election of government officials.236 If
these norms are not satisfied, the outcome of the legislative process is not
regarded as legitimate.
The connection between participation and legislative legitimacy is a
strong one. First, legislation that is imposed by an unelected authority is
illegitimate even if the particular laws that are passed are good ones, as
233. The connection between legitimacy and participation has recently been explored by
Christopher Peters. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312
(1997). Many commentators have noted the connection between the legitimacy of adjudication and
participation. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5 (1949)
(“Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. It indicates in part the hold which the law
process has over the litigants. They have participated in the lawmaking. They are bound by something they
helped to make.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 952 (1989) (book
review) (“One other value [of due process] might be to assure an individual participation in decisions
affecting him or her, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the ultimate decision.”); John B. Oakley, The
Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties,
1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 874 (noting the connection between legitimacy and participation in the context
of the Ninth Circuit’s summary disposition procedures). Cf. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of
Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 202–03
(1983) (noting the connection between participation and legitimacy in the context of criminal
procedure).
234. See, e.g., Kenneth Ward, The Allure and Danger of Community Values: A Criticism of
Liberal Republican Constitutional Theory, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171, 188–89 (1996) (discussing
the connection between participation and democratic legitimacy in republican theory).
235. See Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution
to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 792 (1992) (“Democratic government derives its legitimacy
from the formal consent and ongoing participation of the governed, who are considered the ultimate
source of political authority.”).
236. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 882–84 (1963) (discussing the relationship between democratic legitimacy and the right of
participation). See also John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85
KY. L.J. 9, 45 (1997) (commenting on Thomas Emerson’s position).
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measured by appropriate standards of political morality. Second,
undemocratic legislation is illegitimate even if the undemocratic process
(benevolent dictatorship) reliably produces excellent laws. Third,
undemocratic legislation is illegitimate even if the legislation would have
been approved by citizens had they been afforded an opportunity to do so.
Rights of democratic participation are essential to the legitimacy of
legislative processes.
It might be thought that the legislative process demonstrates that
participation is unimportant because there is no individual right to a hearing
before a legislature passes a statute or an agency makes a rule, even if the
statute or rule will have a substantial effect on one’s interest. But this
argument is off the mark, at least if the target is the proposition that
participation in the process never matters to procedural fairness. For
example, the right to an equal vote matters aside from outcomes. Edmund
Burke’s virtual representation theory237 is, in our political culture, a
paradigmatic case of bad political theory. The slogan “No taxation without
representation” is an expression of a fundamental political value of great
importance. A right of participation in the form of an equal vote in the
election of representatives is thought to be a prerequisite for the fairness or
justice of the legislative process. The case of legislation illustrates the
general proposition that a right of participation may be essential to
legitimacy, quite apart from its effects on outcomes.
3. The Importance of Legitimacy
Why is legitimacy important? Citizens are not obligated to regard
illegitimate laws as authoritative. Consequently, they have no contentindependent obligation of political morality to obey such laws except the
obligation imposed by the correspondence of the laws with the independent
requirements of political morality.238 Given human nature and pluralism in
matters of politics, religion, and morality, there will inevitably be
disagreement about the justice or goodness of particular laws. The
consequence of such disagreement under circumstances of illegitimacy is
that citizens can frequently regard themselves as morally obligated or
authorized to disobey particular laws. This does not necessarily entail
general social disorder. The state may be able to coerce obedience to
illegitimate laws—although depending on social circumstances, such
237. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174–76 (1967) (“Virtual
representation exists where the substantive content and effect occur without election.”).
238. Thus, one may have an obligation to obey an illegitimate law against murder because the
content of the law is itself required by political morality.
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coercion may require the repressive use of state power. But even if
normative legitimacy is not required for social stability, it is nonetheless a
very great social good. A society in which citizens can reasonably regard
themselves as having a content-independent obligation to obey the law is
better than a society in which the law begins with a presumption of
illegitimacy.
As it is with legislation, so it goes with adjudication. The exercise of
adjudicative power to bind an individual must be legitimate for the
adjudication to be authoritative and, hence, to create content-independent
obligations of political morality, to obey judicial decrees, and to respect the
finality of judgments. This conclusion is strongly supported by our
investigation of the nature of procedure in Part II. The upshot of that
investigation was the entanglement thesis, including the idea that procedure
transforms general and abstract conduct rules into particular and concrete
action-guiding legal norms. The requirement of legitimacy for substantive
law reflects the action-guiding role of conduct rules. The entanglement
thesis establishes that procedure performs a similar function—guiding
action in particular and concrete factual contexts. More plainly,
adjudication is lawmaking. The particularization that procedure provides is
required for the law to do its work of guiding action, because of the three
problems identified at the outset of my discussion: (1) the problem of
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Not only
does procedure guide primary conduct, procedure must guide conduct for
substance to guide action.
Moreover, in the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we
regard legitimacy as a political good. The goodness of legitimacy flows
from an intuitively appealing principle of political morality: each citizen
who is to be bound by an official proceeding for the resolution of a civil
dispute should be able to regard the procedure as a legitimate source of
binding authority creating a content independent obligation of political
morality for the parties to the dispute.239 The notion that the procedures for
the adjudication of civil disputes should be legitimate is not controversial.
We hold to this notion for important reasons of principle and policy. As a
pragmatic matter, it is important that citizens be able to regard procedures
as legitimate so that we may secure their voluntary cooperation with the
239. Note the modal qualification: citizens should be able to regard adjudication as legitimate.
There may be citizens who will not believe that adjudication is legitimate, even when all of the
objective conditions for legitimacy have been met. This may result, for example, from the clouding of
judgment that results from self-interest.
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system of civil justice.240 Great social evils would attend a system that
resorted to sanctions and incentives to secure the compliance of citizens
who regarded the system as illegitimate and did not regard the system as a
source of binding authority or moral obligation.241 This argument of policy
is complemented by one of principle: as a matter of political morality it
would be unjust to coerce compliance with the judgments of a civil justice
system that could not be regarded by reasonable citizens as legitimate.
As in the case of legislation, the legitimacy of adjudication depends on
affording those who are to be bound a right to participate, either directly or
through adequate representation.242 As in the case of legislation,
adjudication is not legitimate if the norms of participation are violated (a)
even if the outcome of the particular adjudication would be considered
right by independent norms of political morality, (b) even if the procedure
was generally reliable, and (c) even if the outcome would have been the
same had the required participation actually occurred.
Why is a right to participation required if citizens are to regard civil
procedures as legitimate? To see the answer to this question clearly, we
240. This point is strongly associated with the work of Tom Tyler:
[P]eople defer to rules primarily because of their judgments about how those rules are made,
rather than their evaluations of their content. Judgments about the fairness of decision-making
authorities have been found to be more central to a rule’s legitimacy, and to people’s
willingness to accept it, than are judgments of decision favorability. In other words, people
are willing to defer to laws and legal authorities on procedural justice grounds.
Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 219, 231 (1997). For more work by Tyler and others on the connection between
participation and perceptions of legitimacy, see supra note 213. See also Tracey L. Meares, Norms,
Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 403 (2000) (“[T]he use of procedures regarded
as fair by all parties facilitates the maintenance of positive relations among group members . . . even in
the face of the conflict of interest that exists in any group whose members have different preference
structures and different beliefs . . . .”); Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman &
Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse
Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 165 (1997) (“[B]eing treated fairly by authorities, even while
being sanctioned by them, influences both a person’s view of the legitimacy of group authority and
ultimately that person’s obedience to group norms.”).
241. Of course, psychological legitimacy would suffice for this purpose. So, for example, we
might be able to achieve psychological legitimacy through the use of manipulation, coercion, or
deception. But if we reject the use of these techniques on grounds of political morality, the alternative is
that we offer a sound justification for the normative legitimacy of adjudication.
242. Martin Redish observes this about aggregative procedures in mass tort litigation:
The unease about the suggestion must be attributed to different concerns—the belief that the
legitimacy of a democratic system and the dignity of those who make up society require the
actual participation of the citizenry in the governing process. It is arguable that a similar
dignitary legitimacy analysis dictates that a defendant have the opportunity to litigate each
plaintiff’s damages, even if one were to assume that the end result of such a process would be
roughly equivalent to the result of a sampling procedure.
Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 18, 24 (1996).
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must return to the hard question of procedural legitimacy. When we seek to
identify the conditions for the legitimacy of adjudication, we should
assume the point of view of a citizen who is to be bound by a judgment that
he or she has good reason to believe is in error and is adverse to the
citizen’s interests or wishes. For this person, the question is “Can I
reasonably regard a procedure that did not afford me a right to participation
(to observe and be heard) as a legitimate source of final, binding authority,
which creates an obligation of political morality for me to comply with the
outcome of the procedure?” If the answer to this question is no, then we
should affirm the participatory legitimacy thesis.
Let us take up the point of view of this citizen. From this perspective,
it is clear that being barred from participation undermines the legitimacy of
civil adjudication. If I did not participate in a procedure that purports to
bind me with finality, I may always object that the procedure was defective
because an element of my case was not even considered by the tribunal
through no fault of mine. For example, I may complain that salient facts
were not presented or that a relevant legal principle was overlooked. I
might argue that the tribunal did not hear my claim, that the law applied
was invalid on constitutional grounds, or that the tribunal failed to evaluate
my contention that my case was an exceptional one in which equity
required an adjustment of the legal rule. The right of participation is the
right to observe, to make arguments, to present evidence, and to be
informed of the reasons for a decision. Without these participation rights, I
cannot be assured that the proceeding considered my view of the law and
facts.
On the other hand, if I have been given the right to participate in the
proceeding and have chosen not to make a potentially salient argument (by
presenting evidence, making legal arguments, challenging the validity of
the law, or arguing for an equitable exception), then I may not reasonably
complain that the proceeding was illegitimate because my arguments were
not considered by the tribunal. By participating or waiving the right to
participate, I become an “author”243 of the proceeding; the choice of what
arguments will be advanced on my behalf becomes my choice. As
Christopher Peters has observed,
judicial decisions are to a very great extent products not of the unilateral
decree of a judge or panel of judges, but rather of a process of
participation and debate among the parties to the case that greatly
restricts the decisional options available to the court. In this sense,
243. An author, but not the author. Judges, juries, and other litigants are also authors of a civil
action and its outcomes.

SOLU12.DOC

2004]

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

281

judicial decisions resemble the decisions made by a democratic
legislature after debate and a fair hearing at which all relevant views
have been aired.244

One point deserves special mention before we proceed. A citizen who
could be finally bound may wish to raise points that either cannot, or likely
will not, have any effect on the outcome of the proceeding. An important
example of this involves what we might call “principled dissent from legal
norms.” Even if I have no viable legal argument against a legal norm that
binds me, I may have an interest in making (or even attempting to make)
arguments that the norm is illegitimate. In the United States, such
arguments may don constitutional garb because many arguments of
political morality can be dressed in the clothes of equal protection, due
process, or freedom of speech.245 But such arguments need not be legal,
and, even if legal, they may be raised as a matter of principle and not
because they have a realistic possibility of success.246 Some citizens may
regard themselves as morally obligated to express their principled dissent
from legally valid norms.247
This discussion allows us to clarify three aspects of the participatory
legitimacy thesis. First, a right or option to participate is required for final
and binding adjudication to be legitimate—the claim is qualified by the
terms “right or option,” “final,” and “binding.” Second, the legitimacy that
participation confers on adjudication cannot be reduced to accuracy
enhancing effects, subjective preferences, feelings of satisfaction, or even
perceptions of legitimacy. Third, we have not yet specified the institutional
form of the minimal right of participation that is the subject of the
participatory legitimacy thesis.
4. Three Thought Experiments
So far, the case for the participatory legitimacy thesis has rested on
abstract consideration of political philosophy. The abstract can be
supplemented by a few concrete thought experiments designed to elicit first
244. Peters, supra note 233, at 347.
245. In addition to the constitutional arguments in the text, more unconventional arguments may
be made on the basis of the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
246. At this point, critics might argue that such arguments are aimed at success in the court of
public opinion or in the courts of the relatively distant future. This may be the case, but it need not be
so. A citizen might regard himself or herself as obligated to register dissent, even if the citizen believes
that he or she has no likelihood of success.
247. This point would assume a greater significance in a system that permitted jury nullification.
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our intuitions and then our considered judgments about the relationship
between procedure and legitimacy.
Before we go any further, I want to make two concessions about these
thought experiments. The first concession is that my thought experiments
may not succeed in pumping from the reader the same intuitions that they
pump from me,248 but I would ask readers to bear in mind that reasonable
people do share my intuitions. The second concession is that bare intuitions
are not sufficient to make my case. Let me stipulate that the term
“intuition” describes our initial, unreflective reaction to a thought
experiment. Further, such intuitions, if confirmed by reflection and
deliberation, can be said to constitute “considered judgments.” The purpose
of these thought experiments is to provide a combination of intuition and
supporting grounds that will yield good and sufficient reasons for us to
reach considered judgments about procedural fairness.
a. Exclusion from a Meeting
Imagine that you are a faculty member excluded (without good cause)
from a faculty meeting on a topic that concerns you, or a judge excluded
from a meeting of your judicial council, or a lawyer excluded from a firm
meeting, or a law review editor excluded from a meeting of the editorial
board. Suppose further that you are fully satisfied with the outcome of the
meeting and that the meeting did not impose excessive costs or otherwise
violate any rights except your right to participate. Indeed, as a matter of
subjective preferences, we can imagine that you had quite a nice time
during the period of your exclusion, a much better time than you would
have had in a dreary meeting. Is your exclusion from the meeting unfair or
unjust, even though you agree with the outcome and the balance of costs
and benefits favored your exclusion? My considered judgment is that your
exclusion renders the meeting illegitimate with the consequence that you
are not required to regard its outcome as authoritative. Of course, if you
agree with the outcome, you may choose to abide by it nonetheless.
b. Star Chamber
Suppose we had a reliable procedure for producing accurate criminal
verdicts that excluded the defendant and defense counsel from the secret
proceedings. The exclusion is complete, and the defendant may not
participate in any way, even through the submission of written arguments
to the court (let us call the tribunal providing this perfectly accurate
248. On the role of thought experiments as intuition pumps, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW
ROOM 12 (1984).
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procedure “Star Chamber”).249 Would a defendant convicted through such
a process have any ground for complaint? The objection cannot be that the
process was unreliable. By hypothesis, Star Chamber is demonstrably
reliable, and if convicted, the hypothetical defendant will know that he or
she is, in fact, guilty. Nonetheless, many will share the intuition that secret
proceedings from which the defendant is excluded are unfair despite their
hypothesized accuracy. On further reflection it seems likely that this
intuition may well turn into a considered judgment.
The features of Star Chamber that seem objectionable are its secrecy
(most especially the exclusion of the defendant) and the inability of the
defendant to have a say, to raise objections, to ask questions, and so forth.
Suppose that we vary the hypothetical to isolate these features. Would Star
Chamber be objectionable if the defendant had the right to observe the
proceeding but not participate in any other way, either directly or through
an agent or representative? By hypothesis, nothing the defendant would say
could make the proceeding more accurate, although we may hypothesize
that the defendant’s participation might increase the likelihood of an
erroneous decision. My considered judgment is that this procedure is still
unfair to the defendant; indeed, in some ways, the requirement that he or
she remain silent is more horrifying than the requirement that the defendant
remain outside the room. What about having a say without access? It is
difficult to imagine a case in which the defendant is still excluded, but does
have the right to have a say. Having a meaningful say requires knowledge
of the proceeding, at least to the extent necessary to identify what concerns
are relevant to the decisionmakers’ deliberation. The hypothetical variation
of Star Chamber in which the defendant is allowed to submit a written or
videotaped statement, but not to know anything about the rest of the
proceedings, strikes me as unfair, although it is a slight (or perhaps
substantial) improvement over the case in which the defendant is both
excluded and silenced.
c. Guardian ad Litem
Imagine now that you are being sued in an ordinary civil case. You are
disputing a debt with a creditor; you are a competent adult; you have no
disability that would render you unable to make your own decisions
regarding the lawsuit. Nonetheless, the court denies your request to
participate directly and instead appoints a guardian ad litem to act as your
surrogate in the litigation. Your guardian is competent and makes good
decisions. There is no reason to believe that the proceeding will be any less
249.

See Riebli, supra note 1, at 810–11.

SOLU12.DOC

284

11/30/2004 9:41 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:181

accurate because of the guardian’s decisions on your behalf. Moreover, as
far as your preferences are concerned, this is not a bad deal. You do not
derive utility from the litigation process, and quite enjoy spending your
time in other ways. Now suppose that you lose, and furthermore, that you
know a mistake has been made. My intuition is that under these
circumstances, you would have good reason to deny the legitimacy of this
proceeding. Your participation was feasible, and there was no compelling
reason of cost or competency to deny you the right to participate.
The point of these three thought experiments is to suggest that our
intuitions about particular and concrete cases cohere with the general and
abstract considerations of political theory. Given this reflective
equilibrium, we have good and sufficient reason to accept the participatory
legitimacy thesis.
B. FRAMING THE ISSUE: REDUCTION OR DEPENDENCE
Discussion of the value of participation has generated unnecessary
confusion because of a failure to distinguish two possible relationships
between the value of process and participation on the one hand and the
value of accuracy (or other costs and benefits that might be balanced) on
the other. We shall call these two relationships “reduction” and
“dependence.” Before we proceed any deeper into the controversy over the
value of process in general and the participatory legitimacy thesis, this
distinction must be clarified.
1. Reductionist Programs
One possible relationship between the value of process and other
values, such as the value of accuracy, is captured by the idea of a
reductionist program. For example, it might be argued that all of the value
of participation in civil proceedings can be cashed out in terms of the
contribution that participation makes to accuracy. The thesis that the value
of participation can be reduced to the value of accuracy suggests that we
value participation because, under normal circumstances, participation
enhances accuracy. Phrased in terms of the three models, this reductionist
strategy suggests that the idea of fairness identified by the participation
model can be reduced to the fairness specified by the accuracy model.
Another reductionist program suggests that the value of participation
can be explained in terms of the satisfaction that participation provides to
litigants. This reductionist program treats the value of participation as
simply another social cost or benefit that can be weighed against other such
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costs, including the social cost of inaccurate adjudication and participatory
procedure. A more complex reductionist program would combine both the
accuracy strategy and the cost strategy. The value of participation—this
complex reductionist program would claim—can be reduced to the
accuracy effects of participation plus any utility that would be derived from
the satisfaction of subjective preferences for participation.
2. Arguments for Dependence
Reductionist strategies should be distinguished from another kind of
claim about the relationship between the value of process and participation
on the one hand and accuracy or cost on the other hand. It might be claimed
that the value of participation is not independent of the effects on
participation. Dependence does not entail reducibility, although reducibility
does entail dependence. This point is vitally important, but it has not been
obvious in debates over the value of participation.
Consider the implications of this distinction for the relationship
between the participatory legitimacy thesis and reductionist programs. The
thesis that a right of participation is essential for the legitimacy of final,
binding adjudication does not rest on the claim that the value of
participation is independent of effects on outcomes or accuracy. But the
participatory legitimacy thesis is inconsistent with the proposition that the
value of participation can be reduced to accuracy.
Why dependence? Final binding adjudication is not legitimate unless a
minimum right of participation is afforded to those with a substantial
interest in the controversy. If this claim is true, does it follow that the value
of participation is independent of the effects of participation on outcome?
The answer to this question is no. This conclusion can be established
through the following thought experiment: suppose you are offered a right
to participate in a proceeding, but the proceeding is structured so that your
input cannot have an effect on the outcome. Would this right of
participation be sufficient to legitimate the proceeding? No. It is not just
having a say that counts. Meaningful participation must be part of the
process and not a wheel that turns but moves nothing else.250 Meaningful
participation requires that your input to the proceeding be considered, that
what you say plays a role in the deliberative process of the decisionmaker.
In this sense, the value of participation is dependent on possible effects on
outcomes, and, hence, is in some sense dependent on possible impacts on
250. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 271 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that “a
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism”).
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accuracy. Thus, there is good and sufficient reason to believe that the
legitimacy of a procedure is not independent of its effect on outcomes. Put
another way, the legitimacy of a procedure depends, at least in part, on its
accuracy.
Does this form of dependence implicate the further conclusion that the
participatory legitimacy thesis can be reduced to a claim about the
relationship between participation and accuracy? The answer to this
question is clearly no. The reduction of legitimacy to accuracy would
require the truth of one of the following two propositions: (1) if legitimacy
and accuracy are not a matter of degree, then it would have to be the case
that accuracy is both a necessary and sufficient condition for legitimacy; or
(2) if legitimacy and accuracy are a matter of degree (scalar), then it would
have to be the case that the degree of legitimacy of a procedure is an
increasing function of the accuracy rate of the procedure. Neither of the
two propositions follows logically from the fact that legitimacy depends on
accuracy.251
So far, we have dealt only with the dependence of legitimacy on the
possibility that outcomes will be affected by participation. What about the
claim that the value of participation can be reduced to a feeling of
satisfaction or some other psychological effect of participation? This point
may have some force as applied to the dignity theory of the value of
participation,252 but as applied to the participatory legitimacy thesis this
objection is far off the mark. The participatory legitimacy thesis is a claim
about the normative legitimacy of adjudicatory procedures and not
primarily a claim about the psychological acceptability of such procedures.
If psychological legitimacy were the only value at issue, then one might
argue that its value could be reduced to specific costs and benefits, such as
the psychological benefit to litigants of being satisfied with the resolution
of their disputes or the social benefit of perceived legitimacy in promoting
voluntary compliance with the law.
C. DIGNITY, EQUALITY, AND AUTONOMY
The value of participation derives from the idea of legitimacy. Our
focus on legitimacy contrasts with much of the prior literature, which has
suggested three rival explanations—based on dignity, equality, and
autonomy—for the irreducible value of legitimacy. Each of these three
251. That is, the fact that x depends on y does not mean either that x is the case if and only if y or
that x is an increasing function of y.
252. See infra Part V.D.1.
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rival explanations has a contribution to make, especially when considered
in relationship to legitimacy. Considered in isolation, however, dignity,
equality, and autonomy do not provide an adequate explanation of the
value of participation.
We have already addressed dignity in the context of the participation
model of procedural fairness.253 At that point, we asked whether the
participatory process, in respecting the dignity of litigants, could be used as
a model that would, by itself, explain and justify the civil procedure
landscape. Our answer was no. Does dignity offer a sufficient explanation
of the intuitions elicited by our thought experiments, which implied that
participation has irreducible (but not necessarily independent) value? The
answer to this question is also no. When participation is an entitlement
(whether produced by law or by less formal social norms), denying
someone the right to participate is an insult to that person’s dignity. If I am
entitled to attend the meeting and you exclude me, then you have violated
my entitlement, and in so doing you have insulted me. On the other hand, if
I have no right to attend the meeting and you exclude me, dignity requires
that I gracefully accept the exclusion and feel no insult to my dignity. The
point is that dignity does not create the right to participate—it is a
reflection of that right.
A second rival to legitimacy as the ground of a right to participation is
the notion of equality.254 Procedural justice has been defined as “the right
to treatment as an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution of
some good or opportunity, but to equal concern and respect in the political
decisions about how these goods and opportunities are to be distributed.”255
But equality alone cannot do the work of explaining a right to participation.
Once rights of participation are defined, equality comes into the picture. If
253. See supra Part IV.B.3.b.
254. See Massaro, supra note 208, at 902 (“Procedure therefore not only should promote
rationality through unbiased and accurate decisionmaking, but also should show respect for persons by
allowing equal, active participation in decisions affecting their interest.”); Martin H. Redish &
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95
YALE L.J. 455, 484 (1986) (“One value that might conceivably be fostered by procedural due process is
the goal of equality.”); Rehg, supra note 222, at 1147 (“[I]nasmuch as a procedure expresses a
recognition of one’s equal status as a citizen regardless of how insightful one’s judgment on a given
issue, participation in the procedure can reinforce group solidarity, at least to some degree.”);
Rutherford, supra note 136, at 74 (“The right to participate is meaningful only if a person can
participate on an equal footing.”). Although various scholars have seen connections between equality
and the value of participation as a component of procedural justice, William Rubenstein’s investigation
of the role of equality in procedure omits this topic. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of
Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865 (2002).
255. Jeffrey Rachlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 339, 347 (Barton H. Thompson Jr. ed., 1995).
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others are afforded a right of participation, but I am arbitrarily denied this
right, I have been treated unequally and have a right to complain—this is
equality before the law, an important sense of the abstract idea of equality.
Equality also plays a role in theories of distributive justice. It might be
argued that an equal right to participate in litigation is a component part of
distributional equality. But once again, equality comes to the scene after we
have settled the prior question of whether there is a right to participate in
litigation. If no such right exists, then the norm of distributional equality is
consistent with giving the right to none—as it would also be with giving
the right to all. Equality simply does not do the necessary work.
The third rival to legitimacy is based on the notion of autonomy.256 As
Robert Bone has written, “According to [the Kantian process-based]
theory, certain elements of civil process, such as individual participation
and rational decision making, are implicit in what it means to respect
human dignity and autonomy.”257 But if considered in isolation, the value
of autonomy simply will not do the necessary work. On the one hand, the
concept of autonomy is too general to provide a particular right to
participation in the adjudicative process. On the other hand, legal process
necessarily involves limitations on autonomy rights. The sphere of civil
litigation is not the private sphere where individual autonomy holds sway.
To the contrary, civil litigation is the public sphere where individual
autonomy is necessarily qualified by the need for coordination of
individual action.
But when the idea of autonomy is considered in relationship to
legitimacy, a role for autonomy (as well as dignity and equality) becomes
apparent. Legitimacy itself is important because we respect the dignity of
citizens as equal and autonomous. If we rejected the idea that citizens are
autonomous and equal, then the value of legitimacy would not apply to
256. The association between procedural fairness and autonomy is a common theme in the
literature. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution
of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 954
(1995) (“[P]articipation of the parties is considered a key element of due process because of our belief
in individual autonomy.”); Jason Richards, Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme Court Stems the
Crimson Tide of Res Judicata, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 691, 716 (1998) (“‘Central to litigant
autonomy is participation. For the due process right to be meaningfully individual, a litigant must have
the opportunity to tell his story, to try his case.’” (quoting Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo
Process: Virtual Representation as a Justification for Preclusion of a Nonparty Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1303, 1323 (1994))); Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of
Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 670 (1998) (“[P]rocedural fairness may be viewed in
three component parts: litigant autonomy, dignity, and participation.”).
257. Bone, supra note 6, at 509. See also Bone, supra note 156, at 619–20 (assuming that “the
intrinsic value of participation is historically tied to respect for individual autonomy”).
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them. Dignity, equality, and autonomy are fundamental political values.
The idea that they connect in some way to the value of participation is
sound. The error is to believe that any one of these values directly provides
the value of participation—legitimacy plays that role.
D. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS
At this point, we have stated the participatory legitimacy thesis and
clarified the relationship it bears to attempts to reduce the value of process
to effects on outcomes. We can now proceed with an analysis of some of
the arguments that have been made against the claim that participation has
irreducible value.
1. Reductionism One: The Reduction to Subjective Preference
One powerful critique of the value of participation has been offered by
David Rosenberg.258 Rosenberg’s argument, which is specific to the masstort context, is complex and subtle, but we can understand the core of his
objection by attending to the following points. First, Rosenberg argues that
in the mass-tort context, the primary purposes of the law are deterrence and
compensation. Deterrence does not require individual participation and
may be better served without it.259 At bottom, deterrence rests on accuracy
and not on any independent process values. Second, Rosenberg contends
that the value of participation is a “subjective taste for particularized
process,”260 which litigants should be and are willing to trade for lower
product prices.261 These arguments rely on further premises, for which
Rosenberg provides a variety of arguments. Importantly, Rosenberg argues
that collectivization will result in more accurate outcomes by transferring
resources from redundant case-by-case adjudication to collectivized
proceedings.262 Rosenberg also argues that collectivization is less costly
than individual participation; collectivization and insurance will result in a
higher ex ante welfare level for those who are injured.263
Accepting Rosenberg’s factual premises and conclusions, his
argument boils down to the following. Considering the policy goals of
258. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 213, 237–48, 255–57.
259. Id. at 213, 237–48.
260. Id. at 255, 256 n.110.
261. Id. at 213.
262. Id. at 237. Rosenberg argues that the determination of causation and liability issues involves
high costs, that plaintiffs’ lawyers will underinvest in litigating these issues, and that as a result defense
lawyers will have a systematic advantage. Id.
263. See id. at 245–48.
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deterrence and compensation, collectivization should be preferred over a
right to participation because collectivization is both more accurate and less
costly than the alternatives. Thus, both the accuracy and balancing models
favor collectivization over an individualized right to participation.
Moreover, because the value of participation can be reduced to the
“subjective taste for particularized” process, it follows that the value of
participation can be fully achieved by allowing those who desire to opt out
of collectivization to pay the full cost of a particularized proceeding.264
“Plaintiffs are never made better off by being vested with a property
right—which, absent the entitlement, they would not and could not pay
for—to an inefficient day in court, to personal control over their claims,
and to other anti-collectivist procedures.”265
Has Rosenberg made a convincing case against the irreducible value
of process in general or the participatory legitimacy thesis in particular?
Despite the powerful arguments advanced, the answer is an obvious no.
Rosenberg’s argument is question-begging because it assumes the very
conclusion for which he is attempting to argue. The assumption that there is
no right of political morality to individualized participation is smuggled
into Rosenberg’s argument in four moves. First, he assumes that the
purposes or functions of adjudication can be reduced to the purposes or
functions of the substantive law being applied. For example, he assumes
that the function of tort adjudication is reducible to the function of
substantive tort law. Second, Rosenberg assumes the validity of the
balancing model by stating that the functions or purposes of tort
compensation are deterrence and compensation. Third, he assumes that the
value of participation can be reduced to a subjective preference, which can
be balanced against the costs and benefits of accurate adjudication and the
costs of individual participation. Fourth, he then shifts the burden, asking
why individuals should “desire the particularizing process for its own
sake—that is, unrelated to any instrumental reasons, such as providing
cost-effective improvements in accounting or replacement value of
compensation awards.”266
None of these arguments are decisive, however, if the participatory
legitimacy thesis provides support for a background right of political
morality to a minimum level of participation. It is as if Rosenberg has
argued against a right to the freedom of speech by arguing that the purpose
of the political system is to maximize utility, that the value of self264.
265.
266.

Id. at 256 n.110.
Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 256.
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expression is reducible to a subjective preference to make noise, that
democratic processes can maximize utility by collectivized lobbying, and
that, therefore, there is no possible explanation for the noninstrumental
value of an individualized right to free speech. Yes, if all these premises
were true, that conclusion would follow—but look at how much has been
packed into these premises.
To the extent that Rosenberg has a positive argument against the
irreducible value of process and participation, it rests on the assumption
that the value of particularized procedures can be reduced to the subjective
preferences of consumers for such procedures. If this were true, then
Rosenberg would have made a convincing case for the balancing model
and against an independent role for a background right to a minimum level
of participation. If his case for reducing the value of participation to
subjective preference rests on the assumption that some version of
utilitarian moral theory is true, then his argument should be rejected on the
ground that it does not provide an appropriate public reason. Most citizens
are not utilitarians, and the public at large would reasonably reject the
premise that all values are subjective preferences whose intensity can and
should be measured by willingness to pay.
To the extent that Rosenberg does not rely on subjective-preference
utilitarianism, his argument boils down to a question: what is the
noninstrumental value of participation? Rosenberg is certainly entitled to
ask the question, but posing the question does not demonstrate that there is
no answer.
2. Reductionism Two: The Reduction to Accuracy Objection
Louis Kaplow has raised another objection to the irreducible value of
process.267 As we shall see, Kaplow’s objection is closely related to
Rosenberg’s. We shall call Kaplow’s argument the “reduction to accuracy
objection,” and at the outset it is important to recall the distinction between
reduction and dependence. It is not completely clear whether Kaplow
intends to make the claim that the value of participation can be reduced to
the effects of participation on accuracy or whether he is only arguing for
the nonindependence claim. We shall return to the significance of this
distinction at the end of my consideration of his argument.
Kaplow begins by asking whether “process value” is subsumed by the
value of accuracy, raising the question in the following form:
267.

Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 389.
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One suspects that claimants who object to not being heard are those
who are, for example, denied benefits. If only losers complain, however,
one should be suspicious that the complaint is motivated by a concern
for the result, and thus an objection to a lack of process may implicitly
be an instrumental argument. An entirely plausible reason to object to
not being heard is that one may believe (perhaps feel certain) that the
decision was adverse precisely because the decision-maker was deprived
of information one had to offer. Thus, the decision may have been
inaccurate. Alternatively, one may suspect that the decision-maker
would be more favorable when the claimant appears personally,
independent of any additional information made available, suggesting a
favorable shift in the implicit burden of proof.268

In a footnote, Kaplow observes that “one does not often hear stories of
individuals who win complaining that they did not get their day in
court.”269 Although he may be wrong about this—the evidence suggests
that there is a very strong preference for participation270—the real problem
with his argument is that it elides the hard question of procedural
legitimacy. The most important task for a theory of procedural justice is to
offer those who suffer from inaccurate and binding decisions a reason to
regard themselves as legitimately bound.
Kaplow argues that the hypothesis that process value is independent of
accuracy can be tested:
To test this, one must consider a hypothetical situation—one
probably too far removed from the typical disappointed applicant’s mind
for him to take seriously—in which the applicant is heard but it is certain
that the decision would be unaffected by the hearing. Would individuals
value appearing if they knew in advance that they would be ignored or
that they would be “heard” but that hearing them could have no effect
whatever on the decision?271

Kaplow’s hypothetical produces an intuition that process does not matter
apart from outcome.272 But does the hypothetical frame the issue correctly?
Certainly a hearing in which one knows in advance that one will be ignored
is not a hearing in which one has a meaningful opportunity to participate. A
meaningful right to be heard requires that the adjudicator not turn a deaf
268. Id. at 390–91 (footnotes omitted).
269. Id. at 390 n.249.
270. See supra note 213 (collecting social psychology literature on a preference for participation).
271. Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391 (footnotes omitted and
emphasis added).
272. A set of hypotheticals that produce opposing intuitions is offered in Part V.A.4.
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ear.273 Likewise, if the adjudicator listens but the participation “could have
no effect,” then there is no meaningful right of participation. The modal
operator “could” is crucial to Kaplow’s argument because it builds the
hypothetical in such a way that it is impossible for the input to change the
outcome,274 and it suggests that the input is not really part of the process at
all.275
Kaplow then goes on to explicate his thought experiment, but in a way
that shifts our focus from whether there are any intrinsic process values to
the quite different question of whether the subjective preference for process
is sufficiently weighty to justify its costs:
From one perspective, this is simply an empirical question that
could be tested directly. There is indirect evidence relevant to how much
people value [personal] appearances for their own sake. One type of
evidence noted previously is the high rate of settlement in most civil
litigation. Another is the form of dispute resolution typically specified by
contract, and these often are of a simple sort. Of particular relevance for
Mathews v. Eldridge, individuals’ private disability contracts presumably
do not provide for personal appearances in formal hearings. Moreover, in
such instances, individuals who agree to summary procedures forgo not
only the benefits of greater personal involvement per se but also any
positive effect such involvement may have on the accuracy of outcomes.
Finally, it is important to recall . . . that individuals’ incentives to
promote their interests in claims proceedings, by personal appearance or
otherwise, tend to be socially excessive. Thus, even if individuals, at the
273. There is an important distinction between turning a deaf ear and listening when there is little
likelihood that one’s mind will be changed, but this distinction is lost if one measures the difference by
the probability that listening will result in a different decision. One can have an open mind, and yet
believe that it is most unlikely that one’s mind will be changed.
274. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 250, at 271.
275. Kaplow’s hypothetical can be more precisely formulated in possible worlds semantics, which
cash out the notion of possibility in terms of relationships between the actual world and possible worlds.
It may be important to pin down the precise sense of “could” that Kaplow means to invoke. We can do
this by introducing the notion of accessibility relations between the actual world and other possible
worlds. Something “could” happen in the logical sense if it does happen in at least one logically
accessible possible world, and all possible worlds are logically accessible—a logically impossible world
does not exist. Something “could” happen in the physical sense if it does happen in at least one
nomologically-accessible possible world, that is, in at least one world that obeys the general laws of
science. Historical accessibility is the relationship between the actual world and worlds that share the
history of the actual world up to the present moment. One interpretation of Kaplow’s remark is that he
is asking whether someone would value a right of participation in proceeding P at time T1 if that person
knew of no nomologically, historically accessible possible world in which he or she could participate
and prevail in P. See generally DIVERS, supra note 68 (discussing the issues raised by the philosophical
idea of possible worlds); KRIPKE, supra note 70 (same); LEIBNIZ, supra note 69 (same); LEWIS, supra
note 71 (same).
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time disputes arose, did value further participation and were willing to
pay for it, satisfying such preferences may be socially undesirable.276

None of the evidence that Kaplow adduces is sufficient to establish the
conclusion that process has no irreducible value or that there is no
background right of political morality to adequate equal participation.
Consider each argument in turn. First, “the high rate of settlement in
most civil litigation” may be evidence against a subjective preference for
participation, but it is simply irrelevant to whether the right to such
participation is justified on grounds of political morality: no one has argued
for a duty to participate or a requirement that every case go to trial.
Moreover, Kaplow’s understanding of what is meant by participation is
implausibly narrow. Kaplow asserts that “in a settlement, both sides forfeit
the opportunity to appear personally and participate, implying that
settlement destroys value for both parties if participation is indeed valuable
to them.”277 But in the usual or typical case, one does have an opportunity
to participate in settlement negotiations, either in person or through an
agent. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a settlement process that completely
eliminates party participation—perhaps a mediator could make a settlement
proposal without consulting with the parties and each party would then
have to accept or reject the settlement without comment. It is true that
settlement involves a different form of participation than does an adversary
hearing, but this hardly suffices to establish that there is no irreducible
value to participation at all.278
Second, even if it were true that “individuals’ private disability
contracts presumably do not provide for personal appearances in formal
hearings,” such contracts are entered into voluntarily. Instances of the
waiver of a right do not provide evidence that the right itself lacks a
foundation in political morality. Moreover, one does have a right to an
individualized hearing when one purchases private disability insurance;279
276. See Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391–93 (footnotes
omitted).
277. Id. at 392 n.254.
278. To avoid misunderstanding, we should note the difference between the adjudicatory and
legislative contexts with respect to settlement. It is true that in a sense one waives the right to
participation in a formal process in the course of settlement, whereas normally one cannot waive the
right to vote in bargaining (among interest groups or among legislators). But this difference between the
two contexts does not establish that there is no irreducible value to participation, because, as is pointed
out in the text, the waiver of the right to formal process does not waive the right to participate in
determination of the outcome of adjudication.
279. Kaplow is likely correct in assuming that there is no right to a formal hearing before one’s
claim is denied, but this is not decisive. The notion that there is an irreducible value to process and
participation does not entail that this value is sufficient to justify a hearing before benefits are denied.
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that right is provided by the substantive law of contract and insurance,
creating a cause of action for the wrongful denial of benefits. The case in
which such a right is not present would be one in which the insurance
company required its insured to consent to entry of judgment against the
insured in case of a dispute over the policy—a procedure that would be
analogous to the cognovit note. There is no evidence that insurance
contracts contain such provisions, and it is not clear that such contracts
would comport with due process.
Third, the assertion that “individuals’ incentives to promote their
interests in claims proceedings, by personal appearance or otherwise, tend
to be socially excessive” assumes a utilitarian framework for the resolution
of the question. If we assume utilitarianism first, we will be able to make a
convincing case for a utilitarian version of the balancing model, but this
argument would simply beg the question of whether the balancing model
provides the best account of procedural justice. The balancing model is, in
a sense, already built into a utilitarian framework.
Kaplow expresses his argument somewhat differently when he poses
the following hypothetical: “[O]ne could have two systems, known to
produce identical outcomes, but in only one is the applicant heard. By
charging differential fees, one could measure the value individuals
associate with the procedure.”280 But this hypothetical assumes that the
irreducible value of procedure must be measurable by willingness to pay—
in other words, this argument is the subjective preference argument that has
already been considered above. Moreover, the assumption that the two
systems are “known to produce identical outcomes” is simply a variation of
the hypothetical in which it is assumed that participation cannot affect the
outcome.281
This leads to my final observation about Kaplow’s argument. The
modally restricted hypotheticals, in which participation cannot affect
outcomes, may support the contention that the value of participation is not
independent of effects on outcomes, but such hypotheticals do not support
a reduction of the value of participation on effects on outcomes. If we bear
in mind the distinction introduced above, in Part V.B. It becomes apparent
that Kaplow’s arguments, whatever its merits as directed against a claim of
independent value for participation, does not engage the participatory
legitimacy thesis, which claims irreducible but not independent value.
280.
281.

Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391 n.253.
See supra text accompanying note 271.
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3. Reductionism Three: The Reduction of Participation to Other Values
Most arguments against the independent value of participation do not
directly address the relationship between participation and legitimacy.
Kaplow provides, however, a brief discussion of this relationship.282
Kaplow’s argument proceeds by the method of separation of cases. Kaplow
argues that there are four possible variations of the argument that
participation is required for legitimacy: (1) participation provides
legitimacy because it enhances accuracy;283 (2) participation creates the
appearance of legitimacy because it creates a perception of accuracy;284 (3)
participation provides legitimacy because it respects the dignity of
litigants;285 and (4) participation provides legitimacy because it prevents
the abuse of power.286
Of course, the validity of Kaplow’s argument depends on whether he
has correctly identified the basis of the legitimacy argument. Kaplow is
remarkably candid about his own doubts on this score. In the first footnote
of this discussion he confesses: “This subsection does not explore what
legitimacy means or why it might be valuable. Of course, given the
resulting ambiguity of the subject, one is unavoidably more uncertain about
the relevance of any analysis of it.”287 Without any analysis of what
legitimacy is and why it is valuable, one wonders how he could possibly
believe that he has produced any arguments against the thesis that
participation is required for legitimacy.
Interpreting Kaplow charitably, we might construe his argument as the
claim that the concept of legitimacy is itself so ambiguous that its value
must reduce to something else. If this is his actual claim, it is radically
underdeveloped. What is ambiguous about legitimacy? If the problem is
truly ambiguity, that is, multiple possible meanings, why can we not
resolve the ambiguity by choosing the best conception of legitimacy?
Perhaps Kaplow means instead that legitimacy is fatally vague, but, once
282. See Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 395–96.
283. Kaplow argues that in this case, legitimacy reduces to accuracy. See id. at 395.
284. Kaplow’s remarks on this case are underdeveloped:
If the procedures do not produce more accuracy, but citizens mistakenly think that they do,
there arises a familiar problem in governance that there is no point in attempting to illuminate
here. (As an analogy, one might ask whether the government should adopt a highway plan
that results in more loss of life because most citizens mistakenly believe otherwise.)
Id. at 395 n.263. He might argue that it would be wrong for government to decieve citizens—although
given his welfarist framework, he could not rely on any deontological prohibition on deception.
285. Id. at 395 & n.264. Kaplow refers back to his own critique of the dignity argument. Id.
286. Id. at 395.
287. Id. at 395 n.262.
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again, he has no argument for that proposition either. Crucially, the
participatory legitimacy thesis is not reducible to any of his four
interpretations, and, hence, is not open to his objection.
4. The Moral Harm Objection
An objection to the independent value of participation from a
deontological perspective has been developed by Ronald Dworkin.
Dworkin considers the argument that process has what Laurence Tribe calls
“intrinsic value.”288 Tribe’s argument was that a background right of
political morality to participation is justified by the “idea that to be a
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done
with one.”289 Dworkin counters that
[t]he language about talking to people rather than dealing with them, and
about treating them as people rather than things, is of little help here, as
it generally is in political theory. For it does not show why the undoubted
harm of faceless decisions is not merely bare harm, and statements about
what treatment treats a person as a person are at best conclusions of
arguments, not premises.”290

This argument rests on Dworkin’s distinction between two kinds of harm,
which he calls “bare harm” and “moral harm.” Dworkin defines moral
harm as follows:
[T]he violation of a right constitutes a special kind of harm, and people
may suffer that harm even when the violation is accidental. We must
distinguish, that is, between what we might call the bare harm a person
suffers through punishment, whether that punishment is just or unjust—
for example, the suffering or frustration or pain or dissatisfaction of
desires that he suffers just because he loses his liberty or is beaten or
killed—and the further injury that he might be said to suffer whenever
his punishment is unjust, just in virtue of that injustice. I shall call the
latter the “injustice factor” in his punishment, or his “moral” harm.291

Moral harm does not depend on any psychological state; rather it “is an
objective notion which assumes that someone suffers a special injury when
treated unjustly, whether he knows or cares about it, but does not suffer that
injury when he is not treated unjustly, even though he believes he is and
does care.”292
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

TRIBE, supra note 153, at 503–04.
Id.
See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 106, at 102.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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Thus, Dworkin’s argument is that the proponents of an irreducible
value for process and participation have not explained why exclusion (or
other process flaws) give rise to moral harm. Given his definition of moral
harm, this amounts to an argument that no explanation has been given as to
why the denial of a right of participation is unjust. Dworkin’s argument
then, at bottom, is like Rosenberg’s, but with a deontological twist. It does
not present a positive case against the thesis that process has irreducible
value, but it does question the sufficiency of the arguments raised on behalf
of that thesis. If it can be shown that a denial of participation is unjust, then
that denial will give rise to moral harm, and Dworkin’s objection will be
answered. The participatory legitimacy thesis is, in fact, an argument that
shows that the denial of a right to participation does inflict moral harm—
understood in Dworkin’s special technical sense.
5. The Objection from the Inseparability of Substance and Procedure
Yet another argument against the participation model is suggested by
Larry Alexander. In a somewhat different context, he questions whether
there are independent rights to procedural due process. He argues that
“because the procedure for applying a [substantive] rule [of law] can
always be viewed as part of the substance of the [substantive] rule itself, a
concern for procedure apart from substance verges on incoherence.”293 This
argument rests on a concealed premise that is false. The premise of the
argument is that the procedure for applying a substantive rule of law can
always be viewed as part of the substance of the substantive rule itself.
Let’s assume that this premise is true. From this premise Alexander draws
the conclusion that a concern for procedure apart from substance verges on
incoherence.
Alexander’s argument is still incomplete. It assumes the following: If
X can always be viewed as part of Y, then the distinction between X and Y
is incoherent. But, of course, this premise is false. Seahorses can be viewed
as part of the ocean, but it is not the case that the distinction between
seahorses and the ocean is incoherent. We have already established that the
entanglement of substance and procedure does not mean that the distinction
between these two concepts is incoherent. Indeed, the point of the thought
experiment of acoustic separation between substance and procedure can be
stated in language similar to Alexander’s: the procedure for applying a
substantive rule of law can always be viewed as distinct from the substance
293. Larry Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987).
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of the substantive rule itself. Alexander’s argument, if reconstructed, is
logically valid but unsound because it rests on a false assumption.
Nonetheless, Alexander makes an important point. Sometimes
substantive rules are adopted with specific procedures attached—some
administrative schemes are of this sort. But our primary question—what is
a fair procedure?—and the fact that procedures sometimes vary with
substance does not moot that question. Indeed, Alexander’s formulation of
his point assumes that we can recognize the difference between a
substantive rule and the procedures for applying it. Moreover, it is
undeniably a fact that many procedures are transsubstantive294 in many, if
not all, contexts. Procedures frequently come in largely undivided clumps;
for example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Administrative
Procedures Act. Whatever the merits of Alexander’s argument in the
context in which he advanced it, the argument does not establish that the
notion of an irreducible value to process based on a background right of
political morality to participation is incoherent.
6. The Counter-Example of Legislation
Yet another argument against the irreducible value of participation has
been put forth by Robert Bone. Bone suggests that the argument for a right
of participation grounded on respect for the dignity of litigants proves too
much because it would create a right, not present in law, to direct
participation in the legislative process: “A state that sets the legal driving
294. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and
Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989).
The term transsubstantive originated with the late Robert M. Cover in For James Wm. Moore: Some
Reflections on a Reading of The Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). Of course, the question of whether
procedural rules ought to be transsubstantive is a live one. For a variety of viewpoints, see Stephen B.
Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 693, 716–17 (1988); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Body of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079–81 (1989); Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern
Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 989, 1028 (1995); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494, 526–27 (1986); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175–78 (1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak
to the Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s ‘Tolstoy Problem,’ 46
FLA. L. REV. 57, 78–84 (1994) (favoring nontranssubstantive discovery rules); Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2042–43, 2048–51 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and
Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV.
27 (1994); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501
(1992).
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age at sixteen, for example, is not required on dignity grounds to give each
person an individualized hearing before deciding that the person’s age
disqualifies her for a license.”295 Bone is right to observe that rights to
participation do not have the same implications for legislation as they do
for adjudication. Both legislation and dispute resolution implicate
procedural justice, but the general idea of procedural fairness operates
differently in the two contexts. When the context is the legislative process,
a right to participation is expressed in the right to vote, the principle of one
person, one vote, and the freedom of expression. These are rights to
individual participation in the legislative process, but they take into account
the impracticability of rights of direct participation by citizens on the floor
of a legislative body. In different contexts, individual rights of participation
assume different forms.
One way to see the error in Bone’s argument is to examine its flip
side. Suppose that the question was whether there is a group right to
participate in the legislative process by democratic election of
representatives. It might be argued that such a group right is absurd,
because if such a right existed, it would dictate that democratic majorities
have the right to participate in the decision of individual cases by the
passage of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. This argument is an
enthymeme—it includes an unstated assumption that the form of a right to
participation cannot vary with context. But this unstated premise is
obviously false—participation in lawmaking can take a different form in
adjudication and legislation. The same goes for Bone’s argument. Once the
missing premise is stated, it becomes clear that the argument, while valid,
is unsound.
As we have already noted, the notion that there is an irreducible value
to process is the subject of wide agreement once we move to the realm of
democratic politics. One might argue that correct outcomes are all that
really matter and the democratic process is valuable only insofar as it
contributes to correct outcomes. But surely the more widely held view is
that an undemocratic regime violates an important human right, even if it
legislates as well as or even better than a democratic regime. The example
of legislation establishes that the form of participation may vary with the
procedural context, but it does not establish that process has no value apart
from outcomes.
295.

Bone, Day in Court, supra note 209, at 281.
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7. The Argument That Representation Supercedes Participation
Another objection to the idea that participation is essential for
legitimacy is suggested by Owen Fiss. His core idea is that representation
supersedes participation as the basis for procedural legitimacy. Fiss’s
version of the argument addresses doctrine, but his argument can be
transformed into an argument about procedural justice. Fiss claims that
what the Constitution guarantees is not a right of participation, but rather
what I will call a “right of representation”: not a day in court but the
right to have one’s interest adequately represented. The right of
representation provides that no individual can be bound by an
adjudication unless his or her interest is adequately represented in the
proceeding.296

Importantly, Fiss formulates his claim in terms of the representation of
interests and not of individuals:
[T]he representation that I speak of is not a representation of individuals
but a representation of interests. It is not that every person has a right to
be represented in structural litigation, but only that every interest must be
represented. If an individual’s interest has been adequately represented
then he or she has no further claim against the decree. The right of
representation is a collective, rather than an individual right, because it
belongs to a group of persons classed together by virtue of their shared
interests.297

Corresponding to Fiss’s argument about the Due Process Clause, we can
construct a parallel (Fissian) argument about procedural justice.298 That is,
we could argue that it is adequate representation of interests (and not
participation) that confers legitimacy on adjudicative procedures.
The Fissian argument that representation supersedes participation has
some obvious attractions. Much hangs on what counts as adequacy. For
example, if adequacy is measured by contribution to accuracy, then the
argument for supersession is simply a restatement of the argument that
participation reduces to accuracy. If adequacy reduces in this way, the
Fissian supersession objection is an old argument in a new bottle. We can,
therefore, put this possibility to the side.
296. Fiss, supra note 208, at 970–71.
297. Id. at 972.
298. Of course, the argument that I will present is not Fiss’s own—although it is inspired by his
argument. To the extent that the argument has merit, Fiss deserves the credit, but if the argument fails,
the fault is mine. If “Fissian” suggests too strong a connection between Fiss and the argument, “quasiFissian” could be substituted.
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It might be argued, however, that representation (and not
participation) creates legitimacy that is not reducible to accuracy. By way
of analogy to the case of legislation, it could be argued that individuals do
not have an individual right to participate in the legislative process itself;299
representative democracies are legitimate so long as interests are
adequately represented. Moreover, it might be argued that even in the case
of traditional litigation, various types of litigants are represented by others.
Thus, wards are represented by guardians, beneficiaries by trustees, and
persons with mental disabilities by guardians ad litem. At first blush, it
might seem that the Fissian objection runs into the fact that in ordinary
cases, there is an individual right of participation. Parties ordinarily
represent themselves, and representation is the second-best substitute for
participation. At this point, however, the Fissian objector would have a
powerful counter: the case in which individuals directly participate might
be seen as a special case of adequate representation. In some cases, an
individual is simply the most efficient and accuracy-enhancing
representative of his or her own interests. If this Fissian maneuver worked,
then we would have undergone a classic duck-rabbit300 shift in perspective.
Before the shift, we saw participation as the norm and adequate
representation as the exception. After the shift, we come to see that
representation is the norm and participation is simply a special case.
But the Fissian duck-rabbit maneuver will not work. Participation is
not plausibly seen as a special case of adequate representation. The Fissian
conjuring trick is to redefine the object of adequate representation, “not a
representation of individuals but a representation of interests.”301 Fiss may
well be right that when group rights are at stake, the relevant interests are
the interests of groups, but in individual litigation, the interests at stake are
the interests of individuals. But now the interests drop out. We are
concerned about individual interests because we are concerned about
individuals. Interests themselves have no moral standing. Individuals
represent themselves, not because they are the best or most efficient
representatives of their own interests; individuals represent themselves
299.
300.

See supra Part V.D.6.
The duck-rabbit is from Wittgenstein. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 250, at 194.

The duck-rabbit can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit. Most readers should be able to force a perspective
shift at will.
301. Fiss, supra note 208, at 972.
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because they are human persons, who act on their own behalves, define
their own interests, and speak for themselves. If it looks like a duck, walks
like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.
8. The Contractarian Objection
The contractarian objection is based on the idea of hypothetical
consent. As explained by Bone, the idea is the following:
The ex ante argument supposes that a procedure is fair to a party if a
rational person in the position of the party would have agreed to the
procedure before the dispute arose. In deciding whether to agree, a
rational person weighs the costs and benefits that he expects from the
procedure.302

As applied to the value of participation, the idea is that a rational person
would choose to forgo the option to participate if that option would be
neither cost beneficial nor accuracy improving. Because Bone has provided
a thorough and convincing treatment of the general form of the
contractarian objection,303 we can confine ourselves to a single point.
Whether rational persons would bind themselves to process without
participation will depend on the structuring of the initial choice situation.
For example, if the choice situation is structured so that the interests of
rational persons are solely in economic payoffs, preference satisfaction, or
objective welfare, then they will be willing to forgo rights of participation
that do not produce these payoffs. On the other hand, if rational persons are
conceived as having an overriding interest in having reasons to consider
themselves as legitimately bound by erroneous decisions, then they will
choose participation over accuracy and cost. In other words, the
contractarian argument can easily become question begging. For this
reason, the real work of contractarian accounts of procedural justice
consists in the arguments that justify the set up of the initial choice
situation.
9. The Ineffability Objection or the Absence of an Explanation
At this point, we are in a position to observe that several of the
objections to the irreducible value of process share a common form.
Although they are cast in the guise of affirmative reasons to believe that
302. Bone, supra note 6, at 496. Bruce Hay and Rosenberg are strongly associated with this
argument. See Hay, supra note 7; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 285, 2000) at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/285.pdf.
303. See Bone, supra note 6.
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there is no irreducible value to process, they turn out, on close inspection,
to rest on a burden-shifting move, that is, on questions rather than
arguments. In the absence of a clear explanation of why process should
count aside from cost or outcomes, many argue that there is something
mysterious or ineffable about the claim that participation itself has intrinsic
value. For example, Bone asserts that “[t]he conventional understanding of
American adjudication supposes that it is primarily a means to the end of
producing outcomes that conform in some close way to the substantive
law.”304 But if this is so, Bone argues, “then the demands of dignity should
be satisfied in most situations by outcomes meeting the quality
standards.”305 If we assume that accuracy alone is important, then “it is
difficult to see what institutional value there could possibly be in
guaranteeing participation beyond what is needed for”306 accurate
decisions.
The ineffability objection, in its various forms, founders when
confronted with the participatory legitimacy thesis. Legitimacy may be an
abstract idea of political philosophy but it is not ineffable. Indeed, the idea
that political processes should be legitimate is one of the most familiar and
widely accepted views in all of political theory. It is certainly no more
controversial than the utilitarian assumption that only consequences count
or the welfarist idea that subjective preferences are the sole criterion of
goodness. Legitimacy is no more obscure than the deontological idea of
autonomy. Quite the contrary, the idea of legitimacy, as a matter of
practical politics, enjoys greater comprehension, acceptance, and
argumentative potency than these rival notions. Indeed, the ability of
ordinary folk to see the connection between legitimacy and participation is
well confirmed by social science.307 It is a strange irony of contemporary
academic discourse that the straightforward and obvious value of
participation has come to be seen as obscure. This irony is compounded
when we realize that rival accounts of procedural justice rest on deeply
controversial assumptions.
In sum, my assessment of the state of play is this: although there is a
convincing argument that outcomes count, there is no convincing argument
for reductionism. That is, none of the critics has given good and sufficient
reason for the proposition that participation lacks independent value.
Indeed, critics sensitive of the view that process counts because some level
304.
305.
306.
307.

Bone, Day in Court, supra note 209, at 281.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
See supra note 213 (collecting social psychology literature).
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of participation is required by a concern and respect for individual dignity,
admit to lingering doubts about their own critiques.308
VI. PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Accuracy, cost, and participation must all play a role in a theory of
procedural justice. But if such a theory is to be sufficiently specific to do
actual work as a standard against which a system of procedure can be
measured, then the relationship between accuracy, cost, and participation
must be ordered and articulated. In this part, I restate the conclusions we
have reached so far in the form of two principles of procedural justice.
A. THE STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES
Consider the following formulation for a set of principles that express
a conception of civil procedural justice:
1. The Participation Principle: The arrangements for the resolution
of civil disputes should be structured to provide each interested
party with a right to meaningful participation, as specified by
the following conditions and provisos:
a) The Interest Condition. The right to participation should
extend to all persons who will be the subject of final
binding adjudication and to all other persons with a
substantial interest that, as a practical matter, will be
finally determined.
b) The Scope Condition. The right of participation should
include the following minimum:
(1) Notice. The arrangements for civil dispute resolution
shall include advance notice to the individuals
specified in the interest condition;
(2) Opportunity to Be Heard. The arrangements for civil
dispute resolution shall afford an equal and
meaningful opportunity to present evidence and
arguments that are relevant to the dispute.
c) The Impracticability Proviso. In the event that actual notice
or an opportunity to be heard is impracticable, the absent
interested individual shall be provided with an adequate
legal representative and the proceeding shall be structured
so as to give full and fair consideration to the interests of
308. See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 106, at 102–03; Bone, Personal and
Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 209, at 287.
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the absent individual. Represented persons should be
afforded practicable opportunities to challenge the
adequacy of their representation.
d) Fair Value of Procedural Justice Proviso. Such
arrangements shall ensure the fair value of the basic
liberties, including the right to reasonable attorneys’ fees
in suits for relief from violation of such liberties.
2. The Accuracy Principle: The arrangements for the resolution of
civil disputes should be structured to maximize the likelihood
of achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding,
subject to the following provisos. A procedure may depart
from the maximization of accuracy only for the following
reasons:
a) The Substantive Rights Proviso. In order to ensure that
the process of adjudication does not unfairly infringe on
the substantive rights guaranteed by the basic liberties,
such as the rights of privacy and freedom of speech;
b) Fair Distribution of the Risk of Inaccurate Adjudication
Proviso. In order to provide for a fair distribution of the
risk of inaccurate adjudication;
c) Systemic Accuracy Proviso. In order to maximize
systemic accuracy, so long as the procedures are
announced in advance and create general rules with
which parties can comply by making a reasonable good
faith effort; procedures may also be arranged to maximize
systemic accuracy where the arrangement will not result
in inaccuracy in particular cases;
d) Costs of Adjudication Proviso. In order to ensure that the
systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in
relation to the interests at stake in the proceeding or type
of proceeding.
3. Ordering of the Principles and Provisos. These principals shall
be satisfied in lexical order, such that satisfaction of the
Participation Principle shall take priority over satisfaction of
the Accuracy Principle. The Provisos to the Accuracy
Principle are also ranked in lexical order. In cases of conflict,
the first proviso shall take precedence over the rest, the second
proviso shall take precedence over all but the first, and so
forth.
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Before proceeding further, we should observe that these principles require
interpretation and exposition if they are to serve as the foundation for a
fully developed conception of procedural justice.
B. THE PRINCIPLES IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE THREE MODELS
The principles bear a direct relationship with the considerations raised
by the three simple models of procedural justice discussed in Part IV.B.
Each principle attempts to capture the core intuition or considered
judgment that underlies one or more of the models, and the complex
structuring of the principles attempts to remedy the deficiencies of each and
the inconsistencies of all by providing a proper lexical ordering and
enumeration of exceptions.
Consider first the relationship between the accuracy model and the
Accuracy Principle. The Accuracy Principle expresses the accuracy model
and attempts to rectify the deficiencies of that model. Recall that the first
deficiency was that the accuracy model suffers from a general problem of
fit, because a variety of procedural rules do not aim at accuracy; for
example, the rules of claim and issue preclusion prevent the relitigation of a
claim or issue, even when it can be shown that the prior adjudication was
clearly wrong. The Accuracy Principle acknowledges that accuracy may be
balanced against costs in the Costs of Adjudication Proviso.
A second deficiency of the accuracy model was that it failed to
distinguish between systemic accuracy and case accuracy. The Systemic
Accuracy Proviso resolves this ambiguity and attempts to strike a fair
balance between systemic accuracy and accuracy in the particular case. On
the one hand, the basic statement of the Accuracy Principle expresses the
judgment that procedural justice aims to resolve the case that is being
decided accurately; the baseline notion is that case accuracy takes priority
over system accuracy. Our notion of procedural justice requires the fair
treatment of individuals, and making systemic accuracy the baseline would
fail to take the differences between individuals seriously.
On the other hand, there are situations in which systemic accuracy can
be promoted without treating the individual unfairly. Where a rule
promoting systemic accuracy is announced in advance and parties can
reasonably comply with the rule, imposing a case-accuracy distorting
sanction is not unfair to those affected—the opportunity to comply places
the responsibility for the distortion on the party who disobeyed the
procedural rule.
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The balancing model is expressed in two of the provisos to the
Accuracy Principle. The Costs of Adjudication Proviso reflects the notion,
expressed in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, that the maximization
of accuracy must be balanced against the costs of adjudication.309 The
Violations of Substantive Rights Proviso expresses the idea that so-called
balancing should not be limited to the costs of adjudication but should
include considerations of fairness and respect for basic substantive rights.
These provisos express the core intuitions of the balancing model.
The participation model as refined by my investigation of the value of
participation is reflected in the Participation Principle. This principle
recognizes that procedural legitimacy requires a basic right of notice and
opportunity to be heard in all cases in which the basic rights of
participation are practicable. The lexical ordering of the principles
expresses both (a) the notion that a concern for accuracy does not trump the
concerns for legitimacy underwriting the requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard and (b) the notion that once these requirements are
met, a fair procedure should aim at legally correct outcomes.
C. THE PRINCIPLES IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE STRUCTURE OF EXISTING
DOCTRINE
The principles and their ordering do not map perfectly onto existing
doctrine, and this should not be surprising. The structure of existing
doctrine has been determined by a pattern of historical development, and
much of contemporary procedure is frozen legal history. Nonetheless, the
substance of the two principles is reflected in the general contours of the
procedural law of the United States.
1. The Participation Principle
The central idea of the Participation Principle—that notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential to procedural fairness—is frequently
found in judicial opinions:310 “The principle is as old as the law, and is of
309. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1978).
310. Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 231, 239 (1867). See also Kaggen v. I.R.S., 57 F.3d 163,
167 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that “basic considerations of procedural fairness
demand an opportunity to be heard”); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 579 (3d Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (stating that “the principles of procedural fairness embedded in the
Constitution . . . require adversary proceedings including notice and an opportunity to be heard unless
the events occurred within the view of the court.”); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230, 1244 (3d Cir. 1975) (“One of the basic tenets of American jurisprudence is that procedural
fairness requires that each party have notice of the issues involved and an opportunity to be heard at a
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universal justice, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his
day in court.” Some courts have gone so far as to make explicit that this
aspect of procedural fairness may not be balanced against other
concerns.311
There is, however, a potential problem of fit in this respect between
the Participation Principle and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge. It might be argued that Mathews adopted the balancing model,
and, hence, that existing doctrine implicitly assumes all rights of
participation may be denied if the balance of costs and benefits favors this
result. It could be further argued that support for this theory is found in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,312 in which the Supreme
Court allowed the rights of contingent beneficiaries to a trust to be
adjudicated without any actual notice to the beneficiaries.313
These arguments, however, fail on closer inspection.314 Mathews and
Mullane are fully consistent with the Participation Principle. Mathews does
not stand for the proposition that all participation can be denied if the
balance of costs and benefits favors this result. Instead, Justice Powell’s
opinion for the Court states, “This Court consistently has held that some
form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a
property interest,”315 and “the fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’”316 Furthermore, “the essence of due process is the requirement
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”); In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“Notice is a central tenet of procedural fairness and assures justice and fair dealing by giving creditors
an opportunity to present and contest the status of their claims.”); Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 202, 208 (Ct. App.) (equating “procedural fairness” with “notice of the charges brought against
the individual and an opportunity to respond to those charges”), superseded, 941 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1997);
Milenkovic v. Milenkovic, 416 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“The essence of due process is
procedural fairness, as embodied in the elements of notice and opportunity to be heard.”); Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (“Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness.”).
311. One district court stated the importance of procedural fairness this way:
We cannot accept defendants’ contention that the essential elements of fundamental
procedural fairness—advance notice of any serious charge and an opportunity to present
evidence before a relatively objective tribunal. . . . must be dispensed with entirely because of
the need for summary action or because the administrative problems would be too
burdensome.
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citations omitted). Accord Lathrop v.
Brewer, 340 F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878, 885 (D. Mass.
1971).
312. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
313. Id. at 317–18.
314. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
315. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319, 333 (1978).
316. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.’”317 Similar language appears in
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Mullane.318 Thus, the broad language of
Mathews is consistent with the proposition that the Participation Principle,
as expressed in the rights to notice and some opportunity to be heard, is
lexically prior to the Accuracy Principle and its Cost of Adjudication
Proviso. More technically, in Mathews itself, application of the balancing
test resulted in the denial of a right to a pretermination hearing,319 but the
opinion does not suggest that no violation of the Due Process Clause lies
where a deprivation of benefits that constitute a property interest is
accomplished with no hearing.
The interest condition triggers the right to notice and an opportunity to
be heard. In particular these rights are triggered for “persons who will be
the subject of final binding adjudication and to all other persons with a
substantial interest that as a practical matter would be finally determined.”
This triggering condition is reflected in the rights of participation generally
afforded by existing law. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
contemplates dismissing an action if the absence of a party who cannot be
joined “might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties.”320 It
also favors joinder of an absent party if “the person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect that interest.”321 Similarly, Rule 24
affords a right of intervention (which, of course, is just a right of
participation)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
317. Id. at 348–49 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72
1951) (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
318. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); id. at 314 (“An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).
319. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340–41.
320. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
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or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.322

The Participation Principle also requires the fair value of procedural
justice in a proviso: the arrangements for resolution of civil disputes shall
ensure the fair value of the basic liberties, including the right to reasonable
attorneys’ fees in suits for relief from violation of such liberties. This
proviso demonstrates that the system of procedure should be structured so
that inequalities of litigation resources cannot operate to deprive
individuals of the fair value of their basic liberties, such as the freedom of
speech. Current law reflects this idea through the provision of attorneys’
fees for successful lawsuits challenging the violation of an individual’s
basic federal rights.323 This is, of course, a large topic unto itself. For the
purposes of this Article, which focuses on procedural justice at a high level
of generality, we can simply note that this proviso is added for reasons that
would take our investigation far afield of our core concerns, and hence that
a detailed investigation ought to be postponed until another occasion.
2. The Accuracy Principle
The second principle is the Accuracy Principle, which requires that
civil procedures be structured so as to maximize the chances of achieving
the legally correct outcome in each proceeding and is subject to four
provisos. Participants in the system—judges and those who draft rules of
procedure—believe that the system is designed with accuracy as a primary
goal. We have already examined the evidence for this proposition in our
discussion of the accuracy model; the current system of procedure is
understood as engaged in a search for truth.324
The first proviso to the Accuracy Principle permits a departure from
accuracy where an accuracy enhancing procedure would lead to the
violation of another fundamental right. This proviso allows for departures
from accuracy that ensure that the process of adjudication does not unfairly
infringe on the substantive rights guaranteed by basic liberties, such as the
rights of privacy and freedom of speech. This proviso is reflected in the
structure of current doctrine in a variety of ways. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) allows a trial court judge to limit discovery by entering a
protective order;325 one reason for granting such an order is to protect
322. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
323. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (2000).
324. See supra Part IV.B. See also supra notes 158–159 (collecting sources identifying the search
for truth as the goal of the system of adjudication).
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
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substantive rights, such as the right to privacy.326 Similarly, various
privileges protect substantive rights when the search for truth collides with
confidentiality.327
The second proviso to the Accuracy Principle allows departures from
the goal of case accuracy that have the purpose of providing for a fair
distribution of the risk of inaccurate adjudication. In civil litigation, the
goal of fair distribution of the risk of error is reflected in the preponderance
of the evidence standard for the burden of persuasion, and departures from
the standard are justified on the ground that a shift would more fairly
allocate the risk. Thus, the Supreme Court has justified departure from the
preponderance standard in child custody cases on the ground that a fair
distribution of the risk of error requires the departure.328 Another example
is the requirement for clear and convincing evidence that a party signing a
cognovit note expressed a waiver of the right to notice that was “voluntary,
knowing, and intelligently made.”329 Here, inequality in the risk of error
protects the constitutional right to notice, which the Participation Principle
suggests is a prerequisite for procedural fairness. In this case, the stakes are
unequal (the monetary recovery on the cognovit note versus the protection
of the fundamental dignity of the individual) and, hence, an unequal
distribution of the risk of error is not inconsistent with fairness to the
parties.
The third proviso allows departure from the goal of case accuracy in
order to maximize systemic accuracy if the procedures are announced in
advance and create general rules with which parties can comply by making
a reasonable good faith effort. We explored the tension between case
326. Cf. Dominick C. Capozzola, Discovering Privacy, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 28 (arguing that
discovery orders should be narrowly tailored to protect legitimate privacy rights and interests).
327. See, e.g., Bruce P. Brown, Note, Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of
Researcher-Subject Communications, 17 GA. L. REV. 1009, 1028–29 (1983).
328. Specifically, the Supreme Court justified the departure in this manner:
Even accepting the court’s assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a
preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of
that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous
termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights. For the child, the
likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of an uneasy status
quo. For the natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural family. A standard that allocates the risk of error
nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765–66 (1982) (citation and footnote omitted).
329. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185–86, 187 (1972) (assuming that the same
standard of proof applies to waiver in the civil context as in criminal cases, and citing criminal cases).
See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187; Davies v.
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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accuracy and systemic accuracy in connection with the accuracy model.330
The existing procedural landscape reflects the systemic accuracy proviso in
myriad ways. Statutes of limitations and discovery sanctions, for example,
frequently lead to an inaccurate result in the particular case, but are
justified at least in part on the basis of the contribution they make to
systemic accuracy.331
The fourth proviso authorizes departure from the goal of accuracy to
ensure that the systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in relation
to the interests at stake in a proceeding or type of proceeding. We have
already discussed this proviso at length; it is reflected in procedural due
process cases like Mathews and Mullane. These cases have enshrined the
fourth proviso as a basic component of due process jurisprudence.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION
In this part, we apply the two principles of procedural justice and the
participatory legitimacy thesis to the central problem of contemporary civil
procedure in the United States—the problem of aggregation. Traditional
procedure, especially the civil action and individual trial, has been
challenged by the advent of the mass wrong—asbestos torts, tobacco torts,
systemic misrepresentation, and so forth. In response, lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars have advocated a variety of techniques for aggregation.
These techniques have included expanded use of the class action and its
close cousins, the theory of virtual representation and sampling. This part
addresses whether and how the technologies of aggregation can be squared
with the Participation Principle.
A. TECHNOLOGIES OF AGGREGATION
Individual participation is costly, and so the system of procedure is
under pressure to aggregate. The system has responded to these pressures
with a variety of procedural innovations—technologies of aggregation.
Three such techniques are (1) the class action, (2) the doctrine of virtual
representation, and (3) sampling or aggregated trials.
330. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
331. Cf. Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed
Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse, 12 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 145, 166–67 (2003) (discussing policy considerations of statutes of limitations and
discovery rules to “ensure the accuracy and fairness of the judicial process”).
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The class action is the most familiar technology of aggregation.332
Class actions aggregate by allowing an individual named party to act as a
representative of a class. From our perspective, it is important to
distinguish between two types of class actions. 333 In a mandatory class
action, class members have no choice regarding their membership in the
class and, hence, may not preserve the right to individual participation in
any proceeding that will bind them.334 In an opt-out class action, individual
class members may elect out of the class to preserve the right of individual
participation.335 A civil action may not proceed as a class action until the
class is certified; a judicial determination that the named party (or parties)
is an adequate representative is a prerequisite for certification.336
The doctrine of virtual representation provides a second technology
for aggregation.337 One way of understanding virtual representation is as a
class action without the formalities. The individual litigant in the first
action acts as the representative of a party with similar interests in a
subsequent action, but no class is certified and the representative
relationship is only recognized after the fact when the doctrine is asserted
in the subsequent action. Virtual representation is always mandatory.
Because the first action does not proceed on a class basis, there can be no
notification of absent parties that they have a right to opt out.
A third technology of aggregation is sometimes called “sampling” or
“aggregate trial.”338 The idea is to take representative cases, try them, and
then use the results as factual findings in cases that were not tried. The
332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See generally John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419 (2003) (discussing the class action as an aggregation device).
333. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1602
(2003) (distinguishing opt-out and mandatory class actions); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 153 (2003) (“The operation
of the class action today as a rival to the conventional institutions of public lawmaking cries out for a
normative account of the distinction drawn between mandatory and opt-out class actions, for the
distinction defines the binding effect of class settlements.”).
334. See Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 716
(2003).
335. See id.
336. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
337. See Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 209; Howard M. Erichson,
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related
Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 458 (2000) (discussing virtual representation as informal aggregation); F.
Carlisle Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 580
(1936); Johnson, supra note 256.
338. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation in
Mass Tort Trials: Justice Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1998); Michael
J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992).
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most famous example is Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,339 an asbestos
case tried during 1990 in Texas. Cimino involved 2,298 plaintiffs. In an
initial phase, various “common issues” were resolved. These issues
included which products contained asbestos, which products were
dangerous, which defendants manufactured the products, and so forth. The
plaintiffs were then divided into five injury categories. From these five
categories, 160 cases were randomly selected and presented to two separate
juries. The results were then applied to the plaintiffs whose cases were not
tried.340 Without substantial changes in current doctrine, sampling is
voluntary, not mandatory341—although the use of mandatory sampling has
been suggested.342
B. THE PARTICIPATION PROBLEM
Technologies of aggregation can create a problem of participation.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical.343 Suppose that a
mandatory class action is the solution to the problems created by a mass
tort. We might imagine such a class action in response to a harmful
substance (“the chemical”) that affects hundreds of thousands of
individuals—think of tobacco or asbestos. To simplify the example,
suppose that exposure of those affected by the chemical is relatively
uniform and the persons who were exposed are easy to identify. The plan
for the class action is to proceed in two phases. In phase one, a trial will be
held on various issues such as breach of the relevant standard of care and
causation. In phase two, a quasi-administrative procedure will distribute the
damage award, if any, to the members of the class. Let us further suppose
that the named parties will get a hearing on class certification and the
adequacy of representation, but that no collateral challenges to either
certification or adequacy are permitted. Absent class members will be
339. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653, 664–65 (E.D. Tex. 1990), vacated in
part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
340. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 338, at 45–46.
341. The Fifth Circuit held that the plan devised by the District Court in Cimino violated the
defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 320–21. The same argument would invalidate
sampling imposed against the wishes of plaintiffs.
342. Cf. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What
Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199,
215 (1999) (raising the question “whether mandatory statistical sampling violates a plaintiff’s due
process rights”).
343. Let us put to the side whether such a class action would be permitted by existing law. Under
Rule 23, if the described class action were certified under Rule 23(b)(3), then opt-out and participation
rights would be afforded under Rule 23(c)(2). If the class were certified under Rule 23(b)(1), then the
participation in the class would be mandatory.
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finally bound by the decision; the doctrine of claim preclusion or res
judicata will apply. What this means is that class members will be bound
by the decision (a) whether it is correct or erroneous, (b) whether it is for
the plaintiffs or the defendant, (c) whether the absent parties’ claims are
substantially the same as that of the class members, and (d) whether
representation was, in fact, adequate.
What opportunities for participation would this procedure afford? The
answer to this question is virtually none. In the hypothetical, a mandatory
class action would afford absent class members neither the right to opt out
of the class and pursue their own individual lawsuits nor the right to be
represented by counsel in the class proceeding. Class members might be
permitted to participate in the class certification hearing by making an
appearance or by letter, but once the certification decision is made, this
right drops away. Class members would not be allowed to participate
directly via a collateral challenge to the judgment (for example, by filing
another lawsuit) because of the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Should we be concerned about the absence of a right to participate?
Both the accuracy model and the balancing model suggest that the answer
to this question could be no. If we determine that the aggregate level of
accuracy would be enhanced by a mandatory class action as compared to
individual trials, then the accuracy model gives us no reason to prefer a
system of individualized trials. From the perspective of the balancing
model, the case against individualized trials is likely to be even more
compelling. Individualized participation is expensive as compared to a
mandatory class action. The balancing model would allow rights of
individual participation if they are cost justified, either by enhancing
accuracy or because of a subjective taste for participation. Hypothetically,
let us suppose that rights of individual participation would be neither
accuracy enhancing nor cost justified.
If we accept the participatory legitimacy thesis, however, then it is not
clear that our hypothetical mandatory class action meets the requirements
of procedural justice. The first principle of procedural justice, the
Participation Principle, states that civil dispute resolution shall afford an
equal opportunity to affected individuals to present evidence and arguments
that are relevant to legal rules and equitable considerations that should
govern the dispute as a matter of substantive law. Given the hypothetical
facts we have described, there is a prima facie case that the mandatory class
action would violate the Participation Principle. Persons who will be finally
bound are given no opportunity to participate.
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However, the first principle of procedural justice does include an
impracticability proviso: in the event that actual notice or an opportunity to
be heard is impracticable, the absent interested individual shall be provided
with an adequate legal representative and the proceeding shall be structured
so as to give full and fair consideration to the interests of the absent
individual. The application of the impracticability proviso to any actual
mass tort case will depend on the facts. It is certainly possible that
affording equal rights of individual participation would be impracticable.
Consider two scenarios. On one hand, if the effect of affording such rights
was to consume the resources available for compensating plaintiffs, then
the result would be self-defeating. On the other hand, if affording a right of
participation is consistent with substantially just outcomes, then the case
against such a right is much weaker. It is true that rights of participation
may impose costs, but legitimacy is the kind of value that warrants the
expenditure of significant resources.
Returning to the hypothetical, let us hypothesize that affording rights
of participation is practicable. For example, we might assume that allowing
opt-out rights, while adding costs without appreciable accuracy gains,
would not produce costs that would bankrupt the defendant or be wildly
disproportionate to the stakes involved. This hypothetical provides a test
case for the two principles of procedural justice—the Participation
Principle and the Accuracy Principle—as compared to the rival theories
offered by the accuracy model and the participation model. The two
principles would require that class members be afforded opportunities for
participation that are practicable. Both the accuracy model and the
balancing model would require that such a right be denied.
In the context of this hypothetical, the participatory legitimacy thesis
provides reasons of political morality to affirm the two principles and reject
its rivals. Does this result cohere with our intuitions and considered
judgments about the hypothetical? Readers must answer this question for
themselves. My guess is that many readers will agree that participation is
required for legitimacy under these circumstances. But I am also certain
that readers strongly committed to consequentialist theories, such as
welfarism or utilitarianism, will reject the conclusion that practicable
participation is required as a matter of procedural justice for situations in
which its costs exceed its benefits. I might ask these readers the following
question: do you have any reason for denying the right to practicable
participation that does not depend on some version of the controversial
proposition that only consequences count? If not, then the argument may
reach a dialectical impasse at precisely this point.
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C. STRUCTURING AGGREGATION TO ALLOW PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
One of the lessons of the mandatory class action hypothetical is that
rights of participation are not necessarily inconsistent with aggregation.
Individualized litigation is not the only alternative to aggregation. There are
a variety of modalities of participation that are consistent with technologies
of aggregation. Briefly, these modalities include the following:
• Opt-out rights. We can allow absent class members to opt out
and pursue individual litigation.
• Participation rights. We can allow class members to enter an
appearance in a class action. The Participation Principle does
not require that these participation rights be attached to a right
to hold out (that is, to veto settlement or other agreements
between the class representatives and other parties).
• Certification hearings. Even if class members are not allowed to
participate directly in the litigation, it may nonetheless be
practicable to provide a right to participate in the class
certification process, including, for example, the right (1) to
argue for a more limited class definition, (2) to advocate the
creation of subclasses, or (3) to argue against the adequacy of
representation.
• Settlement hearings. If a class action settles, raising familiar
questions about conflicts of interest between class counsel and
class members, absent class members can be given rights of
participation in settlement hearings.
• Issue hearings. The concept of allowing limited participation by
class members in specific hearings need not be confined to
certification and settlement. At crucial stages of the litigation,
class members could be afforded the right to submit written
briefs, make oral presentations, and even to present evidence.
The enumeration of exemplary modalities of participation helps dissolve a
false dichotomy—the choice between individual litigation with maximal
rights of individual participation and aggregation without any rights of
individual participation at all. The participatory legitimacy thesis requires
meaningful participation, but it does not require individualized litigation.
As Michael Saks and Peter Blanck conclude, “When well done, the
aggregated trial does not deny any of the instrumental values of due
process, particularly from the viewpoint of defendants. Moreover, the value
of procedural participation, central to legitimate judicial process, is not
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necessarily compromised in aggregated trials for either class members or
defendants.”344
D. AGGREGATION IF PARTICIPATION RIGHTS ARE IMPRACTICABLE
There may be actual cases in which individual rights of participation
in any meaningful form are impracticable. In these cases, the principles of
procedural justice permit participationless mandatory aggregation—as
would the accuracy model and the participation model. It might be argued,
however, that these special cases undermine the participatory legitimacy
thesis. We can express this argument in the form of a dilemma. The first
horn of the dilemma is based on the premise that the participatory
legitimacy thesis implies that aggregation without participation is always
illegitimate. If this premise is true—the argument continues—then the
Participation Principle is incorrect and should be modified by deleting the
Impracticability Proviso. The second horn of the dilemma is based on the
opposite premise that the participatory legitimacy thesis implies that
aggregation with participation is sometimes legitimate. If this premise is
true—the next step of the argument would go—then it undermines the
participatory legitimacy thesis itself. If a binding decision can be legitimate
without participation for reasons of practicability, then such decisions can
also be justified by other practical considerations, such as accuracy and
cost.
Although the dilemma expresses a real concern, it relies on false
assumptions. The first horn of the dilemma assumes that aggregation
without participation is always illegitimate, but this assumption is incorrect.
Normative legitimacy, like other normative concepts, does not demand the
impossible or the impracticable. Moreover, legitimacy is not an “all or
nothing” concept. Procedures with full rights of participation may confer a
greater degree of legitimacy, but procedures with minimal participation still
confer some legitimacy. The second horn of the dilemma assumes that
impracticability (as a ground for denying rights of participation) cannot be
distinguished from accuracy and cost. This assumption is also false.
Impracticability as a reason for denying rights of participation is
substantially different that marginal improvements in accuracy or cost.
When rights of participation are impracticable, there is, in theory, a
choice for the design of a system of civil adjudication. One option is to
require impracticable participation and, hence, to deny rights by making
344.

Saks & Blanck, supra note 338, at 830.
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remedial procedures unavailable. This option is unattractive both because it
produces inaccurate outcomes and because the rights of participation it
affords are illusory. The other option is to adopt participationless
procedures that provide the most accurate outcome available at a
reasonable cost. The theory of procedural justice embodied in the
Participation Principle requires the second option. When participation is
impracticable, then accuracy and cost should shape procedural design.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The real work of procedure is to guide conduct. It is sometimes said
that the regulation of primary conduct is the work of the general and
abstract norms of substantive law—clauses of the constitution, statutes,
regulations, and common law rules of tort, property, and contract. But
substance cannot effectively guide primary conduct without the aid of
procedure. This is true because of three problems: (1) the problem of
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. The solution
to these problems is particularization by a system of dispute resolution—in
other words, a system of procedure. A theory of procedural justice is a
theory about the fairness of the institutions that do the job of
particularization.
A theory of procedural justice must answer two problems. The easy
problem of procedural justice is to produce accurate outcomes at a
reasonable cost. Of course, what is easy in theory may be difficult in
practice. A very high order of art and science may be required to design
actual systems of civil adjudication that achieve accuracy at a reasonable
cost while minimizing collateral violations of substantive rights. But the
practical problems of procedural architecture should not obscure the
obvious: procedural justice aims at accuracy and efficiency. In the abstract,
these goals are shared by both the theorists and practitioners of procedural
design.
The hard problem of procedural justice marks the point at which
consensus about shared goals gives way to controversy. The hard problem
of procedural justice goes deep. Procedural justice is necessarily imperfect
because perfect accuracy is unattainable and approaching the unattainable
would be unjustifiably costly. The fact of irreducible procedural error is
that even the best system of civil procedure that human ingenuity can
design will make mistakes. This fact gives rise to the hard problem of
procedural justice. How can litigants who will be finally bound by a
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mistaken judgment regard themselves as under an obligation to comply
with the judgment? Framing the hard question of procedural justice
suggests the key to the answer. The participatory legitimacy thesis makes
clear what outcome reductionism obscures: because a right of participation
must be afforded to those bound by judicial proceedings in order for those
proceedings to serve as a legitimate source of authority, the value of
participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation
on outcomes; nor can the value of participation be reduced to a subjective
preference or feeling of satisfaction.
Solving the hard problem of procedural justice clears the way for the
formulation of principles of procedural justice. The Participation Principle
requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes be
structured to provide each interested party with a right to adequate
participation. The Accuracy Principle requires that the arrangements for the
resolution of civil disputes be structured to maximize the chances of
achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding. Together, the
two principles provide guidance where guidance is needed, both for the
architects of procedural design and reform and for judges who apply
general procedural rules to particular cases.
A theory of procedural justice is one thing; the practice of procedural
design and application is another. We are tempted to sacrifice procedural
fairness on the altar of substantive advantage. This temptation is strong and
persistent—after all, much good can be done. Desirable outcomes can be
reached and costs can be minimized. We can easily rationalize the sacrifice
of procedural justice from a consequentialist perspective. The measurable
marginal benefits of participationless procedure may exceed the marginal
costs. In the end, however, these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure
without justice sacrifices legitimacy. Law without legitimacy can only
guide action through force and fear. Procedure without participation may
command obedience, but it cannot win principled allegiance. When we
sacrifice procedural justice on the altar of substantive advantage, we risk a
very great evil. But when we regard ourselves as bound by the principles of
procedural justice, we produce a very great good—we give citizens a
principled reason to respect the outcomes of civil process.
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